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
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PREFACE

This study has been prepared by the Georgetown Research Project, a Department of the Atlantic Research Corporation, under contract to the Air Force Office of Scientific Research. Its purpose is to investigate actual and potential crisis and conflict situations in the African theatre which are germane to U.S. national security interests and objectives. Within this limited framework the study undertakes to project major crisis and conflict potentials which can be anticipated in the course of the next ten years.

In order to provide the necessary background for the investigation, the study first presents an analysis of the elements which bear upon U.S. security interests in Africa. This analysis indicates that the military geography of Africa, in particular its transportation geography, points to the significant role of the U.S. Air Force in the overall objective of safeguarding U.S. security interests on the African continent.

The interrelated military, political, cultural, and economic factors which can lead to domestic and international conflicts in Africa are then examined with the emphasis on U.S. security interests. These factors are discussed from a regional perspective and subsequently from a functional approach. Each regional and functional analysis concludes with an identification of potential future crisis and conflicts and their implications for U.S. security interests.

None of the findings of this report are startling in the sense that they point to any crisis and conflict situation which as such has escaped attention altogether. However, in the large volume of literature on African problems, no comprehensive examination exists of the implications for U.S. security interests of these crisis and conflict situations. The present study attempts to fill this vacuum. It also points to certain problem areas which deserve further research in order to provide the military planner with a more definitive basis for his deliberations. Cases in point are the impact of tribalism on nation-building, and factors inhibiting U.S. air mobilities throughout the continent, e.g., overflight and landing rights.

The study is based entirely on unclassified sources, including British, French, and African publications. The opinions expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the Air Force Office of Scientific Research or of any other agency of the U.S. Government.

Hans W. Weigert
Director
Georgetown Research Project

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SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS

This report of "Africa and U.S. National Security" focuses on domestic and international crisis and conflict potentials in Africa which may affect U.S. interests. As background for the study, U.S. and other foreign interests in Africa are defined and some of the principal historical determinants of African instability are examined. The discussion then deals with the potential conflicts in the major African regions. Subsequently, the various factors which influence the stability of the continent are analyzed on a functional basis. The several regional and functional analyses conclude with a series of implications for U.S. security interests. These findings are summarized here, reorganized and amplified only for purposes of clarity.

A. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. INTERESTS OF DOMESTIC CONFLICT POTENTIALS IN AFRICAN STATES

1. Northeast Africa

As a region of strategic significance to the United States, a conflict in the Horn would adversely affect U.S. security interests. For the near future, however, the domestic conflict potentials in this region are low. The internal situation in Somali does not by itself contain any greatly disruptive issues. Somali's continued domestic stability, however, is closely related to the pan-Somali question. If pan-Somalism were to suffer a decided setback, the ensuing domestic crisis would invite radical African and Communist interference in the internal affairs of the Republic. Somali's expansionist aims have particularly important implications for U.S. interests in the peace and order of the region and are, therefore, discussed in the section dealing with international conflict potentials.

While there are distinct signs of internal unrest in Ethiopia, a serious upheaval appears unlikely as long as the emperor lives. In view of the close relations which the United States has with the present regime, its continued viability is important to the United States. The emperor is one of the more stable African rulers. His influence, which has a moderating effect, carries weight in inter-African councils. Should a domestic struggle for power in the wake of the emperor's death bring a more radical regime into power, it would have a negative impact on the U.S. military presence in Ethiopia, it would upset the region's delicate balance, and remove a major moderating force in inter-African affairs. For these reasons, Ethiopia's unresolved problem of succession has direct implications for U.S. interests in Ethiopia as well as in the rest of the continent.

2. Northern Africa

The interests of the United States in the domestic and regional stability of northern Africa reflect primarily the need to insure the continued independence and non-alignment of the north African states in cold war issues. The danger to the United States here lies in the possibility that the Soviet Union will abet internal political divisions and capitalize on the eruption of a domestic crisis. With the exception of the Sudan, however, the internal crisis potentials of northern African states are relatively low. In the Sudan, the unresolved schism between the Moslem Arab north and the animist Negroid and Nilotic south continues to produce the most explosive situation of the region. Should the present Sudanese regime fail to contain the secession movement in the south, a civil war may result which will have repercussions for the order of the entire region.

The other states present currently a stable political picture, but each carries the seeds of domestic unrest. Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia face the prospect of rapid social change, but in case of an internal crisis, France would be more affected than the United States. Libya is confronted with the problem of succession. Should a new regime move toward the more radical left, Libya will become an extremely difficult host for the U.S. military base there. Egypt has severe population pressures and serious economic problems. Its military establishment depends on Soviet aid. But compared to the large Soviet military and economic assistance programs in Egypt, Communist influence in Egypt's internal affairs has been marginal. The Nasser regime has remained sufficiently in control to contain domestic disorders.

3. Western Africa

United States interests in the western region center primarily on Nigeria and Liberia. The domestic conflict potential of Nigeria remains one of the highest of the entire African continent. Whether Nigeria can survive the present conflict between its northern Moslem tribes and its southern Christian and animist Ibos and Yorubas, and whether it can preserve its territorial and national integrity, is far from certain. United States military intervention appears unlikely, although assistance with rescue operations of persecuted minorities or white citizens may be possible. In any event, the United States can no longer depend on Nigeria as an exponent of democratic development and as a stabilizing force in inter-African councils.

President William V. S. Tubman's regime remains firmly in control of Liberian affairs, but the problem of succession is vexing. The highly personalized and autocratic rule of Tubman suggests that a transition will be accompanied by unrest and disorder. Since Tubman's party has no serious political rivals, a successor government will

probably retain similar close ties with the United States. On the other hand, the possibility exists of a coup by members of the military and the elite, who are increasingly dissatisfied with Tubman's conservative domestic and foreign policies. Such a development may lead to a more radically inclined regime, which would adversely affect U.S. interests in Liberia.

While ethnic conflicts and tensions exist in varying degrees in the other states and the usual problems germane to developing African countries are present, most governments appear relatively stable. In these states, moreover, either France or Great Britain have a pre-dominant role. This does not mean that the United States has no interests at all in the domestic stability and development of these states. United States objectives in Africa have been promoted by the generally moderate attitudes of most French speaking states. The United States has also been concerned with Communist incursions in Guinea and Mali which provide the opportunity for extending Communist influence into other areas. But, on the whole, any sudden change in the domestic balance of power in these states will affect France and Britain more deeply than the United States.

4. Equatorial Africa

Essential to U.S. interests in equatorial Africa is the development of a stable and moderate government in the former Belgian Congo and the emergence of a reliable security force there capable of dealing with internal and external threats. None of the Congolese regimes so far, including the present Mobutu Government, has made significant headway towards forging a nation out of the numerous disparate and often opposing ethnic groups. Nor has an effective and politically reliable domestic security force been created. Rebel groups remain active in the northeastern provinces. A major threat to the life of the current government in Leopoldville continues to be the exiled former Prime Minister Moise Tshombe and his supporters in Katanga. Since Tshombe is identified in African opinion with "western imperialism," the Mobutu regime may well start an anti-Western, if not anti-American, campaign in order to strengthen its position both at home and in other African circles. On the other hand, should Tshombe attempt another comeback to the Congo, the result may well be an international conflict with some of the neighboring states, such as Congo-Br., Tanzania, and Uganda, opposing the efforts of the former Prime Minister. The center of Africa will continue, therefore, to be a source of concern for the United States.

None of the domestic problems in other countries have such direct implications for the United States. In Kenya, leftwing Oginga Odinga has been removed from the political scene. In Tanzania, the government appears stable and has become more moderate, in spite of Communist China's aid program. Rwanda and Burundi continue to be scenes of tribal

dissidence, but U.S. interest in these countries is marginal. The presence of Chinese Communists in Tanzania has more relevance for the liberation movements of southern Africa, than for the domestic affairs of Tanzania. Internal security in Chad and Cameroon remains limited at best. But should an upheaval occur in either state, France would experience the major impact of instability. The same applies to other parts of west central Africa. Should a more radical regime replace the moderate leadership in Chad, Cameroon, Gabon, or the Central African Republic, U.S. interests would be indirectly affected inasmuch as this weakens the moderate group in inter-African councils.

5. Southern Africa

A compelling question in this region from a U.S. point of view is the problem of white minority domination. In the ten year time frame of this study, however, the southern region will retain its general political stability. Neither a significant change in racial relations, nor an organized rebellion in South Africa seems likely. To a lesser extent this is true for the colonial territories, and even for Rhodesia. With respect to the latter state, Great Britain has the primary responsibility for settling the Rhodesian problem. United States involvement will remain limited to facilitating the implementation of economic sanctions, imposing an embargo on arms from the United States, and helping to alleviate the economic effects on Rhodesia's black neighbors, for example, by an airlift of oil to Zambia. The only important question confronting the United States is the South West Africa problem. The decision of the World Court on South West Africa will probably lead to increased pressures on the United States by the Afro-Asian states, either directly or through the United Nations, to deprive the Republic of South Africa of its mandate over the territory. But in the near future, developments in the southern region are not likely to have serious or direct implications for U.S. security interests.

In the long run, the situation in the southern area can trigger political and emotional upheavals, based on the racial issue, which will jeopardize the peace and stability in Africa, and which will have serious repercussions throughout the world. While it is highly unlikely that a U.N. force would be created to intervene against a white southern African regime, some kind of multilateral effort may be necessary to end a racially oriented flareup. A multilateral operation would probably require U.S. logistical support. Because of the psychological and symbolic elements involved, a racial conflict will offer irresistible attractions for exploitation by the Communists. Unlike the United States, the Communist nations do not need to maintain relations with Portugal, Rhodesia, and South Africa. They can pledge unconditional support to the liberation movements and express complete condemnation of the white minority regimes. In this regard the image of the United States in Africa and Asia will decline because of the understandable reluctance to take stronger action against white supremacy. For all these reasons developments in southern Africa can profoundly affect U.S. national security concerns.

6. The Military Coups d'Etat

The implications for U.S. interests of the military coups depend on the significance of the coup state to the United States and on the relative power positions and characteristics of the ousted head of state and the new military leader.

The coups in Dahomey, Upper Volta, and the Central African Republic only affect the general U.S. interest in African stability because of the relatively small importance of the countries concerned.

The coup and countercoup in Nigeria precipitated such violence that this may result in a civil war. An internationalization of this crisis could involve the United States just as the rebellion in the Congo caused a resort to the U.S.-Belgian rescue mission.

The coup in Congo-L, a state of strategic importance and great mineral wealth, brought initially the promise of domestic stability. Whether Mobutu can impose lasting law and order on the rival political groups and turn the factionalized army into a reliable security force, remains to be seen. His anti-Belgian measures threaten to deprive him of desperately needed civil and military aid. It is unlikely that the United States will fill this void. Moreover, his anti-western, if not anti-American, campaign is liable to deepen tensions and to set back U.S. objectives in the Congo.

The coups in Ghana and Algeria removed two of the most militantly anti-western leaders and chronic revolutionary meddlers in African affairs. They were replaced by military men prepared to cooperate with the West and to maintain cordial relations with the rest of Africa. A more receptive climate for U.S. policies emerged which may spread to other areas and to the Organization of African Unity. In addition, two major centers of Communist subversion were closed.

The military coup d'etat as a phenomenon has also more subtle implications for U.S. interests. First, for the time being at least, military regimes tend to assure domestic stability. Secondly, most black African officers are usually conservative in international affairs in the sense that they discourage foreign military and political adventures. They are also inclined to oppose diversification of military assistance sources, which at least in sub-Saharan Africa tends to limit military relationships with Communist powers. The United States may expect for the near future that military regimes will pursue a generally moderate policy in African affairs and a western oriented policy in matters of military aid.

The short term effect of the military coups of 1965-66 was thus not harmful to U.S. security interests inasmuch as civilian governments were overthrown which did not offer the prospect of social and political development and which were as a rule hostile to western policies.

The long range effects of past and possible future coups on the states involved and U.S. security interests are more difficult to appraise. In the interest of order and efficiency, army rule tends to limit popular political participation. If political freedom continues to be suppressed, the stability and order imposed by the military is liable to become arbitrary and even tyrannical, and would begin to erode as soon as army rule weakens. Hence military rule may eventually defeat the very objective of stability it hoped to achieve and which U.S. policy favors.

Social and political development are the primary goals of U.S. policies in emergent nations throughout the world. Because army rule tends to suppress the free interplay of political, social, and frequently also economic forces, military regimes in Africa are not the best instruments that can further such development. For this reason the countries in which military governments have been installed require continued U.S. attention.

B. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. INTERESTS OF INTER-AFRICAN STABILITY AND INSTABILITY POTENTIALS

1. Inter-African Organizations and Alignments

The importance of inter-African organizations and alignments to U.S. security interests lies in their potential to reduce inter-African tensions and to reconcile conflicting objectives and policies of their members. Inter-African cooperation is most often found among formal and informal regional groups. In the short run, therefore, the existence of the smaller organizations and alignments have more relevance for U.S. interests than the continent-wide Organization of African Unity (OAU).

The tendency of African states is to separate into moderate and radical camps and a more or less neutral third group. The more moderate stance of the French speaking states in the Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache (OCAM) and the earlier Brazzaville group has usually been in harmony with U.S. interests. Their readiness to preserve the territorial status quo and their hostility to foreign interference in domestic affairs have contributed to African stability. OCAM, for example, was partly created to oppose collectively Ghanaian and Chinese Communist subversion. The willingness of the moderate states to compromise has reduced inter-African tensions. Their desire to maintain close ties with the former metropole corresponds with the U.S. concept of encouraging European assistance in the development of Africa. Their generally friendly relations with the West have promoted U.S. security objectives in Africa as a whole.

In contrast, the efforts of the states allied in the radical wing of the OAU and the former Casablanca bloc have usually adversely affected U.S. security objectives. Their militantly anti-colonial views

led them to form their alignments partly in order to oppose regimes which continue to maintain ties with the former metropole. Their inclination to intervene in the domestic affairs of such a state has exacerbated frictions and intensified disorder. In the Congo crisis, for example, the radical states actively supported the rebels in the hope of overthrowing the Tshombe government which they regarded as a colonial puppet regime. Their anti-colonial positions, moreover, incline them to find their allies in the East. Conversely, the tendency of the Communist powers to support the members of the radical group has strengthened their position vis-a-vis the western nations and has been a restraining factor in U.S. policies in Africa.

African membership in the Commonwealth is important to the United States inasmuch as Britain retains an influence in African affairs. The possibility that African Commonwealth members can call on each other or on non-African members for military assistance reduces the likelihood of U.S. intervention in a conflict situation. Although the Commonwealth as such exercises a restraining influence in African affairs, its general ineffectiveness in African conflicts limits its value for the United States as an instrument of African stability.

For the same reason the continent-wide OAU is of relatively little importance to U.S. security. Unless its members are already predisposed to compose their differences outside the framework of the OAU, the Organization is incapable of settling such disputes. The cleavage between radicals and moderates in Africa makes itself felt within the OAU and has prevented it from solving major conflicts. When the radicals were able to dominate the OAU, its resolutions and policies aggravated, rather than alleviated, tensions. In the 1964 Congo crisis, for example, the actions of the OAU Ad Hoc Committee had the effect of strengthening the position of the rebels which precipitated direct U.S. and Belgian intervention. Although the balance within the OAU has recently swung in favor of the moderate group, the continuing split prevents the organization from taking concerted action. The walkout of radical members in protest against the seating of the delegation of Ghana's new military regime, is a case in point.

As experience has shown, neither the moderates nor the radicals have succeeded in forming a harmonious and enduring group. The result is not necessarily a permanent fragmentation of the OAU. In the long run, the OAU may become an institution to which the United States can look for the solution of African problems by Africans. But in the time frame of this study the ability of independent Africa to meet its own security problems through the mechanism of the OAU is sharply reduced by the conflicting interests and ideologies of its members. Africa is more likely to solve its security and development problems in the context of regional alignments or organizations.

2. The Distribution of Military Power in Africa

The implications for U.S. security of the African military structure lie in its generally restraining effect on inter-African conflict situations.

Continental Structure: The distribution of military power capabilities on the continent shows a vacuum between the Mediterranean littoral and the white controlled southern region. Independent black African countries south of the Sahara lack the capabilities to launch an armed offensive against white ruled countries in the south. In addition, logistical factors argue against such a move by north African states. An armed conflict between the white dominated states in the south and the rest of Africa is therefore remote.

Regional Structures: Within black sub-Saharan Africa, military imbalances between individual states do not have much significance for inter-African conflict. The limitations of their military power capabilities make resort to conventional war highly unlikely, even if a relative superiority of one state over the other exists.

In the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia's military superiority acts as a stabilizing factor inasmuch as it prevents Somali from implementing its irredentist aims with armed force.

In northern Africa, however, Algeria's current military buildup has deepened tensions and produced an incipient arms race among the states of the region.

3. Liberation Movements

The activities of the exiled liberation groups, which aim at overthrowing the white governments in their home states, do not have immediate implications for U.S. security interests. With the exception of PAIGC, the rebel movement in Portuguese Guinea, these groups have failed to achieve the necessary unity of effort, external support, and internal reception required for successful operations against the white regimes. The Soviet Union has been reluctant to assist revolutionary groups in any decisive measure if they do not have prospects of quick success. Communist China provides training and arms assistance through its centers in Dar es Salaam and Congo-Brazzaville. Splits within the liberation movements, however, have reduced their overall effect. The highly successful countermeasures of the white regimes have further limited the capability of the liberation movements to gain headway in the target countries.

PAIGC is the only group which has achieved a degree of success. The implications for the United States lie in the possibility that its insurgency may spark an international conflict between Portugal and the states adjacent to Portuguese Guinea which provide covert support to the

rebel movement. Should PAIGC, moreover, manage to oust the Portuguese, its leadership would provide an extremely radical regime in Portuguese Guiana. Such a regime would encourage liberation movements in Angola and Mozambique. Its presence in west Africa would also intensify instability potentials in the more moderate French speaking states. For this reason the United States will have to follow closely the developments in the Portuguese colony.

In the long run, the existence of the liberation movements and the pledge of the OAU to support their aims, threaten the stability of the southern region. Serious insurgency would jeopardize order and economic development. Although the initiative of the liberation efforts comes from the Africans themselves, the Communist nations can be expected to capitalize on the disruption and chaos that will accompany such endeavors.

The United States faces a particular dilemma on this point. On the one hand, successful containment of the insurgent movements serves inter-African stability and order. On the other hand, failure of the liberation movements to obtain support from western or neutral sources causes them to invite Communist support. The dilemma for the United States is rendered more difficult where the efforts of liberation movements are directed against its NATO ally, Portugal. The U.S. interest in the military base on the Azores further complicates U.S. policies on the issue of Portuguese colonialism.

4. Border Conflicts

As far as predictions permit, the general issue of Africa's artificial borders will become progressively less important in U.S. security calculations. With the exception of two specific border claims, boundary rectifications are not likely to be made by force.

The Morocco-Algeria and the Ethiopia-Somali-Kenya border disputes do have an exceptionally high conflict potential. Particularly in the Horn intermittent local fighting can be expected to continue. The implications for U.S. security interests of a possible eruption of either dispute into armed hostilities are serious, since the confrontations would occur in highly strategic locations. Moreover, the defense installations of the United States in Morocco and Ethiopia have created a special U.S. concern with their national security.

The possibility of escalation into a conflict of international dimensions remains. Egypt may well repeat its 1963 performance of rallying to Algeria's aid. Chances are remote for direct Soviet intervention on behalf of Algeria and Somali or for a decisive increase in Soviet military assistance to either. The Soviet Union would reap extremely limited benefits from such action. Communist support is more likely to be rendered through an intermediary state, and through Egypt

in particular. It can be expected, however, that the Soviet Union will continue to keep conflict potentials alive in these disputed border areas.

5. Inter-State Subversion

When directed against a state which features prominently in U.S. security considerations, subversive activities of African states can profoundly affect U.S. security interests. Through their support of exiled opposition or rebel movements, unrest in the target country is intensified. If subversive efforts take the form of providing military advisers and guerrilla troops to insurgent groups, the viability of the target government is directly threatened and the conflict situation can assume international proportions. For example, had Algeria acted upon its promise to send guerrilla fighters to aid the rebels in the Congo, the military situation there would have seriously deteriorated, which could have drawn the United States further into the vortex of Congolese disorders.

Inasmuch as radical states shelter and support exiled dissident groups as a means of overthrowing moderate governments, Communist powers have relatively easy access to these groups. The threat of inter-state subversion to U.S. interests lies, therefore, also in the opportunities it presents for Communist infiltration of banned opposition movements. Sino-Soviet rivalry compounds U.S. security problems in this respect when the need to pre-empt Chinese Communist influence prompts the Soviet Union to take more militant action.

With the political demise of Nkrumah and Ben Bella, two of the most ardent advocates of subversive warfare, and with Nasser increasingly occupied with Middle Eastern problems, the major remaining threat of inter-African subversion centers currently in Congo-Br. Although Congo-Br.'s capabilities will necessarily limit the scope of its subversive activities, of special concern to the United States are the operations of Chinese Communist agents in Brazzaville among banned opposition movements. For this reason the challenge of inter-state subversion to U.S. interests in African stability remains.

C. PARAMOUNT CONFLICT SITUATIONS

Reduced to essentials, the actual and potential conflict factors in Africa which can have direct implications for U.S. security interests are the existing rebellion in the southern Sudan, the current tribal dissidence in Nigeria, and the precarious domestic stability in Congo-L. The Ethiopia-Somali-Kenya and Morocco-Algeria border disputes remain high on the list of issues which influence U.S. security calculations in Africa. The threat emanating from Brazzaville, as a center of inter-state and Communist subversion, is another factor which influences U.S. security considerations.

Actual or potential conflict situations which indirectly affect U.S. security interests are the continued insurgency activities in the Cameroon, the ethnic tensions in Chad, and the controversy over Rhodesia's unilateral assumption of independence.

In the long run the succession problems in Ethiopia and Liberia will have direct implications for U.S. security interests in Africa, while the issue of white supremacy in the southern region and in the remaining Portuguese and Spanish enclaves will assume increasingly serious proportions for U.S. security concerns.

CHAPTER I

UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN AFRICA

As background for this study of actual and potential crisis and conflict situations in Africa which are germane to U.S. interests, the present chapter analyzes the various elements which comprise and bear upon these interests. The first section deals with the geographic, and in particular locational, factors which contribute to the geopolitical significance of Africa to U.S. security interests. Subsequently, U.S. security objectives and policies are discussed as identified in public statements of leading U.S. officials. Such statements are essentially guideposts for U.S. relations with African states and can be influenced by the policies of the European allies of the United States, particularly by the policies of Britain, France, Portugal, and Spain which have important interests in Africa antedating the involvement of the United States in African destinies. It is therefore necessary to include a limited discussion of western European powers in Africa to the extent that they bear upon U.S. objectives.

In recent years, the involvement in African affairs by the Soviet Union, Communist China, and their allies, has become a major factor in the power struggle over Africa. Communist interests will frequently conflict or compete with U.S. and other western interests. Hence, Soviet and Chinese interests and objectives in Africa are also covered in this chapter.

Another important element which bears upon U.S. policies in Africa is the participation of the United Nations. The extent to which the activities of the United Nations affect U.S. security interests in Africa is therefore reviewed.

A. LOCATIONAL FACTORS

1. The Continent of Africa and the Power Centers

Various geographers in viewing the inhabited world as a unit, have focused on the "heartland" centering in the great land mass of Eurasia with the remainder of the habitable areas as a "marginal crescent" or "rimlands." While the location and extent of the heartland and the relative position of the rimlands may vary in differing concepts, the essentials -- that there is a heartland in central east Asia where about 40% of the world's population lives and which continues to exert outward pressures on the rimlands -- appear to be generally accepted among western geographers.¹ Africa, especially the area south of the Sahara, lies on the outermost perimeter of this "heartland" with only northern Africa closely associated with a portion of the European rim-

land. The Indian and Atlantic Oceans separate Africa from the four centers of world population: eastern Asia; the Indian subcontinent; Europe; and eastern north America.²

Africa except for the Mediterranean littoral, in all these views, has been peripheral to the mainstream of human events. Whereas Mackinder spoke of the great spheres of the East and West as dominating the globe, he saw Africa and south America as "vacancies."³ In order to see Africa's geopolitical relevance, the continent should be viewed in terms of its relationship to the power centers of world affairs -- one in the "heart-land" and the other in the "outer oriented rimlands," all of which lie north of Africa.

2. The Significance of Africa in the Containment Policy

When in the years after the Second World War the Soviet Union extended its hegemony over eastern Europe and when subsequently a Communist regime acceded to power in China, the United States and its allies responded with the development of a global strategy calling for a defensive perimeter which would create a political and geographical blockade against further Communist incursions. Aggression was to be halted wherever it occurred.

Out of this strategy grew a series of regional alliances supplemented and strengthened by a pattern of western operational bases along the perimeter which became known as the outposts of the Free World and which were actually potential arenas for future direct confrontations with the Soviet Union or Communist China.⁴ Direct and quick access to these areas, whether it be at Berlin or the Iranian border, became vitally important. The uninterrupted use of sea and air routes leading to the network of western bases along the entire perimeter became a requirement. If there was to be a global "firebrigade," the streets had to be clear to get to the fire.

It was a happy circumstance of geography that the United States and its allies found themselves in control of the strategic areas of the world which permitted this freedom of movement. On the other hand, the Communist powers were severely handicapped in their efforts to deny this accessibility because they lacked control of these areas.⁵ The western allies were able to shift their strategic power to meet Soviet or Chinese concentrations wherever the Communists attempted to break out of their perimeters. This containment policy continues to depend on control of the air and seas around the periphery and on the maintenance of adequate naval and air establishments with the necessary land forces on forward bases to confront hostile forces at any point of the perimeter.

The Soviet buildup of its stockpile of nuclear weapons placed on the United States and its allies an additional requirement to maintain a retaliatory force capable of surviving any initial attack. This force, made virtually impregnable to surprise attack through site-hardening, dispersal, and airborne alert, has created a situation of nuclear deterrence.

While the development of intermediate and long range missiles, including the development of nuclear submarines in the United States and the Soviet Union, have reduced dependence on aircraft and airbases for a retaliatory force, there is nevertheless a continuing need for aircraft and their supporting bases in the time frame of this study.

Central to meeting locational requirements for strategic containment and retaliation is the role of northern Africa. To the extent that the requirement exists for airbases, northern Africa will be of importance to the United States. In a testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee, the Secretary of Defense stated: "The African areas of most immediate strategic concern to the United States are those bordering on the Mediterranean and in the Horn. The former guards the southern flank of NATO and the latter stands at the approaches to the Red Sea".⁶ Twenty-five modern air bases and commercial airfields, principally the Wheelus Air Force Base⁷ could backup the forward air bases located in western Europe and serve as dispersal recovery areas in the event of sudden attack. Because they border on the Mediterranean and are protected by the Sahara desert, these air bases are relatively easy to defend from external attack.

3. The Mediterranean-Suez-Red Sea Route

Marginal seas and narrow straits have had great influence on world strategy throughout history. These shipping lanes converge and sea traffic is slowed and congested at the entrance and exit. Such areas have traditionally been subject to military conquest, by sea or air interdiction and by political incursions. The Mediterranean-Suez-Red Sea route is one of the most travelled of these restricted passages because of its location between Middle East oil fields and markets and because it has linked the European powers with colonial holdings in Asia. The Mediterranean itself also serves now as a vital link to north African oil and to the southern tier of NATO backing onto the eastern Mediterranean.

A disruption of the Suez artery either by political or military means -- and the latter either through military occupation or threat of bombing -- would interfere with western peripheral defensive operations under conditions short of general war.⁸

Middle East pipelines and the development of major oil reserves in Libya and the Maghreb have reduced European dependence on the Suez Canal to some extent. To reach the Red Sea and Persian Gulf areas through the Mediterranean is no longer of crucial importance to the western powers, unless their forces are committed to action in the Far East in which case the increased shipping time around the Cape would intensify difficulties of support.

Continued freedom of movement in the Mediterranean is of much greater significance to western Europe and, thereby, to the United States than unrestricted use of the Suez Canal. The Mediterranean

provides vital internal communications for the defense of western Europe. The Mediterranean is secure so long as northern Africa remains in friendly hands or as a minimum remains free of Communist domination. Particularly the eastern Mediterranean is important to the western powers inasmuch as it protects NATO's southern flank against Soviet naval elements debouching from the Black Sea.

4. Africa and Lower Levels of Conflict

As the western strategy of containment succeeded, the Communist powers sought to escape the encircling geographic blockade. One of the elements in their efforts to further their influence outside the perimeter in the developing states is to support the "wars of liberation." As defined by Premier Khrushchev in 1961, these wars were "not to be identified with local wars," but they were "popular uprisings" towards which Moscow had a "most favorable attitude." The Soviet Union would "support just wars of this kind."⁹

One can foresee within Africa in the course of the next decade various possibilities of armed conflict at lower levels of violence which will have international significance and which will be of concern to the United States. This does not mean that every crisis or conflict situation will be inspired by Communists inside Africa or by the Communist powers. There are numerous domestic and international conflict potentials in Africa which find their roots in the African environment and past. Lower levels of conflicts can be exploited by the Communist powers as a means to their objectives. These conflicts can include: direct aggression by one or more African states against another; armed insurgency supported across international boundaries; and internally supported armed insurgency involving subversion of elements within the domestic society.

5. The Importance of Air Power in Africa

An analysis of the geography and transportation infrastructure of Africa indicates the significance of air power if U.S. military forces have to be deployed in response to any of the situations described above. The role of air power is also important if U.S. forces were deployed as part of a multi-national force or if the United States would merely render logistic support to a multi-national force under U.N. or regional auspices. Essentially, U.S. force requirements are for landing rights, overflight rights, logistic bases, airbases from which support may be rendered, etc.

The great distances over which military operations in Africa might take place is of profound concern to military planners. A few statistics will serve to illustrate this characteristic. Africa is enormous enough

to contain within its borders the combined land masses of the United States, India, Japan, Europe, and New Zealand and still have room left for Communist China. The Nile River from its headwaters in central Africa flows for 3,300 miles (1,000 miles further than the entire Mississippi) before it reaches the Aswan Dam which is 700 miles from the sea. If two C-5A transports were to take off from Tunis, one bound for the North Pole and the other for South Africa, the first would reach the top of the world and begin its return to Tunis before the second arrived at Capetown after a twelve hour flight at 500 knots. Even if modern rapid transportation would be available in Africa, countries and localities would tend to become isolated from each other by natural barriers and the long distances. The lack of a modern transportation infrastructure accentuates the distance factor even more.

Ports have developed greatly since the Second World War but they have generally a limited capacity save for the very few at major cities. For example, in 1961 seventy-eight African seaports combined handled about the same tonnage as the port of New York. In some areas inland waterways provide relief, especially for movements to and from seaports. Movements inland from coastal areas would be difficult and slow unless air transportation were used.

Compared to surface means in Africa, air transportation is much better developed. Most states are served by regularly scheduled airlines and the number of jet airports is steadily increasing.¹⁰ While some areas, and northern Africa especially, possess better air facilities than others, virtually all states have the minimum essential to support some type of U.S. air operation. However, this does not mean that the United States will be able to use these facilities automatically. Rights for the use of these facilities, particularly in emergency situations, can be acquired only through political negotiation. Over-flight rights, landing and refueling rights are a major concern to U.S. planners in view of the vagaries of African politics. These problems are further complicated for U.S. planners when long distances require the adoption of "multi-staged" air lifts.

Nevertheless, to move most effectively and rapidly quantities of men and supplies over the appreciable distances to Africa and within Africa air transportation is called for. For example, for the U.N. peacekeeping operation in the Congo from 1960 to 1964 about 60% was airlifted of the approximately 118,000 troops and 18,000 tons of cargo which the United States transported to and from the Congo.¹¹

If U.S. forces -- or allied or U.N. forces which would receive U.S. logistic support -- were required for deployment in Africa, the initial

movement as well as a large part of follow-up support would be by air. Because of the vital role which air movement would play in a U.S. operation, African states assume importance for the United States according to their locations, both with respect to air routes from the United States and Europe and to possible objective areas. In the following discussion the criteria which have been used to establish relative importance of African states are: directness of available air routes from the United States through the state's airspace to possible objective areas; proximity of the state to neighboring states, and therefore its accessibility to air transportation; surface lines of communication in the state, especially seaports; and rail facilities.

The existing north African airbases have a significant, though limited, utility for air movements from the United States or intermediate U.S. bases in Western Europe to sub-Saharan objective areas. The need for inclusion of north African bases in a particular operational plan will depend on the logistics and the requirements of the particular operation. However, there are other operations in which utilization of bases in north Africa are either unnecessary for reasons of logistics or otherwise, or undesirable in view of unsolved overflight and landing problems. As far as the latter issue is concerned, the problems of unsettled overflight, landing, and refueling questions in limited warfare operations requiring U.S. air force support, apply to the entire continent. This issue requires the kind of in-depth investigation which would be beyond the scope of the present study.

A concrete example in which the United States side-stepped the sensitive issue of overflight rights over north African and west African countries was the Belgian-American rescue mission of white hostages in Stanleyville in November 1964. Political reasons dictated that U.S. planes should avoid Africa. They flew from Belgium to the British base on Ascension Island, from where they subsequently flew directly into the Congo. But not every type of operation to all parts of sub-Saharan Africa can be staged from Ascension Island. It is, moreover, less costly and much quicker to use more direct flying routes. Staging rights, or at least overflight rights of one of the northern African states are highly desirable, if not necessary, for U.S. operations in sub-Saharan Africa in the ten-year time frame of this study.

Libya, Algeria, and Morocco are conveniently located with respect to established air routes. Egypt and the Sudan would be important for possible U.S. operations in eastern Africa. The two countries are equally important to the Soviets for support of military operations since they, too, would depend largely on air transportation. Denial to the Soviet Union of the use of air routes through these countries would seriously complicate its problems of air entry into Africa.

Beyond this first tier of northern African states are other key locations within Africa. United States operations in east, central, and

southern Africa would be greatly facilitated by access to Tanzania and Mozambique. Together these two countries border on nine other states. The major ports and inland routes of Mozambique would also facilitate surface operations. Niger, Mali, Chad, Guinea, and particularly Congo-L offer expedient locations for operations in west and central Africa. Niger and Guinea provide direct access to six states each. Congo-L borders nine countries and controls together with Congo-Br. the Congo River, the largest inland waterway in equatorial Africa.

Operations in the southern African region would be greatly facilitated by access to air facilities in the Republic of South Africa, although certain airborne U.S. operations in this region could be conducted by carrier based craft. As the most developed state in Africa, the Republic possesses facilities which would be of substantial assistance to U.S. operations if the political situation would permit access. South Africa's strategic location with respect to ocean routes around the Cape further enhance its value to the United States were transit through the Suez Canal denied.

6. The Geopolitical Significance of Africa¹²

Certain basic facts of geography help to identify U.S. security interests in Africa. Africa's importance derives largely from the extent to which northern Africa can affect uninhibited use of the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean remains vital to the internal communications of NATO. The continued need for dispersal and fall back airfields for NATO aircraft further contributes to the strategic value of northern Africa. The Mediterranean-Suez-Red Sea artery is important as the shortest link between southern Europe and Asia. Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somali along the southern shores of the Mediterranean, the Suez Canal, and the Red Sea play a major role.

In the event of U.S. military operations in sub-Saharan Africa under conditions of limited and sub-limited warfare, the importance of the north African littoral and the Horn is increased. Because of the paucity of surface transportation means in Africa and the distances involved, projection of U.S. power -- or of an international force which receives U.S. logistic support -- into the interior of Africa is dependent on U.S. airlift and the availability of airbases on the periphery of Africa. Certain air facilities in the north African littoral and the Horn would greatly facilitate U.S. operations in sub-Saharan Africa. Access by air into Africa, however, is sensitive to the continued maintenance of overflight rights and rights to bases around the periphery.

The locational factors which render northern Africa and the Horn significant to the United States also make these areas of interest to the Soviet Union. This is largely borne out by the distribution of U.S. and Soviet aid in Africa. The larger part of U.S. as well as Soviet military assistance to African countries is accorded to states located in northern

Chart I - I

LOCATIONAL FACTORS OF IMPORTANCE IN GENERAL, LIMITED, AND SUB-LIMITED WAR

	1. Strategic Value	2. High transit and over-flight value	3. High Sub-limited war value	4. Major air (A) and surface (S) facilities.
<u>North and Northeast Africa</u>				
Morocco	x	x		x (A,S)
Algeria	x	x		x (A,S)
Tunisia	x			x (S)
Libya	x	x	x (6)	x (A,S)
UAR	x			x (A,S)
Sudan	x	x	x (8)	x (S)
Ethiopia	x			x (A,S)
French Somaliland	x			x (S)
Somali	x			
<u>West Africa</u>				
Senegal		x	x (5)	x (A,S)
Guinea		x	x (6)	x (A,S)
Liberia				x (S)
Ivory Coast		x	x (5)	x (S)
Dahomey				x (S)
Nigeria		x		x (A,S)
Mali		x	x (6)	
Upper Volta		x	x (6)	x (A)
Niger		x	x (8)	x (A)
<u>Equatorial and North Central Africa</u>				
Chad		x	x (6)	x (A)
Cameroon			x (7)	x (S)
CAR		x	x (5)	
Congo-Brazzaville			x (5)	x (A,S)
Congo-Leopoldville		x	x (9)	x (A,S)
Uganda			x (5)	x (A)
Tanzania		x	x (8)	x (A,S)
Kenya		x	x (5)	x (A,S)
<u>Southern Africa</u>				
Angola		x		x (A,S)
Zambia		x	x (6)	x (A,S)
Mozambique		x	x (5)	x (S)
Republic of South Africa	x	x	x (7)	x (S)

1. Strategic value in war in western Europe, Middle East, or Asian sub-continent. Western access and denial to hostile powers are important.
2. High overflight rights value, i.e., provides routes of entry into Africa with alternate egress routes for supporting military operations in sub-Saharan Africa. Western access and denial to hostile powers are important.
3. High value as sublimited war base area, i.e., provides access to five or more neighboring countries in case of sublimited warfare.
4. Has air and/or surface transportation facilities of importance for operations in a major region.

Africa and the Horn. Map I-2 and table I-2 on the following pages indicate the major recipients in Africa of U.S. military and economic aid. Soviet aid recipients are shown on table I-4 and map I-4 in the section dealing with Communist aid activities.

In addition to the northern tier of African states, certain other African states, such as Congo-L., Tanzania, and Guinea, are important to the United States either because their position offers easy access into neighboring African states or because denial of these key areas would prevent such access to an opponent of the United States and its allies.

B. UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND POLICIES IN AFRICA

A recent effort to define U.S. security objectives was undertaken by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara in his Montreal address in May 1966.¹³ His speech reached beyond the confines of strictly military posture and specific areas, but related the military interest to the broader political interest and global relationships. It is suggested that this relation be kept in mind throughout a study with a more limited objective of investigating crises and conflicts in Africa which can influence U.S. military planning.

A basic concept which Mr. McNamara emphasized was that the maintenance of an adequate military posture did not constitute "the exclusive or even primary ingredient" of U.S. national security. If the United States wished to "preserve its own intrinsic security," it had to maintain distinctive sets of relationships with three groups of states.

The first pattern of relationships involved the United States and the developing states. The United States had "to help protect those developing countries which genuinely need and request our help and which -- as essential preconditions -- are willing and able to help themselves." The second set of U.S. relations centered on those self-sustaining nations with which the United States would have to achieve a more effective partnership since they could share in peacekeeping responsibilities and in helping the less developed states. The third group of states were defined as those which might be tempted to become the adversaries of the United States.

Although Secretary McNamara's speech was couched in global terms, it provides a framework for U.S. policies in Africa. Earlier as well as later statements by U.S. officials affirm this framework.

1. United States Bilateral Relations with African States

Secretary McNamara stressed, like other ranking government officials,¹⁴ that U.S. security interests are closely tied to continued political and

Table I-2

Major Recipients in Africa of U.S. Aid¹
 (in millions of dollars)
 1948-1964

	Food for Peace Program	A.I.D. Economic Assistance	Military Assistance
Algeria.....	146.0.....	3.3.....	
Congo-L	83.7	192.1	8.8
Ethiopia	14.5	96.8	81.5
Ghana	5.7	89.9	
Guinea	18.9	27.6	
Liberia	10.3	88.3	4.7
Libya	35.3	137.7	22.5
Morocco	170.6	278.7	21.3
Nigeria	1.4	111.17
Somali Republic	4.3	34.0	
Sudan	13.1	68.3	
Tanzania	15.9	19.7	
Tunisia	179.8	210.6	19.1
UAR (Egypt) ²	715.1	169.1	

Notes: 1. The amounts listed are cumulative for the period from the inception of the program to fiscal 1964. Data are taken from U.S., Agency for International Development and Department of Defense, Proposed Mutual Defense and Development Programs FY 1966 (Washington: 1965).

2. Egypt received major U.S. economic assistance in previous years, but is no longer a recipient of major U.S. aid.

economic development of the newly independent states. To make this development possible the emerging nations need a protective shield of law and order which the United States is prepared to help maintain.

Certain conditions, however, are placed upon U.S. participation in the development process as a whole and in the construction of the security shield. An important limitation is that U.S. assistance is to be provided only upon request. A second limitation on U.S. aid stipulates that the country in question be prepared to make the primary effort itself. The partnership of the United States is contingent upon active contributions of the developing states. Closely related to the concept of self-help is the U.S. preference to provide indirect assistance rather than to become involved in the execution of the development and shielding effort.

Applied to the national security sphere, this indirect role serves to limit the types of assistance. Basic guidelines for U.S. military assistance to the recently independent states in Africa have been defined in U.S. mutual defense programs: "The U.S. programs (in Africa) are oriented, from the military standpoint, strictly to internal security and civic action projects. They are primarily designed to help control the volatile situations which threaten the stability of many recently independent nations."¹⁵

2. United States Relations in Africa with Self-Sustaining Free Nations

Those free nations which have reached the point of self-sustaining prosperity "can and should share international peacekeeping responsibilities" with the United States. Secretary McNamara urged them to take a more active role in international peacekeeping undertakings. In light of the profound concern about violence in developing regions and in view of the deep roots of western European nations in Africa, the United States expects its European allies to shoulder increased responsibilities in possible future peacekeeping operations in Africa and in assisting the newly independent African states.

The United States thus regards the maintenance of the shield to which it has committed itself as transferrable to this second group of nations and looks to them for rendering much of this security assistance. The strictly bilateral relationship between the United States and African countries is hereby converted to a trilateral one. The U.S. mutual defense program affirms that the major responsibility for military assistance to African states rests with the former metropolitan powers, while the United States intends to play "a supplementary role."¹⁶

Current U.S. policy in Africa assumes the collaboration of the western European allies in maintaining African stability and in security and development assistance. On the whole, U.S. objectives in Africa are

compatible with the interests of the western powers and harmony of effort between the United States and the former European powers can be anticipated in the next decade. However, if the present strains in the NATO alliance were carried over into African affairs, a readjustment in U.S. policy in Africa could be required and the United States may have to assume more responsibility for African stability and development. French-U.S. frictions over NATO issues may affect their relations in Africa. The Portuguese Prime Minister has referred to the inadequacy of NATO, indicating that U.S. policies in Africa were contrary to Portugal's interests.¹⁷ On the other hand, there remains a broad basis for mutual British-American cooperation in Africa.


3. United States Relations in Africa with Possible Adversaries

Secretary McNamara discussed in his Montreal speech the relations of the United States in the developing states with a third group of nations -- those who might be tempted to make themselves the opponents of the United States. Designating poverty and economic stagnation as the major problems in the developing world, he stressed the relationship between economic backwardness and the incidence of violence. Increasing violence can be expected in the poor nations even if the threat of Communist subversion did not exist.

Communist powers, however, are apt to exploit the grievances of the developing states. Regardless of their ideological differences, both Moscow and Peking consider the modernization process highly susceptible to the promotion of Communism. United States objectives in Africa of building independent, stable, and economically viable states can therefore be jeopardized by the efforts of the Soviet Union and Communist China and their allies. The extent to which their activities can intensify African conflict potentials and seriously complicate U.S. policies will be illustrated in later pages of this study.

C. WESTERN EUROPEAN INTERESTS IN AFRICA

Europe's long involvement in African affairs has conditioned its continuing political, economic, and intangible interests there. A threat of external aggression to an African state or a breakdown of domestic law and order is likely to affect the interests of the associated metropolitan state. The possible response of the European power concerned to such a threat will be influenced by a series of political considerations. The policy of the metropolitan or former metropolitan power will also depend on its military capabilities in Africa and on the type of military relationship which it has with the threatened state. Inasmuch as U.S. planning assumes the cooperation of the European allies in helping to maintain African stability, it is important to review the military interests and ties which the western European powers still retain in Africa.¹⁸



Sources: New York Times, December 24, 1965. "France's Military Role in Africa", Africa Report, Vol. 9, No.1, Jan. 1964, p. 10. David Wood, The Armed Forces of African States (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, April 1966).

1. France

France's military involvement in Africa, although still extensive, has been scaled down. By the beginning of 1966 the total number of French troops stationed in Africa was about 16,000, which included some 4,000 troops at Mers-el-Kebir and 2,000 at the Saharan test sites.¹⁹ In the course of 1966, however, some detachments in sub-Saharan states are to be withdrawn. The main bases for French troops in Africa which remain are at Dakar in Senegal, Fort Lamy in Chad, and Diego-Suarez in the Malagasy Republic.²⁰

The primary function of the French troops in sub-Saharan Africa, including the forces at the three principal bases, is to support the metropolitan Intervention Force, the Eleventh Division. The latter which is based at Pau in southwestern France and in Brittany could be deployed anywhere in Africa in accordance with agreements with France's former African colonies.

French military commitments in Africa are expressed in a variety of agreements which France has made with its former colonies except with Guinea. These range from "military technical agreements," i.e., for training and material assistance, to bilateral and multilateral defense agreements. Special agreements which provide for direct French assistance in maintaining public order are reported to exist, but the specific provisions of these are unknown. All these agreements, including the Union Africaine et Malgache Defense Agreement (UAMD) of September 1961, have created a set of interlocking military relationships, that cover almost all of the French speaking countries of Africa.

Table I-3 on the following page shows French commitments in Africa. France is committed upon request of the African nations to support seventeen African countries with military assistance (Column A), and to intervene with French forces in eleven of these (Column D), although the obligation is discretionary on the part of France. Judging from the disposition of the French forces which will remain permanently in Africa (Column E), it is reasonable to assume that France has a special military interest in the eight countries in which they are disposed.²¹ These countries must be protected since they contain the sites of facilities intended for Intervention Force use.

France has internal and external security responsibilities for French Somaliland which is still a French overseas territory. There is a French garrison at Djibouti of some 4,000 troops, including navy, air force, and gendarmerie units.

In addition, some 3,000 French officers and NCO's are serving as advisers to the armies of the French speaking African countries.

TABLE I-3

FRENCH MILITARY COMMITMENTS IN INDEPENDENT AFRICA

Country	Military Assistance Agreement	Regional Defense Agreement	Regional Defense Agreement: EDC ¹	French Bilateral Defense	Location of French Bases
	A	B	C	D	E
Algeria	x				x ²
Cameroon	x				
Central Afr. Republic	x		x	x	x
Chad	x		x	x	x
Congo-Br.	x		x	x	
Dahomey	x	x		x	
Gabon	x		x	x	
Ivory Coast	x	x		x	x
Malagasy Rep.	x			x	x
Mali	x ³				
Mauritania	x			x	x
Morocco	x				
Niger	x	x		x	x
Senegal	x			x	x
Togo	x			x	
Tunisia	x				
Upper Volta	x				

- Notes:
1. Equatorial Defense Council
 2. Includes the Saharan test sites
 3. Mali has received financial aid

2. Britain

Overall British objectives in Africa can be stated in terms similar to the pronouncements of American government officials. In the words of one British observer, British goals in Africa are to ensure the development of "peaceful, stable, and prosperous" states. "The interest of 'defending' the area from 'Communism' in so far as it is realistic at all is entirely secondary. If Communism could provide peace, stability and prosperity in the area we would profit as much as anyone by its dissemination; but we have good reason to suppose that the pragmatic capitalism of the West has a great deal more to offer it than the theological dogmatism of Moscow or Peking."²²

Direct British military interests in Africa are not as formally defined as those of France. They fall within the context of overall British defense policy which has been defined as: to avoid major operations of war except in cooperation with allies; to refuse rendering military assistance unless the recipient will provide Britain with the facilities needed to make such assistance effective in time; and to maintain defense facilities in an independent country, provided that country wishes this.²³

Britain maintains air staging posts at Benina and El Adem in Libya, and continues to provide a Palace Guard for King Idris I. Small British garrisons are still in Benghazi and Tobruk. Britain's defense agreement with Nigeria was abrogated by mutual consent. No similar agreements between Britain and its former colonies in Africa are reported in open sources to exist. Theoretically Britain still has the direct internal and external defense responsibility for the three High Commission Territories in southern Africa (Basutoland, Swaziland, and Bechuanaland), but whether the defense relationship of these countries to Britain and the Commonwealth will have any practical meaning in the future may be doubted.

In general, British defense relationships with Africa are handled in a manner consistent with the ad hoc informality that is characteristic of the Commonwealth. This has been manifested in two ways -- the diversification of military assistance, especially training,²⁴ within the Commonwealth, and the mutual support which the former British colonies have given to each other in times of crisis.²⁵ Direct British intervention in Africa during the post independence period has been limited to east Africa in the army mutinies in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika in January 1964, at the request of the countries concerned. Although the permanent British garrison was withdrawn from Kenya in December 1964, Britain retained overflight and staging rights, and access to ship repair facilities in Mombasa.

Britain has provided training facilities and has loaned officers to the newly independent Commonwealth countries. Training facilities have also been established in certain countries outside the Commonwealth. As of 1964, there were approximately 530 British officers and NCO's serving in African Commonwealth countries where they perform advisory and training functions.

3. Spain

The Spanish colonies in Africa are technically regarded as integral parts of Spain. Their defense is undertaken by the metropolitan armed forces. The magnitude of the Spanish commitment is indicated by the presence of some 20,000 Spanish troops in Africa in addition to 7,000 men in the Canary Islands.

About 6,000 Spanish servicemen are stationed in the Spanish Sahara, 1,000 in Ifni, and 5,000 in Spanish Guinea. The security of the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla is protected by approximately 8,000 Spanish troops.²⁶

4. Portugal

Portugal's economic viability depends heavily upon the retention of the markets in its overseas territories in Africa. Portugal regards its African possessions as integral parts of the homeland and considers a military threat against them as a threat against itself. Its large military commitment to the internal defense of these "provinces" reflects the importance of these territories as well as the disproportionate drain on Portugal's treasury for military expenditures.

Some 100,000 Portuguese troops are currently serving in Africa. Portuguese forces in Angola total 50,000, in Mozambique 30,000, while about 20,000 troops are tied down in Portuguese Guinea.²⁷

5. Belgium

From the beginning of Congolese independence Belgium was deeply concerned about the establishment of an effective indigenous security force. The protracted Congo crisis, the problems of Katangan secession, and U.N. policy against bilateral military aid prevented for a long time a significant degree of Belgian military assistance to the Leopoldville Government. Once Katanga was reintegrated into the Congo, and particularly when the U.N. position towards bilateral aid efforts became more flexible, Brussels launched in the summer of 1963 a direct military aid program to reorganize and retrain the Armee Nationale Congolaise. By 1965 there were some 400 Belgian military advisers in the Congo.²⁸ Belgian military aid activities continue in cooperation with the United States which delivers most of the necessary equipment and materiel.

Under military assistance agreements with Rwanda and Burundi, Belgian missions also help train and command the armies of the former trust territories.

6. Western European Activities in Africa and U.S. Security Interests

The overall interests of Britain, France, and Belgium in promoting the economic viability and the internal stability of their former colonies

and in maintaining international peace in Africa are consistent with U.S. objectives.²⁹ There have at times been instances in which sharp divergencies appeared, as in the Suez Canal crisis of 1956, during the U.N. operation in the Congo, and over Algerian independence. Similar controversies can be expected to occur, for example, as an outgrowth of British and French free trade policies which currently clash with U.S. observance of the arms embargo on the Republic of South Africa. In spite of such differences, however, advantages accrue to the United States from continued French, British, and Belgian involvement in African affairs.

The United States has been able to avoid direct military action in the former French and British colonies as a result of British and French willingness to do so. Similarly, in the Rhodesian crisis, Britain's acceptance of primary responsibility for settling the crisis has relieved the United States from possible direct involvement. While U.S. relations with Belgium were frequently marred by disagreements during the first few years of the U.N. Congo operation, the record attests to U.S.-Belgian cooperation on Congolese issues since that time.

There is no similar harmony among U.S., Spanish, and Portuguese views. The more flexible Spanish policies when compared with intransigent Portuguese intent to retain its colonies, suggest that any future U.S.-Spanish differences may be more easily reconcilable than U.S.-Portuguese discords. Only in the case of Spain's "places of sovereignty" on the African continent, the two enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla (which Spain has occupied since 1580 and 1487, respectively) does Spain appear to be unyielding. But the intensity of Moroccan claims to these two cities is considerably attenuated by apparent Spanish willingness to come to some agreement with Morocco on Ifni and the Spanish Sahara, and by Morocco's own inclination to temporize in view of rival Mauritanian interest in Spanish Sahara.³⁰ In Spanish Guinea (Fernando Po and Rio Muni) Spain bowed to African and U.S. pressure in 1963 to grant local autonomy as a first step towards ultimate independence.

The record of U.S. differences with Portugal on African problems centering on Angola and Mozambique has been well documented since the Angola issue was placed on the U.N. Security Council agenda in March 1960.³¹ This conflict over basic objectives in these two colonies poses a major U.S. security problem because it involves possible loss of the U.S. military facility in the Azores.

Thus, with the exception of Portugal and, to a much lesser degree, Spain, there are few major discords between the European powers and the United States which would have serious implications for U.S. security in African crisis and conflict situations. Differences in implementing these policies may exist and may require resolution on an ad hoc basis. With respect to Soviet and Chinese Communist efforts to penetrate the African continent, the European powers and the United States basically share the same philosophy in regard to the potential threats of Communism

in Africa. They disagree only on the techniques of defense, which, in themselves, are colored by the nature of their respective relations to the Communist states.

D. THE SOVIET UNION AND COMMUNIST CHINA IN AFRICA

1. Communist Interests and Objectives in Africa

Both the Soviet Union and Communist China are relative newcomers on the African scene. Their involvement in Africa derives partly from their global and ideological ambitions. Moscow and Peking have an acute interest in the future of Africa's political development, as the increase in their separate engagements in Africa indicates.

Moscow's overall interest in Africa is reflected in its efforts to be identified with the aspirations for independence and neutralism and to strengthen thereby the Soviet image as the champion of anti-colonialism in the eyes of the Afro-Asian nations.³²

The Soviet Union has a direct strategic interest in northern Africa and in the Horn of Africa. This interest centers on the areas which include the strategic Suez artery, the approaches to the oil fields of the Middle East, and the entry airfields into Africa of the UAR and Somali.

Soviet strategy towards Africa incorporates both long-term and short-term objectives. Moscow's ultimate goals are to create a pro-Soviet orientation throughout Africa and to bring the continent with its human and rich material resources into the Soviet sphere of influence. This objective mirrors the Soviet Union's ideological conviction of the final triumph of world communism, yet it is vague enough not to require more specific implementation.

The Soviet Union's more immediate goals are to prevent alignment of the African states with the United States and its allies and to neutralize the paramount influence of the West. The Soviets try, therefore, to create increasingly close political, economic, and cultural relations between the African states and the Soviet bloc. Opportunities to act on these objectives, such as those which developed in Guinea in 1959, in Congo-Leopoldville in 1960, and in Zanzibar in 1964, are quickly seized.

Communist China's entry into Africa began with the opening of its Embassy in Cairo in 1956, as a result of its own independent efforts at the Bandung Conference, rather than because of Soviet sponsorship.³³ Previously, Communist China was too absorbed in its own problems of consolidating its position in the Far East to be concerned with the remote areas of Africa.

Peking does not have, and will probably not have during the ten year time frame of this study, specific locational interests stemming from strategic considerations. A reasonable case could be made for an

ultimate strategic Chinese objective of establishing a hegemony over the countries rimming the Indian Ocean basin, but this consideration is too remote to warrant discussion in this report.

Lacking the specific strategic concern with the African continent that colors some of the Soviet motivations, Communist China has more catholic objectives. Chinese actions are motivated by a desire to divert the energies of the western nations, particularly the United States, to conflicts which are geographically remote from the periphery of China. Peking's goals in Africa are to absorb, divert, and divide western energies and attention. The Chinese further seek to attain a position of ideological leadership in African Communist movements, in competition with, and jealous of, Soviet aspirations.

Clearly the appraisal of Communist objectives in Africa must take into account the existence of the Sino-Soviet rift. Ideological differences between the Soviet Union and Communist China are apparent in their actions in Africa. Whether or not they will be patched up in the foreseeable future as a result of the war in Vietnam remains in the realm of speculation. China, more militant in its position, has shown a greater and more blatant willingness to foment conflict. It has selectively backed "anti-imperialist" clandestine movements and opposition groups in the more conservative states. The Soviet Union has shown a more cautious attitude and has tried to maintain correct formal relations with the newly established African Governments. It has been markedly more circumspect than China in its support of armed dissidents.

Moscow faces, nevertheless, the need to exclude Chinese competition. Militant Communist Chinese activities can trigger Soviet pre-emptive action, especially if an easy or quick success seems possible. Regardless of their ideological differences, Soviet and Chinese policies in Africa are likely to show distinguishing features in the next decade. In view of China's logistic problems and limited support capabilities, the military importance of its operations in Africa should not be overrated. But both Peking and Moscow can be expected to continue to exploit the crisis-prone situation in African states and to complicate the U.S. effort to promote stability and development.

2. Current Communist Aid Activities

A reliable indicator of the current activities of the Soviet Union and Communist China in Africa can be found in the distribution of their military and economic assistance.³⁴ While this overt aid is only one segment of their foreign policies, these programs offer an overview of their recent and present emphasis. Most of the major Communist aid programs, particularly military assistance, started in states ruled by more radical regimes, such as Egypt, Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, and Mali. The reason lies partly in the anti-colonial predilections of the ruling

Table I-4

ESTIMATED COMMUNIST MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID TO AFRICAN COUNTRIES.
(From inception of the program through 1965)

<u>Soviet Aid¹</u>		<u>Chinese Aid²</u>	
United Arab Rep. ⁴	\$1,864,000,000	Tanzania ^{3,4,5}	\$45,780,000
Algeria ⁴	380,000,000		
Ethiopia	114,000,000	Algeria ³	55,000,000
Guinea ⁴	100,000,000	Ghana	40,000,000
Ghana ⁴	171,000,000	Congo-Brazz.	25,000,000
Mali ³	87,000,000	Guinea	24,000,000
Somali ⁴	93,000,000	Somali	23,000,000
Tanzania ^{3,4}	55,000,000	Mali	19,600,000
Kenya	44,000,000	Kenya	18,000,000
Sierra Leone ³	28,000,000	Uganda ³	15,000,000
Morocco	27,000,000	Central African Rep. ³	8,000,000
Sudan	23,000,000	Burundi	(Unknown)
Uganda	16,000,000		
Congo-Brazz.	9,000,000		
Senegal	7,000,000		

1. Georgetown Research Project, op. cit., p. 131. U.S., Dept. of State, The Communist Economic Offensive Through 1963 (Washington: 1964), and Ibid., Communist Economic Aid in 1964 (Washington: 1965), for figures through 1964.

2. Africa Report, Vol. 10, No. 1, January 1965, p. 40 for figures through 1964.


3. Additional aid agreements during 1965, as documented in Africa Report and African Research Bulletin have been added.

4. Countries which have received high levels of military assistance relative to the size of their armed forces.

5. An additional \$42 million was offered in June 1965.

MAP I-4

CURRENT COMMUNIST MILITARY AID TO AFRICAN STATES



elites in these countries which made them receptive to Communist penetration. It should be borne in mind, however, that even for the Communists the truism holds that assistance cannot be rendered where it is unwelcome. While the Soviet Union or Communist China may have an important interest in a specific country, the prospective recipient may spurn offers of Communist assistance. Conversely, a state of much less intrinsic value to the Communist donor, may readily accept Communist assistance. Comparison of the levels of Communist aid to two countries, therefore, does not necessarily indicate the relative degrees of current Communist interest.

The greatest impact of Soviet military assistance has been felt in Egypt, Algeria, and Somali - the foci of Soviet strategic interest. Mali, Guinea, Ghana, Sudan, and Tanzania have also been recipients of Soviet arms aid in recent years.³⁵ In line with its general objectives of offsetting western influence and excluding Chinese competition, Moscow has used its military aid for certain specific tasks. Derived from an analysis of the patterns of worldwide Soviet military assistance, these tasks can be stated as follows:³⁶

1. To establish Soviet influence in the principal national institutions
2. To encourage domestic Communist movements
3. To increase local military capabilities
4. To provide support by proxy to insurgency movements and to promote internal subversion through giving arms aid to a third party government
5. To establish favorable relations with states which control "bottlenecks" in strategic lines of air and surface communication and which have important strategic resources
6. To develop strong military influences in regions which constitute vulnerable territorial approaches to the Soviet Union
7. To establish forward facilities having potential strategic value.

Soviet ability to execute these tasks has been conditioned by two conflicting factors. On the one hand, the Soviets face the necessity of maintaining correct diplomatic relations with the sensitive governments of the newly independent African states. On the other hand, Moscow has to meet the competition of the Chinese Communists who are not so inhibited by this concern. The need to counter Chinese influence has on a number of occasions prompted the Soviet Union to take more militant action. For example, the extensive Soviet and Chinese aid offers to Somali reflected the ideological schism. The two Communist protagonists also competed for influence in Zanzibar, and later in Tanzania. A similar situation developed in late 1964 with respect to supporting the Stanleyville rebel movement in the former Belgian Congo.

The extent of Communist China's military assistance in Africa is difficult to determine either in monetary terms or in weapons and equipment counts. Chinese arms supply and training assistance have largely been covert in nature. Peking has periodically been defeated in military aid races with the Soviet Union. Compared to Soviet programs, China's military aid efforts have been modest because of financial, technical, and logistical limitations. Evidence of Chinese support to clandestine and rebel movements has been found in the two Congos, Ghana, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, and Burundi.³⁷ The two key centers of Chinese operations are currently Dar es Salaam and Brazzaville.

E. UNITED NATIONS ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA AND U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS

The activities of the United Nations in African affairs frequently have had important implications for U.S. interests and policies in Africa. With the exception of the Congo operation, however, U.N. involvement in Africa has been confined to the economic and political realm. A detailed discussion of non-military U.N. activities in Africa would fall beyond the scope of this study. At the same time, the broader aspect should not be lost and may be briefly mentioned.

Through its economic programs in Africa, the United Nations has furthered U.S. interests in African development. The United Nations and its specialized agencies have provided increasing economic aid and technical assistance in various fields to African states. In the late fifties a special U.N. Economic Commission for Africa was established to help the soon to be independent states in their development planning.

Under U.N. auspices a number of African states attained national sovereignty. Seven of the original eleven U.N. trust territories were in Africa: Somalia, Tanganyika, the British and French Cameroons, British and French Togo, and Ruanda-Urundi. All are now independent or integrated with other states. The disposition of other ex-Italian territories was also arranged under the aegis of the United Nations: Eritrea was incorporated into Ethiopia, and Libya became independent.

The fate of former and present European territories has extensively been debated in U.N. halls. The questions of the former French protectorates -- Morocco and Tunisia -- and Algeria are familiar agenda items in the General Assembly. The questions of the Portuguese colonies and South West Africa can still be found on the Assembly's agenda. While various strongly worded resolutions against the associated metropolitan powers and South Africa have Passed, the role of the United Nations remained limited to providing an international platform for African and other states to express their bitter opposition to colonialism.

The most extensive U.N. involvement in an African state, one, which had the most direct military implications for the United States, was the U.N. operation in the Congo.³⁸ The U.N. peacekeeping effort in the Congo, 1960-64, was the largest field operation ever managed by an international organization.³⁹ In total, more than 93,000 men from 35 countries served in the United Nations Force (UNF). At its height the

UNF included almost 20,000 men. The total cost of the U.N. military mission was \$411 million, of which the United States provided 41.5%.

The Congo crisis erupted within a week after the former Belgian Congo became independent on June 30, 1960. The proximate cause of the crisis was the mutiny of Congolese soldiers which rapidly spread and triggered the disintegration of the entire administrative structure of the Congo. On July 14, after request for military aid by the Congolese Government, the Security Council passed its first Congo resolution authorizing the U.N. peacekeeping mission.

The military intervention of the United Nations has served U.S. interests. Washington was primarily concerned with the breakdown of law and order and with the danger that the Soviet Union would exploit the crisis. Although the Congolese had also asked for direct U.S. military aid, American leaders feared that this might be used as a pretext for Soviet intervention, which, in turn, might lead to an unwanted confrontation of the two powers. Washington also wanted to avoid charges of "neocolonialism" which could be expected to greet direct American military aid. Equally important, the United States sought to share responsibility for African security with other states. For these reasons U.N. intervention was a preferred alternative. Assistant Secretary of State Harlan Cleveland summarized the U.S. position as follows: "Should the Congo's chaos be tackled by a hastily assembled international peace-force; or should we send in a division of United States Marines; or should we just sit on our hands and wait for our adversaries to exploit the situation?" We decided, he continued, "not to risk a confrontation of nuclear powers in the center of Africa." We believed that a U.N. force would serve "the national interest" of the United States and the majority of other U.N. members.⁴⁰

When Southern Rhodesia declared its independence in November 1965, the United Nations was drawn into another major African crisis. The Security Council called for economic sanctions. Britain with the aid of its allies defeated any efforts to force a resolution calling for the use of military force to halt the rebellion. The United Nations recognized in its resolutions that Britain has the primary responsibility for settling the rebellion. Inasmuch as this is also Washington's position,⁴¹ U.N. action coincided with U.S. policy.

The United Nations is thus engaged in a number of crisis-coping activities in Africa which can affect U.S. policies. On the other hand, African states can influence U.S. relations in the United Nations. Membership in the United Nations enhances the importance of African states because they represent a sizeable group of votes. In consequence, they are bound to be wooed by all nations, including the United States, who have a stake in the result of U.N. debates.

F. CONCLUSIONS

United States planning recognizes that a certain degree of violence can be expected in developing societies. The security interests of the United States in Africa are threatened when such violence reaches the point where intervention by non-African powers -- western or Communist -- is likely. When ties with Communist states in a conflict situation are evident, the implications for U.S. interests are particularly serious, since the possibility of a confrontation between the United States and Communist powers is increased.

Initial reactions to a crisis in Africa can come from the metropolitan power. France and Britain have defense and military assistance arrangements with various African states which could prompt their intervention to restore peace and order. Spain and Portugal, because of their direct responsibility for the external defense and internal security of Portuguese and Spanish Africa, are automatically involved should a crisis erupt which affects their colonies. United States intervention in such a crisis may be avoided if the metropole is prepared to take action and capable of doing so. Metropolitan action, however, would have to be compatible with broader U.S. interests. Even if substantial accord exists, it can be assumed that the United States would have to be prepared to support a U.N. or other multinational peacekeeping force.

Soviet hesitancy to intervene directly in Africa has reduced the possibility of armed confrontation with the western powers. Indirect Communist support for operations across national frontiers through use of proxies, such as the UAR, appears to be the preferred tactic.

While Communist China's militancy tends to incite international conflicts, limitations on its logistical and technical support capabilities argue against Chinese stimulation of major regional conflicts. Nevertheless, militant Chinese Communist activities could force Soviet pre-emptions.

American policy planning for Africa is thus complicated by the possibility of various foreign responses to African conflict and violence. Major upheavals within or among African states in which the United States has a security interest, could endanger U.S. interests in Africa. The response of the United States to such crises would have to be determined with respect to their regional and global ramifications as well as in terms of the bilateral relations with the particular state in question.

CHAPTER II

MAJOR HISTORICAL ROOTS OF AFRICAN INSTABILITY:

ISLAM, COLONIALISM

Many of the current problems in Africa can be found in other underdeveloped countries which are experiencing the transition from a traditional society into a modern nation-state. But the problems in Africa are often compounded by its cultural and political heritage. Some of the strongest conflict potentials in Africa find their roots in the past. It may be helpful, therefore, to recall the major historical factors which have produced or intensified current crisis and conflict potentials in Africa.

Like any continent, Africa is characterized by its geographic, ethnic, and cultural diversity. The barriers formed by the highlands of Ethiopia, the swamps of the upper Nile, the forest of the northern Congo and west Africa, and the desert of the Sahara, have divided Africa into north and south. South of the barriers are found primarily animist and Christian negro tribes; north of them the Moslem Arabs predominate. In between, in the desert and the forest, lives a population which, though Negroid in race and language, belongs culturally and psychologically more to the Moslem Arab north than the Negro south. The reason for this is the influence of Islam.

A. THE INFLUENCE OF ISLAM¹

The Islamic invasion of Africa started in 640, only eight years after the death of Mohammed, by Arabs from the Arabian peninsula. Arab Bedouins occupied the Nile delta and north Africa as far as Carthage. Ultimately, they managed to overcome the resistance of the natives in the Nubian desert and the Berbers in the Maghreb, and were able to expand their control over north Africa to the Atlantic coast.²

Attempts at conversion to Islam of the local population met with varying degrees of success. Whereas the Islamic conquest of Egypt was complete, the control by the Moslem Arabs in the Maghreb remained sporadic. A small coterie of Moslem Arab warriors ruled through a body of converts over a heterogeneous population, which was only partly converted to Islam. The influence of Islam would never penetrate into certain Berber strongholds, and even elsewhere it could not erase ancient hatreds. In Morocco and Algeria especially, Berbers in the Atlas and Kabylia mountains have exhibited an almost traditional hostility to Arab control with which current governments are still confronted.

Some Berbers, unwilling to accept Arab domination, migrated across the desert where they settled along the Saharan trade routes and came in contact with the pagan Negro Africans. The conversion to Islam of the

Africans in western Africa began in the tenth century with the invasion of the Ghanaian empire by a Berber Moslem tribe. Once converted, the African not only adhered to the religion, but became an enthusiastic proselytizer himself. In fact, the final destruction of the Ghanaian empire was accomplished by the Negro Moslem state of Mali. Eventually, Islam became the nominal religion for most of the Negro states in west Africa.

Since the agents promoting Islam in the west were either Berber or African, African Islam here acquired an identity of its own, which was different from that practiced in Arabic or Asian areas. Moreover, Moslem Africans remained in control. In addition, local Islamic educational and cultural institutions arose, which compared favorably with those in north Africa. The Islamic communities in west and central Africa could afford, therefore, to develop in relative political and cultural isolation from Asian and Arabic Islam, which reinforced their African character. This factor explains partly why today Egypt has been able to play a more prominent role in some east African states than in west and central African countries.

African Islam, however, became as firmly rooted in the western regions as its Arab counterpart in the Nile delta became. The arrival of the colonialists would not disturb this pattern. But it would, through the creation of colonial boundaries, place these Islamic tribes in direct confrontation with Christian and pagan societies in the south. Much later, the attempt to structure these opposing forces in the context of a national state would produce situations of dissent of which the current upheavals in Nigeria and the Sudan are prime examples.

At about the same period when the Arabs invaded north Africa, a more peaceful encroachment occurred into east Africa. Traders from the Arabian peninsula had long frequented the east African coast. Although the Arab traders now became Moslems themselves, they did not try to convert east Africans. Even successive waves of migration by Moslem Arabs later on, who fled from persecution by either orthodox or heterodox Islamic sects, did not yield a significant degree of conversion. The various Arab Moslem groups maintained their separate identities and perpetuated thereby the orthodox-heterodox schism which had brought them to east Africa originally. An indigenous African Moslem community developed primarily through the efforts of Indian Moslem arrivals in the early twentieth century who were more systematic in their conversion attempts. The Indian Moslem groups, however, who were viewed with hostility by their Arabian Islamic brothers, remained largely a segregated entity.

The east African, once converted to Islam, joined one or the other of the branches of Islam which the original Arab settlers had so stubbornly perpetuated. The result was that the traditional orthodox-heterodox cleavage continued among the Africans, which in modern times took the form of rival political parties. Present frictions within some of the east African states can be traced to this historic split. In addition, because the Islamic religion of the Africans generally preserved

its distinctly Arabic character, the tendency of Indian Moslem groups to remain segregated from the rest of the community persisted, which produced another source of tensions today. Recent efforts in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania to force Indians to leave east Africa are an example.

Islam did not only have divisive effects; it made positive contributions as well. Locally, it provided a foundation for a cohesive social order and equipped its followers with an ideology and culture, which could later form the basis for a separate national identity. Somali nationalism, for example, is inconceivable without this common denominator. At the same time, however, Somali irreligiosity is a serious threat to the stability of the region.

A negative aspect of Islam is its failure to adopt an acceptable principle of legitimacy which could justify the political process and provide for an orderly succession to power. This failure is reflected today in the general political turmoil which marks Islamic areas. It has also contributed to the trend toward autocracy in African states.

The slave trade of the Moslem Arabs provided another irritant in Arab-African relations. It was not essentially a by-product of Islam, but it accompanied the spread of Islam. The small Bantu tribes living south of the Sahara provided most of the supply for the market of the Ottoman empire. The memory of Arabic cruelties has never been erased and continues to deepen some of the tensions between Africans and Arabs.³

In summary, Islam, one of the earliest influences from abroad, created a north-south cultural barrier from the west to the east coast. Within Islamic Africa are further regional and local differences. An African brand of Islam characterizes the western region; a distinctly Arab identity marks Islam in northern and eastern sectors. The divisive impact of Islam can be found today in the rebellion of southern Sudan, the disintegration of the Nigerian Federation, and the ethnic tensions in Chad. On a continent-wide basis, the Islamic factor augurs ill for Pan-African unity. Africa is more likely to meet its security and development problems in the context of regional alignments.

B. COLONIZATION

In retrospect, colonization appears to be the other major historical factor which has left its mark on African societies. Under certain conditions it provided a unifying influence; it also brought new divisions.

The first Europeans to explore sub-Saharan regions were the Portuguese who landed at the west coast in the fifteenth century in search for a route to the Orient. They did not venture into the interior and did not start trading to a significant extent until the new plantations in the Americas opened up the demand for slaves. Even so, the Portuguese, joined by the Dutch, British, and French, kept largely to the coast, buying slaves from predatory tribes. They encouraged thereby Africans to attack and enslave each other. The influence of the slave trade upon future attitudes towards colonialism cannot be overestimated.

On the other hand the coastal trade had also the effect of turning the attention of the Gold Coast tribes to the coast, while the northern tribes in the region continued to be oriented towards the north. Moreover, since the Europeans settled chiefly along the coast, the economic, social, and educational development of the coast eventually came to outdistance the interior. This reinforced the existing split between the coastal tribes and those of the interior, a phenomenon which continues to trouble the west African states of the twentieth century.

The rivalry among the Europeans for African territories began seriously in the eighteen-eighties when they started to explore the interior. Partly because almost everything of importance was settled by negotiation in Europe, the partition of Africa occurred almost without wars among the European powers. Various European territorial claims were based on treaties with local chiefs, which ensured that the colonial frontiers corresponded to some extent with the local distribution of cultural groups. On the whole, however, the distribution of the tribal populations was not an important factor for the European negotiators. The result was that practically every colonial boundary cut across tribal groupings. The balkanization of Africa had serious implications for the stability of the continent in the post independence era. Under certain circumstances some states would vigorously press irredentist claims or become embroiled in border disputes.⁴

1. Colonial Policies

The colonial policies of the European metropolises varied widely. In the Congo, which the Belgian Government annexed as a colony in 1908, the Belgians believed in gradual development of the natives. Belgian paternalism emphasized mass elementary education, rather than the creation of a highly educated elite. Secondary and university training was to come at a later stage of development. Politically, the Belgians kept the Congolese isolated from the rest of Africa, and effectively prevented the creation of indigenous parties until as late as 1959. The result could be found in the disastrous lack of trained Congolese and responsible politicians when the Congo became independent.

Spain and Portugal did little to emancipate their colonial populations. Portugal offered the educated native a position of equality in European society (assimilado), but provided few opportunities for education. Should Portugal be forced to withdraw from its colonies, the absence of trained Africans may cause a transitional crisis similar to the one in Congo-L.

The colonial administrations of France and Great Britain shared as a rule the same economic objective. The colonial economies were mainly geared towards export. The transportation infrastructures built by the colonial powers, therefore, were oriented towards the coast, and do not necessarily meet the territory's present transportation needs. Furthermore, since concentration on one product was usually more lucrative, no attempt was made to develop a diversified economy. This has led in many

African states to the single product economies, which are at the mercy of the weather and the prices of the world market.⁵ The economic practices of the colonial powers in these respects have contributed to future difficulties.

The political and cultural policies of France have been the most enlightened ones in certain aspects, particularly where it concerned the sub-Saharan territories. The liberal ideas of the French Revolution, "liberty, equality, and fraternity," always exerted an influence on France's colonial policy. They provided the general framework for the policy of "assimilation," which was the attempt to make Frenchmen out of Africans. The selection of native students for further study in France, so they would become French intellectuals, was an important ingredient of the assimilation policy. Several of such Africans made a complete transition and never went back to their homeland. Those who did return, contributed to the progress and decolonization of their country. In practice, the assimilation policy was implemented on a selected basis; only a small percentage of the indigenous population ever became Frenchmen. Nevertheless, the French provided a western cultural milieu which permitted the African to express himself on the basis of intellectual equality. Black Africans came to resent French colonial domination, rather than the Frenchman as such or as the representative of the white race.⁶

French colonial rule was centralized in Paris. The French parliament was at the apex of the pyramid. The base consisted of local colonial officials who could be either Frenchmen or African tribal leaders as the direct representatives of the metropolitan government. Opportunity for advancement was available for indigenous politicians. Twenty deputies and seven senators represented the colonies in the parliament of the Third Republic.⁷ To be sure, this African representation could not significantly influence legislation, but it served a useful function as an outlet for some of the rising political aspirations of African elites.

The Brazzaville Conference of 1944 typified French attitudes. The overseas territories were promised the right to participate in the establishment of a new French constitution after the war, but the idea of self government was dismissed. The constitution of the Fourth Republic did allow for territorial representation in the French legislature: 82 deputies and 64 senators. An assembly of the French Union was created to advise on legislation for the overseas territories. The African representatives, however, considered the provisions inadequate and in October 1964 a number of them organized the Rassemblement Democratique Africain (RDA), which played a key part in the development of political parties in French Africa and gave coordinated leadership to the nationalist movements. The personal relationships which exist today among the leaders of French speaking Africa stem from the days of association in the parliament in Paris or in the RDA.

France did not succeed in replacing the local cultures with French culture, but it introduced western culture to its African territories to the extent that there is a foundation for cooperation and agreement among the French speaking African states. Moreover, the racial and intellectual

equality which the assimilation policy proclaimed -- even though it applied only to the native elites -- provided for a cultural affinity between France and its former black African colonies. This helps to explain the continued orientation of the French speaking states toward Paris and their generally more moderate stance in international affairs than that of the English speaking countries. On the other hand, the relationship to the former metropole is an emotional issue in the domestic policies of the French speaking states which has had, at times, a divisive effect.

French colonial policies have been less successful in Mali and Buinea, where the traditions of the Moslem majorities have thwarted the assimilation policy. For the same reason this policy has failed in the Maghreb states. Ironically, under the impact of the French liberal tradition, the westernized elites became the leaders of the anti-colonialist nationalist movements. French policies generally favored the more conservative Moslem elements, which accentuated the existing split between the conservative religious groups and the more progressives ones. In addition, to maintain control, France sought to exploit the traditional rivalries between Berbers and Arabs, which has contributed to their continuing mutual antagonism. The problems in the Maghreb, particularly in Algeria, were further seriously compounded by the presence of large numbers of French settlers.

The development of the British colonies in east and central Africa has been different from the history of French sub-Saharan areas. Their evolution has been shaped by the considerable number of Britishers who settled there. Initial British policy in these territories was designed to protect the interests of the indigenous populations⁸ and, at the same time, to govern as economically as possible. Contrary to the French practice, the implementation of British colonial policy was left to the British governor, who concluded agreements with the local chiefs. At the tribal level the traditional chiefs continued to rule their people under the general observation of the British authorities, and not as the representatives of the British. The British territories were administered as individual units by their respective governors, while the French unified several colonies in a general geographic area under one governor general. The British sought to give the African politicians and civil servants increasing responsibilities. The advantage of British policy was the early opportunity it offered the African elites for gaining experience in local government, usually before their French counterparts.

The negative aspect of the British system was that it often contributed to the ascendancy of one tribe over another. For example, British indirect rule permitted the Moslem Hausa-Fulani emirs of northern Nigeria to retain their strong tribal positions and traditional social structures. It also helped to entrench privileged interests of

some traditional sectors in the community, enabling them later to resist modern political, social, and economic developments to a greater extent than they might otherwise have done. The special constitutional status which the British gave the Baganda in the Ugandan protectorate would eventually prove to be a threat to the government of independent Uganda which had to jeopardize its political life to change the situation.⁹

2. The Colonial Heritage

The coming of the Europeans has brought both divisive and integrating forces into Africa's ethnic mosaic. Current African Boundaries mirror the interests of the European negotiators who during the partition paid little attention to tribal distribution patterns. Further added to the separation into individual colonial units was the division of Africa into areas with different colonial systems.

The Belgian thesis of gradual development left Congo-L. at independence with a lack of trained cadres who could take over from Belgian administrators and military officers. The protracted Congo crisis is an outgrowth of this legacy. Spain and Portugal have lagged behind in preparing the populations of their territories for nationhood.

Unlike French policy, British policy tried to preserve local tribal institutions. It left stronger divisions within the new states when independence came. Although the British had sincerely attempted to assist their wards in efforts to develop politically and economically as fast as possible, the leaders of the English speaking states generally lacked the close affinity with western culture which could be found among French speaking black African elites. This is partly the result of the failure of the British to share their culture with the African intellectual on a basis of equality. France's assimilation policy had the effect of ameliorating feelings of racial inferiority among the Africans. On the whole, anti-colonial bias is much less in French speaking states. Communism and anti-western neutralism, which exploit this bias, do not find strong support in the ex-French territories, unless a leader himself has such a bias, as Sékou Touré for example.

In Africa's international relations the French legacy has been reflected in the usually more moderate policies of the French speaking states. It is significant that the two French speaking countries south of the Sahara which displayed a radical attitude in foreign affairs and which did not maintain cordial relations with the former metropole, were the predominantly Moslem states of Guinea and Mali. It may well be that Islam will prove to be more of a conflict determinant in Africa than the relatively brief presence of the Europeans.

CHAPTER III

CRISIS AND CONFLICT REGIONS

Until relatively few years ago, the United States looked to the continued rule of allied European powers as a safeguard of peace and order on the African continent. The fragmentation of Africa into numerous independent states and the diminishing power of the European metropolises has forced the United States into sharing the responsibility for stability in Africa. As a result, the eruption of a conflict can have more profound and more direct implications for U.S. interests than in the past. The problems which the United States faces in Africa, moreover, are compounded by the Communist bid for the allegiance of the emerging nations in the cold war. It is important, therefore, to analyze the crisis and conflict potentials in Africa in terms of their significance for the United States.

The current chapter is divided into five sections. Each covers a major region: northeast Africa, northern Africa, western Africa, equatorial and north central Africa, and southern Africa. The discussion of each region starts with an examination of U.S. interests and Soviet and Communist Chinese activities there. Subsequently, the internal and international conflict potentials of the states comprising the region are considered. The sections conclude with an analysis of the implications for U.S. interests of these conflict potentials.

A. NORTHEAST AFRICA

1. United States Security Interests

The geo-political location of northeast Africa as the gateway to Asia and bordering on the Red Sea makes the region of strategic importance to the Western powers.¹ Unobstructed passage through the waterway linking the Mediterranean with the Indian Ocean and free access to the oil resources around the Persian Gulf remain vitally significant, although this is less so for the United States than it is for its European allies.

United States concern with the northeastern region is further intensified by the existence of a long-standing high level conflict situation there. For various reasons Somali's irredentist claims on its neighbors remain intractable.

The strategic interest of the United States in Ethiopia is reflected in its military commitment. The U.S. military aid program, more than \$81 million for fiscal years 1948-64 and larger than to all other African states combined,² the American military assistance team of over 100 advisers, the \$60 million Kagnev telecommunications base near Asmara, all testify to the strategic value of Ethiopia for the United States.

The U.S. interest in Somali derives not only from its strategic location, but also from the involvement of the Soviet Union and Communist China in the country. The Russian economic assistance program in Somali is considerable. In addition, Somali accepted in 1963 some \$30 million in Soviet military aid credits.³ By the end of 1965 there were more than 100 Somalis receiving military training in the Soviet Union. However, the implementation of the Soviet military aid program in Somali has been slower than western observers originally expected. Moscow's restraint probably reflects its recognition that Somali's irredentist designs on Somali's neighbors are not supported by most African states. The Soviets also have to protect their relations with Ethiopia. The western nations are, nevertheless, faced with Soviet political incursions in a nation conveniently located near the approach to the Suez artery and the entrance to the Indian Ocean.

Soviet policies toward Somali were also designed to outflank Communist China which sought to obtain a foothold in the Republic. In late 1963 Communist China offered Somali about \$23 million in credits.⁴ Although Peking is currently engaged in small economic and cultural aid projects in Somali, Moscow outmaneuvered its Chinese rival for the time being. The activities of Communist powers in Somali suggest the possibility that a relatively minor domestic crisis can escalate into a major one and turn the country into an arena of the cold war.

2. Internal Conflict Potentials

Somali: The Somali Republic enjoys a rather high degree of ethnic, religious, and linguistic homogeneity. The vast majority of Somalis belong to one of the six major clans, which all trace their lineage to the Prophet. This uniformity is reenforced by the fact that 80 per cent of the Somalis are nomads or semi-nomads who orbit in a traditional pattern in search for pastures and water, disregarding national frontiers. This has produced a sense of national identity among Somalis, both within and outside the borders of the Republic. Translated into political terms, there is a general consensus on the unification of all Somalis in the Horn. This goal is the major binding force in Somali's political life. This consensus pressures the government into adhering strictly to the accepted national goals. The long drawn-out government crisis in the summer of 1964 was primarily caused by the fear of the opposition parties that the government was retreating on the pan-Somali issue.⁵

At the same time, Somali's social structure of a division into clans has resulted in a fragmented political system.⁶ Political cleavages are essentially based on clan and kinship contentions. This has forced the government to depend on the balancing of clan groups for its continuity. The government has had to reconcile traditional clan objectives and modern development goals.

If tribalism is a deterrent to the creation of a modern state, a second problem confronting the government is the integration of the north, formerly British Somaliland, and the south, formerly Italian Somalia. Unlike the Italian colonial administration, the British inhibited the development of political parties. As late as 1959, the British insisted upon clan, rather than party representation in the advisory and legislative councils. Nomadism is less dominant in the south than in the north, which further contributed to the greater political experience of the southern region. The prevalence of the politically more mature southerners in the government has created a sense of frustration in the north. Regional rivalry for army commissions, for example, sparked the unsuccessful coup d'etat of a group of Sandhurst graduates in December 1961.

A third factor which contributes to the domestic problems is the scarcity of economic resources and the chronic deficit of the national budget. Compounding Somali's economic fragility is the need to devote a high percentage of the national budget for defense purposes to support its irredentist designs. Somali's defense budget represents 18.1 per cent of the total government expenditures, one of the highest percentages in Africa.⁷ In view of Somali's nomadic culture, limited water resources, agricultural land and grazing areas, and dependence on bananas and livestock as the major export items, its economic development has seriously lagged behind public demands for progress.

Nevertheless, in spite of Somali's tribal problems, integration difficulties, and subsistence economy, no serious domestic crises and conflicts have occurred. Tribal differences have been composed within the context of the party system without any significant amount of violence. The predominance of the southern-based Somali Youth League has never been seriously challenged. Although tensions have inevitably accompanied the process of north-south integration, a minimum modus Vivendi has been found. The government has been able to offset to some degree its financial deficit with economic and technical assistance from a variety of sources. In consequence, Somali's internal conflict potentials are relatively low.

Ethiopia: Reduced to essentials, the major issues which provide a basis for internal discontent and crisis in Ethiopia are the ethnic and religious divisions and the related tensions between the conservatives who control the government and the more progressive elements.

The cultural and religious tensions arise from the fact that the non-Christian sector of the population, which comprises about 60 per cent, has long been discriminated against by the ruling Christian,

Amhara aristocracy. The Moslems and pagans who live in the coastal and lowland areas have generally been neglected by the administrative and economic planners in Addis Ababa. Unrest has increased in Eritrea since its incorporation as a province under the central government in November 1962. Ethiopia has not succeeded in persuading the politically more active Eritreans to accept this centralization. There is even opposition against orders from Addis Ababa in the predominantly Coptic Christian Tigre area of Eritrea, since the religious bonds between the Amharas and the Christian Tigreans are offset by traditional tribal hostility. Religious, ethnic, and political differences combined with geographic isolation encourage Eritrean dissidence, expressed partly in terrorist activities of the Eritrean Liberation Front.⁸

Ethiopian territorial and political integrity is further threatened by the Moslem Somalis of the Haud and Ogaden regions who seek unification with neighboring Somali. Their secessionist aspirations are strengthened by the traditional rivalry between Islam and Coptic Christianity. In the history of the Solomonic Kingdom, Ethiopian Christianity provided the most important cohesive force against the Islamic invasions. This rivalry continues today in the form of the conflicting claims of Ethiopia and Somali.

In spite of the emperor's sensitivity to the demands of Moslem citizens and his appointments of Moslems to relatively important posts, they receive by no means treatment equal to their Christian counterparts. If the emperor were able to accelerate significantly the pace of change and to provide greater opportunity for integration of minority groups into the national society, the outlook for Ethiopia's stability after the death of the aging emperor would probably be brighter. But the fundamental problem is that the throne bases its support largely upon the church and the Amhara aristocracy which favor the status quo. The leverage that these two conservative sectors of Ethiopian society have with the emperor presents the main barrier to reforms and modernization.

Buttressed by the legend of divine rule for 3,000 years since Solomon, the emperor serves as the fulcrum of Ethiopian unity. The emperor, although an Amhara himself, has used his unique position to institute some gradual reforms and to temper the influence of the church and aristocracy. But as a result of the emperor's social and educational programs, a growing class of educated and restive young people has been created, which has become increasingly critical of the slow pace of development and, consequently, of the throne. There are still no political parties. Members of parliament represent localities. Privilege and corruption continue to surround the throne. The church, which owns about one-fifth of all the arable land, wields enormous power, as was

shown in the excommunication of the reformists who participated in the 1960 coup d'etat against the government.

The 1960 coup attempt revealed the depth of the pressures within Ethiopia for more rapid change and reform, although ambition and personal grudges also played a part. In addition, the coup reflected the frustration of young government officials and military officers who saw their careers blocked by members of the aristocracy. Nevertheless, it was the first coup effort in Ethiopia which had political and economic reforms as its principal objectives.⁹

So far, the opposition forces have failed to consolidate into an effective movement. The opposition remains largely inchoate. The army, which after some hesitation rallied to the emperor in the 1960 coup, continues to support the monarchy. The air force, the church, and most of the aristocracy have never wavered in their backing of the emperor. But student demonstrations in spite of the governmental curbs¹⁰ as well as labor strikes¹¹ indicate continued discontent.

In view of the existing dissidence, on the one hand, and the personal and direct rule of the emperor on the other, the transfer of power is unlikely to be smooth when the emperor dies, especially since he failed to designate a successor. His eldest son, the crown prince, has never been officially named as his political heir. This does not mean that the monarchy will fall after the emperor's death. The institution commands a great deal of loyalty among the people. The question of succession, however, is of crucial significance to Ethiopia's future stability. There will probably be no other attempts to overthrow the government as long as the emperor lives. But the emperor is now in his mid-seventies. In the long run, the internal crisis potential of Ethiopia is, therefore, relatively high.

3. International Conflict Potentials

Overshadowing all other issues in the Horn which may carry the germ of international armed conflict is the border dispute between Somali and its neighbors. Ethiopia's as well as Somali's foreign policy is largely determined by their boundary problems.

Somali's overriding objective, which all political parties endorse, is to bring the Somali populations of the Northern Frontier District of Kenya (NFD), the Ethiopian Haud and Ogaden regions, and French Somaliland into one greater Somalia. Somalis claim that on the basis of ethnic and cultural grounds they have the right to establish such a nation-state.¹² As far as the NFD is concerned, Somali frequently cites the findings of the NFD Commission that the population of the area "almost unanimously demands" incorporation into Somali.¹³ As regards the disputed area in Ethiopia, the Somalis argue that Ethiopia never effectively occupied the territory until the British withdrew

after the Second World War.¹⁴ They further contend that all Somalis living under foreign rule, i.e., Ethiopian, Kenyan, and French administrations, are entitled to exercise the right of self-determination.

Neither Kenya, nor Ethiopia can afford to compromise. Both states fear that any surrender to Somali demands would serve as a dangerous precedent for other minority groups within their borders to try to secede. Ethiopia consistently invokes historical grounds to support its retention of the disputed border areas and its desire to absorb the French Somali coast. Bolstering Ethiopia's determination to contain Somali is the fear that Somali would gain control over French Somaliland. Ethiopia has a vital interest in the French colony, as its Foreign Minister pointed out when the question came into the limelight again in June 1966.¹⁵ The majority of the two main ethnic groups which live in the colony, resides in Ethiopia. But at least equally significant, Djibouti, the French port on the Red Sea, serves as Addis Ababa's only railway terminal to the sea. Djibouti handles about 50% of Ethiopia's commerce.¹⁶

In view of Somali's military inferiority, it is highly unlikely that it will seek to attain its objectives through launching a conventional war.¹⁷ Ethiopia has the military capability to defend its borders. Kenya, though weaker than Somali, is protected by a defense agreement with Ethiopia. On the other hand, the latter could equally ill afford to launch an offensive against Somali. It lacks the military power necessary for occupying Somali. The military balance in the Horn has prevented the outbreak of sustained open war. However, guerrilla fighting and small-scale border clashes continue on an almost regular basis in spite of the Khartoum agreement of March 1964 between Ethiopia and Somali to maintain a cease-fire all along the border.

A number of extra-regional factors have served in the short run to restrain either side from trying to resolve the dispute on its own terms, although they have gravely complicated the border issue. One factor is the interest which Britain retains in Kenya. London has shown in the case of the east African mutinies in 1964 its willingness to intervene with military force to preserve order and stability. Although the chances are remote that Britain will come to Kenya's aid again, Somali has to contend with this possibility.

Secondly, Egypt may exploit the border troubles to its own advantage. While Somali may have reservations about encouraging Egypt to enhance its influence in the Horn, Somali can use this as a threat to exert pressure on Ethiopia. The spectre of growing Egyptian influence in the region has been a restraining factor in Ethiopia's policy toward Somali.

Thirdly, the border issue provided the Soviet Union with the opportunity to obtain a foothold in Somali. To support its irredentist ambitions, Somali accepted in 1963 Soviet military assistance when it found that it could not obtain arms aid on similar conditions from the western powers. Ethiopia, on its part, has also developed some economic ties with the Soviet Union, partly as a means of preventing any diminution in U.S. support. Both Somali and Ethiopia have succeeded in bringing cold war pressures to bear on their dispute in order to strengthen their respective power positions.

Somali, Ethiopia, and Kenya have also sought to enlist African backing. Their border problems have in one way or another occupied a major part of OAU discussions. The tendency within the OAU to preserve the territorial status quo throughout Africa has worked in favor of Somali's adversaries. But apart from appeals to the contending parties to compose their differences peacefully, the OAU has not been able to contribute towards resolving the dispute.

There are other issues which have caused tensions in the Horn. Egypt and especially the Sudan have at times directly and indirectly supported separatist sentiments in Ethiopian regions, particularly in Eritrea. Exiled Ethiopian opposition leaders have found a haven for their movements in Khartoum and Cairo. On the other hand, Sudanese rebels have taken refuge in Ethiopia. In July 1965, however, Ethiopia and the Sudan concluded an agreement to respect their borders, to prevent rebels from using the other party's territory as a base of operations, and to halt the flow of arms to dissidents from each other's territories.¹⁸ Border incidents have continued to occur. Occasionally, this has led to local fighting along the northern as well as the southern end of the boundary.¹⁹ But the two governments are seeking to resolve their border problems within a political framework.²⁰

4. Implications for U.S. Security

The United States faces certain specific potential crisis and conflict situations in the Horn which have a bearing on its security interests. The freedom of surface movement between the Indian Ocean and the eastern Mediterranean rests partly on the area. The region also forms the northeastern entry into Africa. Any serious threat to its stability or to the regional balance of power would be of grave concern to the United States and its allies.

While there are distinct signs of domestic unrest in Ethiopia, a serious upheaval appears unlikely as long as the emperor lives. In view of the close relationship which the United States has with the present regime, its continued viability is important to the United States. The voice of the emperor, moreover, carries weight in inter-African councils and his influence has a moderating effect. For these reasons Ethiopia's unresolved problem of succession has direct implications for U.S.

interests. In addition, a domestic struggle for power in the wake of the emperor's death would plunge the country into a serious internal crisis, which would endanger its stability.

The internal situation in Somali does not by itself contain any greatly disruptive issues. Somali's continued domestic stability, however, is closely related to the pan-Somali question. If pan-Somalism were to suffer a decided setback, the ensuing domestic crisis would invite Egyptian and Communist interference in the internal affairs of Somali. On the other hand, were the prospects for Somali's expansionist aims to improve, the moderate elements in Ethiopia and Kenya would be considerably weakened.

Thus, the active border dispute has the most direct relevance to U.S. and western European interests and threatens to turn the region into an arena of the cold war. The Soviet Union and Communist China have utilized the tensions to seek a bridgehead in the Horn. The Soviets may hesitate to encourage Somali in order not to jeopardize their relations with Ethiopia and Kenya. But in view of Peking's tendency to pursue a more aggressive policy, Moscow may be forced to step up its support of Mogadiscio.

The border issue confronts the United States with an additional dilemma. If current tensions and clashes were to escalate into an extended armed conflict, the U.S. position in the Horn would be affected. Ethiopia is bound to use its American supplied weapons against Somali which will heighten Somali's resentment of what it already views as unjustified favoritism to Ethiopia. This would also have repercussions for U.S. relationships with other African states, sensitive as they are to charges of U.S. interference. Failure on the part of the United States to respond affirmatively to a likely Ethiopian request for military aid would probably drive Ethiopia into seeking assistance from sources hostile to the United States. United States support of Ethiopia would in all likelihood produce a wave of support for Somali in other African states and in Communist quarters. Since the prospects for a negotiated solution to the border dispute appear remote, U.S. interests would be served by preserving the existing regional balance of power, thereby limiting the conflict to the present level of tensions and violence.

B. NORTHERN AFRICA²¹

1. United States Security Interests in Northern Africa

Direct Interests: Northern Africa is one of the African areas of considerable, mostly indirect strategic concern to the United States. The nations bordering on the Mediterranean "guard the southern flank of NATO" and the Wheelus Air Force Base near Tripoli, Libya, is the "only remaining U.S. military air base in all of Africa and the Middle East."²²

The United States still has naval communications facilities in Morocco, and in return for military and economic assistance it receives base rights and other privileges of military significance in a number of countries in the region.²³ Northern Africa will retain its strategic value as a dispersal and recovery area for U.S. defense forces in Europe as long as the United States has its military responsibilities on the European continent.

Indirect Interests: The north African region is also of indirect interest to the United States due to the considerable political and economic involvement of its allies. The Mediterranean Sea has always had an extremely high strategic value for most European countries, not only for those littoral countries which depend upon it for much or most of their foreign trade, but also for those countries on the Atlantic to which it represents the most direct sea route to Middle Eastern oil sources or to Asia. The countries on the African coast are becoming increasingly important trade partners to Europe and the discovery of oil in Algeria and Libya provides an alternate source of supply which is more accessible and less subject to the political volatility of inter-Arab politics than that of the Arabian peninsula. Finally, the question of overflight rights and landing privileges remains vital to England and France, which continue to carry varying degrees of responsibility for the stability of sub-Saharan Africa.

Communist Incursions and Activities: The strategic importance of north Africa to the western powers can also be seen by looking hypothetically at the possible control or influence of an adversary in the region; in the time frame of this study, this means a member of the Soviet or Communist Chinese groups. Increased Communist influence in the UAR would enhance the possibility that Communist vessels would have access to the Suez Canal in case a regional conflict situation would require this.²⁴

The UAR could also be expected to accord overflight rights and landing privileges that could be used, perhaps even more effectively than in the past,²⁵ to support dissident groups in sub-Saharan Africa. There is evidence that the Soviet Union is interested in establishing a base or bases in north Africa for civilian air transport, a move which one source suggests might provide a valuable "staging platform for political penetrations (and potentially, military penetrations) of Africa and Latin America, and especially for supporting Cuba."²⁶

The advantages to the communist powers of a close relationship with the north African states are also important. The proclivities of Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser and (until 1965) Algeria's Ahmed Ben Bella for covert interference in the affairs of other states were firmly established and suggested the possibility of some indirect influence. Communist countries are heavy contributors to the armed forces of Algeria and the UAR, with the result that their military establishments

now are the two largest on the continent. Although this type of influence in a country does not necessarily guarantee compliance with the donor-country's national objectives (Ben Bella, the Lenin Peace Prize winner, was, after all, deposed with Russian tanks), it nonetheless carries a certain potential for influence.

Conclusions: Although the north African area undoubtedly remains of strategic importance to the United States, there is little of direct interest. The complex of bases in Morocco have been largely converted to communications use or turned over to the Moroccan government, and pressures to abandon Wheelus Air Force Base are likely to be heeded.²⁷ The interest of the United States in northern Africa must be seen in the supporting role of the United States in regard to the political and economic interests of Britain and France, and its policy aimed at keeping northern African countries independent and non-aligned in the cold war.

2. Internal Crisis Potentials

Social and Cultural Factors: Ethnically, the north African area, along with the entire Arab world, is a relatively homogeneous area. Aside from a politically motivated opposition to Zionism, Moslems observe few of the ethnic distinctions or racial discriminations common to so many other areas of the world. Yet, as is the case in west Africa (and in any area where the coastal segments of the population have profited from the potentially enriching nature of international contacts), a cultural gulf has emerged between the more progressive littoral residents and the more traditional elements in the hinterland.

In north Africa, this division is illustrated by the occasional opposition of Arab and Berber in Algeria, of Berber mountaineer and plainsman in Morocco, or urban Tunisian and rural Afaqu in Tunisia, and of Sanusi and Tripolitanian in Libya. These sectional differences have varying degrees of effect upon government policies ranging from armed dissidence to inter-party accommodation, but almost nowhere does this opposition by itself pose a threat to the nation's existence.

In the Sudan, however, an ethnic division of a much more basic nature raises serious doubts as to the ability of the government, or even the nation itself, to survive. This conflict situation is not an example of the social diversity to be found within the north African Arab nations, but rather a result of the fact that the Sudan is at once an Arab and a sub-Saharan nation. Like its neighbor Chad, and the Federation of Nigeria, it lies across the boundary line separating the Moslem religion of the north from the animist and Christian religions of the south. The religious split in the Sudan is accentuated by the racial configuration. The northern half of the country is occupied by Arab peoples, while the southern regions are the domain of Nilotic and Negroid tribes. Both groups, due to the longstanding differences of

religion, race, language, skin color, and historical development share feelings of enmity and distrust that currently have taken the form of a liberation and secession movement in the south. Terrorist activities continue and the situation contains a great potential for instability in the northern African region.

The British government pursued colonial policies which had the effect of intensifying the schism. The south was kept almost completely isolated by the British in an effort to prevent proselytizing by Moslems among the Negro population. In 1952, in response to mounting Egyptian pressures for incorporation of the Sudan, England began to speed up the process of granting the Sudan independence. Southern leaders were dissatisfied with the lack of guarantees envisaged for them in the new self-government statute, and the revolt in the three southern provinces broke out before the Sudan became independent in 1956. Subsequent pleas by the south for internal autonomy were increasingly ignored by the government, and the southern position hardened into separatist demands. The Sudan African National Union (SANU) and Southern Front are the main groups which represent the southerners, while a terrorist organization, Anyanya, conducts an effective military opposition. During the summer of 1966, southern rebels were reported to be in tenuous control of the countryside, while government troops are in control of urban areas.²⁸

The bitterness of the fighting, and the "scorched earth" policy reportedly followed by the government troops,²⁹ has produced a large number of refugees in the neighboring countries of Kenya, Uganda, Chad, the CAR, Congo-L., and Ethiopia, severely straining their resources.³⁰ Claims concerning the massacre of southerners by federal troops vary according to the source, yet there is no doubt that a substantial number were killed, creating a residue of ill-will which has, as in the Nigerian case, prejudiced significant compromise. Army morale concerning the conditions of service in the anti-rebel campaign is apparently poor,³¹ and discussions of a referendum to determine the fate of the three southern provinces have become increasingly frequent.³²

In the other northern African countries, regional differences are not nearly as severe, although the potential for social unrest is always present. In Libya, the provinces of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania are both inhabited by Arab Moslems, yet a wide cultural gulf separates them, even to the extent that the nation must endure two federal capitals, one at Benghazi and another at Tripoli. In Cyrenaica, tribal relations and nomadism are the central features of social life, while Tripolitania is primarily urban, detribalized and sedentary. The Sanusi order in Cyrenaica is puritanically orthodox in its Islamic practice, and scorns the "soft and dissolute" life of the urban Tripolitanians. The Tripolitanians tend to be more progressively oriented, and are generally, if clandestinely, opposed to the conservative ruling monarchy.

King Idris himself remains widely respected, because of his role in the independence movement, but his succession is expected to produce a major crisis, since he has no sons or brothers. The factional disputes already produced by this situation are certain to intensify the centrifugal forces at work. The recent oil discoveries and resultant revenues have added a new urgency to the struggle between the progressives and conservatives, and carries a threat to the Monarchy as well as the Monarch.³³

In Morocco, the other monarchy of the north African area, there is also a split between conservative and progressive forces, in which the Berber tribes of the Atlas mountain regions play a part. It took France almost twenty years to pacify the Moroccan countryside due to the resistance of its population. The attempt in 1930 to strengthen French control by dividing the country along Arab-Berber lines,³⁴ failed; the Berber united with the urban Moroccan to form an organized nationalist movement.

After the departure of the French, however, the politicized Berber abandoned the pragmatic alliance with the urban nationalist elite and returned to the defense of his own interests, best described as rural independence. A campaign of passive resistance to government policies in 1958-59 occasionally broke out in armed hostilities, particularly in the Rif mountains along the Mediterranean coast. Even today, although economic and cultural assimilation has narrowed the gap between Berber and Arab, Berber tribesmen in the Atlas Mountains often represent a stronghold of opposition both to the King, whose rule they have never completely accepted, and to the progressives, who also might challenge their autonomy.

The Berber in Algeria occupies a similar position. Algerian resistance to French occupation was centered in the Kabylia mountains and required a fifty year pacification effort. In the 1930's this same intransigence reasserted itself in the form of assimilationist demands. In 1945, and again in 1954, when violence broke out (on the latter occasion to last for 8 years) the clandestine Kabylie-centered Front des Forces Socialistes (FFS) led the disturbances. Kabylie guerilla forces formed the hard core of the wilayists, the "internal" army, which bore the brunt of the fighting, while Col. Hourari Boumedienne's "external army," the present ANP, waited on the border.³⁵

With the signing of the Evian accords in March 1962, the unity imposed by the revolutionary conditions among the Algerian groups disintegrated. Opposition to the new regime arose again in the Kabylia. In September 1963, the Berbers of Kabylia revolted against the government, and the insurgency continued until the fall of 1964. In fact, some sources suggest that Ben Bella's attempts to make concessions to these rebels precipitated his overthrow in November 1965.³⁶

Differences between urban and rural segments of the population are also evident in Tunisia and the UAR but due to the special efforts at

political integration made by the leadership in these countries, such particularism has not posed a threat to stability.

Economic Factors: The Sudan is the poorest of the north African states. The country's immediate economic problem is its dependence upon a single crop. Cotton provides over 65% of the foreign exchange. Due to recent marketing difficulties, cotton has caused a drop in Sudanese foreign reserves from 60 million pounds in 1960-61 to 22 million pounds in 1965.³⁷ With few of the mineral resources of its neighbors, the Sudan will probably be unable to achieve the necessary diversification in its economy in order to decrease its dependence on the world cotton price.

In the United Arab Republic, raising the domestic standard of living has been perhaps the greatest challenge of all to the Nasser regime. With a relatively sophisticated economic infrastructure, the UAR still claims a per capita GNP of only \$150, which with the exception of Sudan, is the lowest in the area.³⁸

The reason for the failure to keep the standard of living equal to the rise in gross national product can be largely attributed to the rate of population growth. The annual increase of population is 3%, and although an official density figure of 72 persons per square mile ranks the UAR only 35th in the world, a computation based only upon the habitable portion of the nation reveals a population density of some 1,900 per square mile.³⁹ As long as this population explosion continues, any economic advance, such as the completion of the Aswan Dam, will be but a temporary palliative. Birth control programs in the countryside have been of doubtful efficacy.⁴⁰

Libya used to be the poorest country of the north African region. A recent series of oil strikes, however, has made Libya the eighth among the world's oil producing countries. It has now a per capita GNP of \$365, which is the highest of the region. Oil revenues are expected to increase in the future. While such wealth is not usually regarded as a source of instability, it has potential dangers for the Monarchy. In addition to the 9,000 Libyans employed in the industry, the boom has encouraged a mass exodus from rural areas to the cities. This has created urban unemployment and unrest, and has led to the abandonment of farms and a shortage of seasonal workers in agricultural areas.

These sharp dislocations in the economy have necessitated the import of food commodities and caused inflationary price increases of food, rent, and construction. One can reasonably predict that if the benefits of the new economic windfall are not shared with a semi-literate and dissatisfied peasantry, the Palace leadership will have to contend with an increasingly vigorous rural opposition.

The Algerian economy received some shocks from the revolution from which it has not yet recovered. Over 85% of the Europeans in Algeria left

the country, and over two million Algerians were uprooted from their homes and farms. Underemployment was prevalent, and unemployment estimates ranged as high as 80%.⁴¹ Oil discovery holds out the promise of some mitigation, although in the immediate future revenues are expected to increase only gradually. Algeria's economy remains tightly bound to France.⁴² The recent nationalization of Algeria's mines by Boumedienne reflects a conscious attempt to eliminate foreign control of a sizeable industrial sector in the country.⁴³

Internal Political Factors: Political instability is not strange to the north African area, whether prompted by the ethnic divisions of Sudan or the economic disparities of Libya. The Moroccan monarchy and the delicate balance of political power which has been manipulated by the Palace since independence offers an example of how the political process itself can become a source of disorder and unrest. The seizure of the government by the ruling Monarch, King Hassan II, in the summer of 1965 was a public demonstration of the supreme power of the throne.

The King has always seemed to thrive on instability, inasmuch as it affected all governing institutions but the Monarchy. The Constitution of 1962 provided for the supremacy of the Palace and for Morocco's first Parliament. Young Hassan, who succeeded his father, Mohammed V, in 1961, appeared more progressive as his formation of parliamentary institutions indicated, but he also thoroughly understood the Arab tradition of cultivating and flattering one's adversaries.⁴⁴ In this climate the new parliamentarians, instead of representing responsible mass-based political movements or genuine interest groups, were more often men whose interests lay not with achieving reforms, but with attracting the attention of the king or other influential personages;⁴⁵ they found it expedient to be "adaptable."

Such political prostitution encouraged the fracturing of parties, and quickly led to the impasse frequently faced by parliaments when the formation of governing coalitions is rendered impossible by quarreling factions. The Moroccan Parliament, which included approximately 12 political parties by June 1965, passed only four major bills during its first two years of existence. When general discontent in the country erupted in a series of riots, Hassan found that he would have to scuttle the very institutions he had created.⁴⁶ On June 7, 1965, he dismissed the Parliament and Cabinet, and made himself premier as well as king.

This drastic action itself did not result in any immediate repercussions. There is a deep popular attachment of the people to the king. They reacted favorably to the move. The army, which has been treated extremely well since its "heroic" performance in the 1963 border dispute with Algeria, is considered to be loyal to the throne. Hassan's action, however, disrupted interaction between the rulers and opposition leaders, and has strengthened the opposition represented by a small but influential number of exiled leaders. The rather concrete evidence of Moroccan (and French) involvement in the kidnapping and

disappearance of exiled opposition leader Mehdi Ben Barka⁴⁷ is indicative of an increased apprehension on the part of the Monarchy with respect to the activity of its opponents abroad.

In Algeria, where Col. Hourari Boumedienne seized power in the summer of 1965, a definite attempt seems to have been made to avoid the political excesses which led to the downfall of Ben Bella.⁴⁸ The Front of National Liberation (FLN) was depersonalized, and the principle of "collegial rule" reinstated. The chief emphasis seems to be not so much on political reform as economic progress. Boumedienne would prefer to rely on the support of his powerful army rather than to develop a political following.

In Tunisia, President Habib Bourguiba can still count on a remarkable national consensus and on complete control over the Neo-Destour party machinery. The political difficulties in Sudan and Libya grow out of related problems, discussed above, and in the UAR, President Nasser seems to have successfully warded off internal threats to his regime by periodic arrest, trial and execution of members of both left and right extremist groups.⁴⁹

Internal Communism: The most powerful Communist Party in the north Africa area is the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP)⁵⁰ It has long been influential in student and labor circles, and very nearly succeeded in coming to power in the chaos following the fall of the Abboud military government in October 1964.⁵¹ After a key by-election in October 1965 indicated that Communist strength was still growing, a coalition of moderate parties pushed through a Constitutional Amendment to dissolve the Party.⁵² Although it has since gone underground, it still manages to capitalize upon existing radical opinion in the Sudan. The Communist parties in all other North African countries are of insufficient size or influence to constitute a threat to internal security.

Conclusions: With the exception of the Sudan, the north African regimes can currently be characterized as generally stable. The rising expectations brought on by Libya's sudden prosperity, and the autocratic turn taken by King Hassan in Morocco have direct implications for the stability of the respective governing bodies, but they do not appear to have immediate crisis proportions at the present. The unrest in the southern Sudan constitutes a serious conflict potential.

3. International Conflict Potentials

Introduction: Any study of a regional character poses the problem of delimiting the exact geographical area to be considered, particularly when there is more than one overlapping framework which could be used.⁵³ An analysis of the international conflict potentials of the north African area should take cognizance of certain areas of conflict which lie outside the continent. Egypt's Abdel Gamal Nasser, for example, is currently engaged militarily in Yemen to the extent of up to 70,000

troops, runs an arms race with Israel, and is personally involved in a most bitter "fraternal" rivalry with the Saudi Arabian monarchy. But a detailed consideration of such problem areas would not be consistent with the specific intentions of this study.

It is essential, however, that any elements of tension within the context of the Arab League or international Moslem movement which affect the relationships of the north African states be considered, and that observations concerning the interest or activities of the UAR in the north Africa area be placed in the perspective of the UAR's greater orientation toward the Middle East.

Of major sources of potential international conflict, the Morocco-Algeria border dispute appears to be the issue with the greatest immediate potential for armed conflict. The repercussions of the Sudanese secession attempt seem to have some potential for internationalization, but more with respect to the neighboring sub-Saharan states than the north African countries. The ideological division in the Arab League, which has rendered it constantly ineffective, is also appearing to have some "spillover" effect in north Africa, and can be seen in the tensions between the UAR, on the one hand, and Tunisia and Libya, on the other.

Military Relationships: The military establishments of the north African countries are of a much larger magnitude than sub-Saharan armed forces. The Egyptian army is the largest in Africa comprising 180,000 regular troops, and 120,000 National Guard and reserve units.⁵⁴ The only African country to have externally-based military forces, the UAR currently maintains almost 70,000 troops in Yemen and 2,500 in Iraq. It also has a sizeable missile command, consisting of approximately 4,500 soldiers and technicians, and some missiles in the 300-500 mile range. German- and Austrian-born scientists are assisting in the missile program, while the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia equipped the armed forces on a lavish scale.

The next most powerful military establishment in the area is Boumedienne's Armee Nationale Populaire (ANP). In August 1964, in an attempt at rehabilitation, Soviet arms, planes and tanks were substituted for the "motley salad of French, German, Czech and American weapons"⁵⁵ which Algeria used against Morocco. Again in May 1966, reports of additions to the 60,000 man army and air force began to puzzle diplomatic circles, which saw no reason for the buildup in the context of north African politics.⁵⁶ The neighboring countries of Tunisia and Morocco, both of whom have recently raised the touchy issue of border claims (see below), have begun to modernize their own equipment in response to the Algerian buildup. Observers still consider the ten-year-old 42,000 man Moroccan army better staffed and better trained than Algeria's (the bulk of which consists of illiterate peasant-guerrillas), although this advantage seems likely to shift in the near future.⁵⁷

The Tunisian, Libyan, and Sudanese armies are much smaller. Sudan has an army of 17,500 men which ran the country, somewhat unsuccessfully, for six years. The troops have spent much of their time fighting guerrillas in the south. The Tunisian army of 16,000 has had some experience as part of the U.N. Congo force, but it is otherwise inexperienced. The Libyan army of 6,000 is the smallest of the region, outnumbered even by the 12,000-man Libyan Police force, which has recently been given the responsibility for guarding Cyrenaican oil fields against sabotage attempts.

It is, therefore, quite evident that the preponderance of military power in the two north African countries, which have assumed the most radical ideological stances in the past, could in itself be a cause of concern to the remaining states. The presence of the U.S. air base near Tripoli has increased Egyptian pressures on the Libyan government. The Algerian buildup of military capacity is likely to stimulate commensurate preparations in neighboring states.

Border Issues and Irredentism: The haphazard methods used to draw African boundaries have created problems in many places. The Algerian boundary in the Saharan area is particularly ill-defined, and border disputes have arisen with both Morocco and Tunisia over the location of the north-south boundaries, particularly since in the Moroccan case, there are important mineral deposits in the area. The French never formally delineated the border, and in October 1963, armed hostilities broke out around Tindouf and Hassi Beida. Despite Egyptian and, reportedly, also Soviet assistance, the Algerian army was defeated by the Moroccan forces.

Because the border conflict threatened to assume international dimensions the President of Mali and the Emperor of Ethiopia helped to effect a cease-fire agreement at the Bamako Conference in October 1963. An ad-hoc commission of the OAU was established to settle the dispute. Although the cease-fire was observed during the following two years, the ad hoc commission failed to arrive at a lasting solution in its nine sessions held since its creation and the dispute remains active.

President Boumedienne, who was head of the Army in the 1963 border war (and reportedly embittered by the defeat)⁵⁸ may even be anxious to reopen the conflict with his strengthened army. On May 7, 1966, Boumedienne announced the nationalization of mines in Algeria, naming specifically the Gara-Djebilet iron ore mine (which is situated in territory claimed by Morocco) and the lead and zinc mine at El Abed, (which lies on both sides of the border and is worked by both countries).⁵⁹ The Moroccan government, which is reported to be one of the main shareholders in El Abed and would be affected by the nationalization measures,⁶⁰ immediately sent an envoy to Boumedienne to raise the issue of the Gara-Djebilet mine. The following week Algerian troops occupied Merkala in the demilitarized zone and in the course of ensuing troop movements by Morocco, four soldiers were wounded and an officer killed by a mine.⁶¹ Such a small incident bears little resemblance to the all-out fighting of 1963, yet it is a reminder that the basic territorial question has not been solved.

The dispute between Algeria and Tunisia never reached serious proportions. In 1964, Tunisia began negotiations with Algeria for favorable terms on oil and gas from fields near the Tunisian border in return for dropping the border claims.⁶² When President Boumedienne came to power, however, he broke off all such negotiations. On the anniversary of his takeover, he lashed out at Ben Bella for having given assurances to President Bourguiba on the "Beacon 233" issue,⁶³ asserting that "frontier questions... cannot be made the subject of bargaining."⁶⁴

The question of irredentism has not arisen recently in north Africa, although at one time Morocco's claims, representing the most grandiose ambitions anywhere on the continent, were the topic of much heated discussion on the part of newly independent states. Although the claims included major parts of Mali and Algeria, Spanish Sahara, Ifni, and the entire nation of Mauritania, the Moroccan government has become more circumspect with regard to its designs on independent states. Since the Spanish Government has exhibited a degree of flexibility with regard to its former colonies, Hassan II has been content to work quietly through diplomatic channels. However, on the issue of Spanish Sahara, which Mauritania was once prepared to see in Spanish hands, since it acted as a buffer to Moroccan expansion, a potential conflict area exists. Both the Moroccan and Mauritanian Governments are pressuring Spain to relinquish the territory to them, and what has until now remained a quiescent problem of jurisdiction could easily bring about a resurgence of Moroccan irredentist activity.

Morocco's irredentism is rooted in its nationalist ideology and influences its political life. It is a powerful force which neither the Moroccan Government, nor its neighbors, especially Algeria, can ignore. Morocco's claims on Algeria involved areas of great mineral resources. Algeria fears that any concessions to Morocco might encourage other states to press their demands for a share of the Sahara. The Moroccan-Algerian border dispute touches upon vital interests of the two states. The intractability of the boundary problem can further be explained by its historical origin, which reaches back into pre-colonial days.⁶⁵

Inter-State Subversion: With the overthrow of Ben Bella in June 1965, and Kwame Nkrumah in February 1966, two of the foremost practitioners of inter-state subversion and foreign adventurism, the heads of independent African states received a temporary respite from foreign interference in their affairs. In the Maghreb, where Algiers had become a haven for exiles of all nations including Morocco and Tunisia, the substitution of Boumedienne for Ben Bella may herald a future concentration on internal rather than external affairs.

In the UAR, Nasser's preoccupation with Yemen, Israel and the intrigues of the Arab League have diverted his subversive efforts from sub-Saharan Africa to some extent. Cairo was the favorite refuge of scores of nationalist African leaders.⁶⁶ It is the home of the "Voice

of Free Africa," a powerful transmitting station used by exile groups to beam messages back home. It provides the locale for various Afro-Asian and pan-African gatherings and conferences. Nasser also attempts to retain his considerable personal influence with Arab communities in sub-Saharan Africa, such as the Lebanese in Liberia.⁶⁷ Crises such as the Algeria-Morocco border dispute and the Congo rebellion cast Nasser in the role of arms supplier by proxy for the Soviet Union.⁶⁸

The assistance given to Algeria in its dispute with Morocco illustrates the wide division between conservatives and progressives within the Arab League. The socialists and radicals who are more often than not controlling the governments of Syria, Iraq, Algeria and the UAR are uncompromisingly opposed to the conservative regimes of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iran, Libya, Tunisia, and Morocco. Despite the professed efforts at Arab unity, it is this schism which contributed to the weakness of the Palestine united Arab command. This split sustains the present conflict in Yemen, and accounts for a considerable amount of the subversion which occurs in north Africa.

The most recent charge of inter-state subversion in the region has come from Libya. Five mid-Saharan oil wells were sabotaged on May 14, 1965, and oil storage tanks at Marsa al-Brega were similarly destroyed on July 22,⁶⁹ which led to the arrest and conviction of three Libyans and an Egyptian police official. Observers believed that their subsequent sentence to death or life imprisonment for "supplying a foreign government with information connected with defense" was an indication that "Libyan authorities blame the UAR for directing the sabotage plot and are discreetly warning Cairo against future interference with Libya's vital oil industry."⁷⁰

The UAR has tried to make the British and American air bases in Libya a special target of political attack. In February 1964 Nasser called for the liquidation of western bases in Libya. Partly because of pressure by pro-Nasser Libyans, the Libyan Chamber of Deputies asked to negotiate the evacuation of the bases.⁷¹ This action, however, undermined in fact King Idris' policy of cooperation with the British,⁷² and the King offered to abdicate. Since Libyan leaders wanted to avoid a more profound domestic crisis, they rallied to support the King and toned down the demand for liquidation of the bases. Tensions were further reduced when an agreement with Britain was subsequently negotiated under which the British promised to phase out their battalion and area headquarters in Tripoli by March 1966.⁷³

With the increased prosperity from oil revenues, a new sense of independence has developed in Libya and the pull of Arab nationalism has diminished somewhat. In May 1965, when ten Arab countries broke with Germany over Bonn's recognition of Israel, Libya did not follow suit. In December 1965, when OAU members denounced Britain's handling of the Rhodesian situation, Libya refused to follow Nasser's lead and declined

to vote for the anti-British resolution of the OAU.

Another factor militating against the success of Egyptian subversion in north Africa has been the somewhat defiant rejection of Nasserist influence by President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia. Bourguiba's political philosophy defies classification. On the subject of Islam, he appears almost as radical as Nasser, abolishing polygamy, giving women equal rights, and denouncing the Fast of Ramadan. However his opposition to Nasser (the two nations closed their respective embassies in 1965 after Bourguiba suggested the possibility of negotiations with Israel on the refugee issue) has led him more frequently into an alignment with Arab conservatives, such as Hassan and Faisal. His refusal to participate in Arab League activities as long as they were dominated by Nasser, is thought to have emboldened other Arab states to experiment with greater independence.⁷⁴

Conclusions: The prospects for international conflict in northern Africa are somewhat limited, but they do exist. The latent disputes on Algeria's eastern and western borders become increasingly sensitive as the nation's capacity for seeking redress increases. Egyptian involvement in such a conflict, as was the case in the 1963 fighting, is a definite possibility, and could lead to indirect Soviet assistance.

The recurrent polarization of the Arab world also remains a threat to the stability of north Africa. The opposition of Nasserist republicanism to conservative monarchism has already produced an armed clash in Yemen and there are indications that the Egyptian President would not remain completely aloof from any anti-royalist upheavals in Morocco and Libya. Particularly in the latter case a response might be expected, since there would be few of the difficulties of sustaining a foreign base of operations. The oil revenues of Libya are quite attractive, and the instability expected after the reign of Idris is conducive to outside intervention. The problems created by such precepts as the inviolability of national sovereignty have been circumvented in the past (1958) by the UAR in its expansive efforts. This tactic, by which Nasser temporarily became ruler of Egypt, Syria and Yemen, could probably be applied to the neighboring Libyan nation.

4. Implications for U.S. Security Interests

North Africa remains of strategic importance to the United States. The primary interest of the United States is to insure the non-alignment and independence of the north African states in issues between western and Communist nations. The major objectives of the United States are to help preserve international and domestic stability as a base for political viability and economic development and to limit the opportunities for increasing Soviet influence in the region, particularly in Egypt.

Internal Crisis Potentials: With the exception of the Sudan, the internal crisis potentials of the northern African states are limited. In turn, the implications for U.S. interests are marginal. Where the Maghreb countries are concerned, France would be more affected than the United States in case an internal crisis ensues. The situation in the Sudan remains potentially the most explosive one in the northern African area and needs to be watched by the United States.

It should be pointed out, however, that although the other states currently present a stable political picture, each carries the seeds of domestic unrest and violence. Libya faces the problem of succession. Morocco has the prospect of rapid social change which could jeopardize its stability. Egypt has serious economic and labor difficulties. The danger to the United States lies in the fact that the Soviet Union would abet internal political divisions and capitalize on a possible eruption of a crisis.

International Crisis Potentials: The international conflict potentials in northern Africa have more immediate and more direct implications for the stability of the region and, hence, for U.S. security interests. Although the Arab-Israeli conflict is not an African problem as such and falls outside the scope of this study, it should be stressed that it has an extremely high disruptive potential for the stability and peace in the region. It is the focal point of tension. Egypt has particularly engaged in an active arms race with Israel over the last fifteen years. Should tensions deepen between Egypt and Israel, or should armed hostilities break out, it will be the conflict most likely to draw in the United States, directly or through the United Nations, and possibly the Soviet Union.

Within northern Africa the Moroccan-Algerian border dispute continues to present a threat to the peace. Because of Egyptian and Soviet sympathy for the Algerian position, the dispute may escalate to the point that it becomes a part of cold war tensions. The Soviet Union, however, is more likely to aid Algeria through the use of a third country, in this case Egypt, rather than to intervene directly. The United States may become involved with mediation efforts and political and economic pressures, but only after OAU and U.N. mediation attempts have failed.

Attracted by Libyan oil deposits, Egypt may seek to further its designs on Libya. Increased Egyptian influence over developments in Libya, particularly after the departure of King Idris, would pose a threat to the area. Washington probably would be forced to withdraw from Libyan bases, and European interests in Libyan oil supplies would be adversely affected. But the improving economic situation in Libya and the history

of UAR attempts at hegemony in the Middle East argue against a close Libyan-Egyptian relationship.

The inter-state subversive efforts of north African leaders, especially Ben Bella and Nasser, have exacerbated political unrest elsewhere on the continent. Their willingness to provide assistance to dissident groups and to channel Communist arms to rebel movements has contravened U.S. interests in African peace and order. The efforts of Algeria, Egypt, and the Sudan on behalf of the insurgents in the Congo in 1964-65 threatened to turn what was largely a domestic uprising into an international conflict. The United States would have been confronted with the problem of direct military support to the Congo Government, if the Congolese rebels had also been assisted with adequate manpower,⁷⁵ as Algeria's president had pledged.

Subversion has been conducted primarily by radical leaders and has provided, therefore, an opportunity for enhancing Communist influence in dissident movements. Ben Bella's removal from the political scene and Nasser's preoccupation with Yemen and Israel have reduced the threat of continued subversion. Subversion is also a two-edged sword. Few African nations are politically so secure that they do not need to fear the implications of supporting dissidence abroad. The same arms that Sudan helped forward to the Congolese rebels were later also used by southern Sudanese rebels. Ben Bella was overthrown partly because of his foreign intrigues.

In summary, the two major issues which can throw north Africa into conflict are the Algerian-Moroccan border dispute and the Arab-Israeli problem. For the time being no other international crisis situations exist which will have serious repercussions for the United States.

C. WESTERN AFRICA⁷⁶

1. United States Security Interests in Western Africa

With the exception of Liberia and Nigeria, the western region as such does not rank high in U.S. security calculations.

The historic relationship with Liberia has produced a more specific U.S. interest in the security and development of this state. Liberia is the only African country with which the United States has a special treaty of cooperation. This accord, signed in 1959, pledged in somewhat loose terms that the United States would "consult" with Liberia on defense measures in case Liberia would be attacked or would be threatened with aggression.⁷⁷ The United States also has a military assistance program in Liberia. Private U.S. economic investments in Liberia further shape the interest of the United States in this country.

A number of factors combine to create a special concern with Nigeria. Nigeria has the largest population of any African country. Its

generally pro-western attitude towards cold war issues and its mitigating role in inter-African affairs, made the United States look upon Nigeria as a major moderating force on the continent. Compared to most other African states, U.S. economic assistance to Nigeria has been substantial.⁷⁸ The initial hope that Nigeria would develop into one of the more stable and democratic countries in Africa has been destroyed by the recent and continuing ethnic turmoil.

With respect to the other states of the western region, and even in the case of Nigeria, the interests of the former metropolitan powers are much more direct. Eight of the fourteen west African states were grouped in former Afrique Occidentale Francaise, while Togo was a French administered trust territory. With the exception of Guinea and Mali, France has maintained intimate ties with all of them. Senegal, traditionally the keystone of French West Africa, is the site for one of the three major French bases in Africa. France has specific defense and aid agreements with Mauritania, Senegal, Niger, Ivory Coast, Dahomey, and Togo. Upper Volta is provided with French military assistance, and even Mali was the recipient of financial aid for military purposes.⁷⁹

Like Commonwealth ties in general, Britain's relationships with its former territories are less formally expressed. British assistance with the development of these states continues. Military aid, primarily in the form of training, is tendered to Ghana, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone.

The United States can thus largely depend on France and Britain to underwrite the security and development of their former territories. Communist incursions into Ghana, Guinea and Mali, however, have aroused U.S. concern. These three countries have received both Soviet and Chinese Communist aid. Soviet arms assistance, compared with the size of their military establishments, has been relatively high.⁸⁰ Communist agents were able to infiltrate exiled opposition movements from independent African states whose members had found a haven in Ghana, Guinea, or Mali. Accra in particular, was a center of Communist subversive operations. The expulsion of Soviet and Chinese technicians and diplomatic personnel from Ghana by the new military regime has relaxed cold war tensions in that country.

2. Internal Crisis Potentials

Cultural Factors: Predominantly negroid populations inhabit the western region; only in the northern parts do Arab and Berber tribes live. Traditional tensions between Berbers and Arabs, on the one hand, and Negroes, on the other, have produced violence at times. The Tuareg revolt of 1964 in Mali, for example, reflected the protest of Tuareg Berber tribesmen against their ancient enemy, the Bambara Negroes, who control the government. Mauritania experiences a similar problem of having to overcome the cleavage between the northern, more traditionally oriented Berbers and the more progressive southern Negroes. The government has been able so far to create a modus vivendi between the two opposing groups.⁸¹

Although the western region has a fairly homogeneous racial population, its tribal structure is enormously varied and complex. Each country contains numerous tribes and sub-tribes. In some instances, tribes have a traditional hostility towards each other. Frequently, however, tribal cleavages are reenforced by certain, usually related, factors.

First, regional economic differences in Ghana, Nigeria, Dahomey, Togo, Liberia, and Sierra Leone have deepened existing tribal differences.⁸² For example, certain tribal lands are richer in resources than others, which gives the occupant tribe a special interest in perpetuating tribal divisions. Upper Volta and Dahomey, until the recent coups, were dominated by tribally-based parties organized around traditional chiefs who also controlled the primary sources of production. A similar situation exists in Niger. In Ghana, a state less troubled by tribal conflicts, historic competition continues between the Fantis and the more powerful Ashantis, whose tribal lands produce the cocoa crop, gold, and timber. Nkrumah succeeded in ending Ashanti dominance, partly through spreading some of the cocoa wealth to the Fantis, whom he used as the basis for his party. Ashanti opposition and resentment was suppressed by imprisoning Ashanti leaders.⁸³

Secondly, differences in degrees of social and cultural advancement further serve to strengthen tribal cleavages. As a result of the patterns of European settlement, social and economic development of the coastal areas outpaced the interior, which accentuated the tensions between the coastal tribes and those of the hinterland. The southern Negro tribes in Mauritania, more receptive to French culture and education, have a much higher educational level than the Moorish majority in the north. In Nigeria, the more advanced educational and economic development of the Ibo and Yoruba reenforced their split with the northern Hausa. In Liberia and Sierra Leone, initially colonies for ex-slaves, a somewhat different historic background yielded similar rifts between the more educated and culturally advanced coastal settlers and tribes of the interior.

A third factor which accentuates the tribal distinctions is the divisive influence of Islam. West Africa was the historic scene of Islamic penetration into the animist Negro communities. Whereas northern and western parts of the region became largely Moslem, southern areas remained mostly animist and were later partly converted to Christianity. Where the line dividing Moslem Africans from animist or Christian groups cuts across a state, fundamental internal divisions exist. Guinea, Senegal, and Mauritania are predominantly Moslem, but all other countries of western Africa have substantial religious minorities. The most dramatic example of the conflict potential of the religious factor can be found in Nigeria. Ancient tribal hostilities, and religious, social, and economic cleavages among the three major tribal groupings, combine to produce the recent and continuing violent upheavals.⁸⁴

About half of Nigeria's population lives in the so-called Northern Region, ruled by the autocratic and traditional Moslem Hausa-Fulani emirs; in the Eastern Region are the more progressive and advanced, primarily Christian, Ibos; in the Western Region the Yorubas live, who, though much wealthier, are somewhat similar to the Ibos. The contrived balance between the three traditionally antagonistic regional groups finally broke down after the rigged election of October 1965 in the Western Region yielded a return in favor of the Northern rulers. In January 1966, the Ibo-led army intervened, which brought the regime of Ibo Maj.-Gen. Ironsi into power. The tribal divisions, however, made themselves felt within the army and six months later dissident northern troops staged a counter coup which resulted in the assumption of power by Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon, a Christian from a northern minority tribe. The situation is currently still fluid. Whether the Hausas will try to impose their control by force, whether the Ibos will try to implement their threat of secession, and whether Nigeria can remain a state, are still in doubt. Some loose confederate structure, providing considerable autonomy to each of the Regions, appears more likely. Ethnic divisions, compounded by religious and social factors produced the disintegration of the Nigerian Federation, breakdown of the unity of the army, and massive tribal killings.

Political Factors: Tribal and regional divisions in western Africa are generally translated in political differences. In this respect the conflict potential in the political situation is a function of ethnic and cultural elements. A number of general and specific factors influence this relationship and shape the potential for political stability or instability in each state.

First of all, virtually all states in western Africa have a single-party system or a system which in practice amounts to this. Only Togo, Sierra Leone, and little Gambia still have a multi-party system. The generalization can be made that inasmuch as a single-party system tends to suppress political dissidence, the system has built-in conflict potentials.⁸⁵

Secondly, where the single-party is the instrument of a highly authoritarian ruler, who tolerates no political opposition, the potential for internal stability is high. Nkrumah's efforts to eliminate all political opposition precipitated his downfall. To the extent that army rule also has the tendency to suppress political opposition, the long term stability of the military regimes in Dahomey, Upper Volta, Ghana, and Nigeria is far from established.

Thirdly, if the tribal and regional factions can find expression within the ruling party and can create a basis for cooperation, the potential for instability decreases. In Guinea, where Sékou Toure's Parti démocratique de Guinée claims to be the representative of all the

people,⁸⁶ the Political Bureau and the Government carefully balance the traditional ethnic rivals, the Malinkes and the Foulahs. Toure himself is a Malinke; Saifoulaye Diallo, the Minister of State and second important political figure, is a Foulah. As long as Toure can restrain in this way the built-in opposition of the Foulahs, his power position is relatively safe.

In Mauritania, President Mokta Ould Daddah's power base is a mass national party, which is actually a coalition embracing the northern Moorish opposition.⁸⁷

In contrast, ethnic and regional divisions continued to disturb the domestic political stability in Dahomey. Originally, the three rival political parties represented the ethnic power centers in the north, the southeast, and the southwest. When Col. Christophe Soglo intervened for the first time in October 1963, a government was installed based on a new single "national" party, the Parti Démocratique Dahoméen (PDD). But the three regional factions continued to be represented in the government and the PDD, producing the same tensions and conflicts as before. In November 1965, the intervention of Col. Soglo resulted in the dissolution of the PDD and the creation of another provisional government, pending national elections. The three main political parties promptly formed new parties. Col. Soglo finally dissolved all political parties. A new government which he controlled was established and elections were indefinitely postponed.

In Nigeria, the divisions among the three regional groupings prevented eventually the functioning of a multi-party system and subsequently brought down the military regime of Ironsi.

Fourthly, even if the national leaders are sensitive to tribal divisions, the conflict between the more progressive younger and the more traditional older generations can produce tensions and instability. Senegal's Leopold Senghor, a Catholic, rules through the Union Progressiste Sénégalaise, a merger of his own following and the opposition. He is supported by the traditionalist leaders of the Moslem tribes. But the urban Christian militants and the younger Moslem progressives were urging reforms and becoming increasingly restless. The tensions came to a head in December 1962, and resulted in the arrest of the Moslem Prime Minister Mamadou Dia, who symbolized the aspirations of the younger generation. A year later at the elections, demonstrations by Dia supporters resulted in a number of deaths.⁸⁸ Although Senghor and his party leaders firmly retain their political control, the long range domestic stability will depend on the accommodation that can be made with these younger dissidents.

In Niger, where President Hamani Diori consolidated his party position by allying himself with the traditional Moslem Chiefs, a similar potential for instability exists.⁸⁹

In a sense Guinea presents the reverse picture. Alienated younger and more educated elements have come to oppose the radical and repressive policies of the government. Anti-government exiles have formed a national liberation front in Paris with the aim of overthrowing Sékou Touré's regime.⁹⁰

Certain leaders may have succeeded to some extent in mitigating or postponing these problems, but the stability of their government rests upon their personal charisma and control. In Mali and Liberia, Mobido Keita and William V. S. Tubman are rather solidly in power. President Keita has made a determined effort to cut across tribal and regional loyalties and to establish a policy which has national support. The government party does not control all Mali factions, as the Tuareg revolt of 1964 demonstrated, but Keita has what in an African context amounts to a mass following.⁹¹ In Liberia, the government's True Whig Party has no significant competitors. President Tubman's political skill has enabled him to create a rapprochement between the traditional chiefs of the interior and the coastal elites. The stability of his government, however, depends on his personal rule. Neither in Mali, nor in Liberia, has a successor been named, which suggests that the transition is likely to be accompanied by unrest and political chaos. Particularly in Liberia a latent opposition is developing among students and among more progressive members of the elite and military against Tubman's conservative domestic and foreign policies.⁹² The eventuality of a coup, therefore, should not be foreclosed.

Conclusions: Most west African states are characterized by regionally based tribal divisions, which economic, social, and religious factors have accentuated. Enclosed within the framework of a national state, this structure has built-in conflict potentials which political factors can either intensify or mitigate. Such opposing regional factions destroyed the civilian government in Dahomey, and the framework of the state itself in Nigeria.

Most national leaders, however, have managed to create some kind of modus vivendi among the traditional rival groups. The government parties of Guinea, Mauritania, and Niger, for example, reflect the coalition with the tribal opposition. Mali sought a solution by trying to erode intra-tribal ties.

Only in the Ivory Coast -- where for various reasons Félix Houphouët Boigny emerged as leader of the whole state --⁹³ and to some extent in Senegal, stability is not threatened by regional and ethnic hostilities.

In Senegal, however, and in other states where the position of the government rests upon support by the traditional chiefs, domestic stability can be disturbed by the developing opposition among younger progressive members of the Christian and Moslem tribes. Under somewhat different conditions, this type of hostility can jeopardize the internal stability of Liberia after President Tubman's death.

Tensions between the younger and older generations can become seriously disruptive forces in all west African states, if not throughout all of Africa. Regardless of the particular political system -- multiple parties, single coalition parties, or any other kind of party -- power within the party or faction is wielded by a small elite. In several instances this has facilitated the forging of alliances between tribal groups because the chiefs did not have to be too sensitive to the preferences of their mass base. But as this mass base advances socially and educationally and becomes gradually politicized, friction is liable to grow between younger members and leaders. This phenomenon can occur in a conservative-led country, such as Senegal, as well as in a socialist-led state, such as Guinea.

3. International Conflict Potentials

In spite of the political fragmentation of west Africa into a series of French and English speaking states, a Portuguese colony, and a country which has strong historic ties with the United States, international conflict has not occurred. In fact, international conflict potentials are low, particularly after Nkrumah disappeared from the political scene.

None of the west African states has sufficient military resources to constitute an armed threat against a neighbor. Even in Ghana, which has a relatively strong military power base, the current regime is too preoccupied with consolidating its own position to be able to afford foreign adventures.

In the French speaking states, the common affinity which many of the leaders have for France, and the bonds derived from experiences shared in the pre-independence days, have kept channels of communication open among ruling elites, even during periods of relatively serious international stress.

Certain factors, however, have caused profound frictions or have the capability to disturb the political climate.

1) The presence of a white-ruled enclave in west Africa has inevitably produced tensions, and especially so since a nationalist movement is conducting an active insurgency with some success.⁹⁴ Senegal and Guinea have provided sanctuary and covert support to the Partido Africano da Independencia da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), the liberation movement in Portuguese Guinea. Portugal has violated the borders of Senegal and Guinea. The ensuing problems have remained at the diplomatic level, but the potential for further internationalization is there. More importantly for long range stability is the spectre that PAIGC's leadership, should it ever come into control, would produce an extremely radical regime, which would deepen the crisis potentials in neighboring states.

2) In fragmented western Africa most borders cut across ethnic groupings. For various reasons the tribal separations have not caused serious conflict.⁹⁵ In only two instances the question of divided tribes became an important issue. The cases involved the Sanwi tribe on the eastern border of the Ivory Coast which wanted to form a separate state or secede to Ghana; and the Ewe which had been divided by the boundary between Ghana and Togo. In both cases, however, Nkrumah's efforts to capitalize on the separatist ambitions of the Sanwi and the Ewe exacerbated tensions. The Ivory Coast settled the Sanwi issue by suppressing the leaders; the Ewe problem gradually resolved itself through the declining enthusiasm among the Ewe population in Togo for secession to Ghana.

3) The radicalism of the leaders of Guinea, Mali, and Ghana in particular, has been a major source of instability in the western region. Their virulent anti-colonialism and militant pan-Africanism automatically placed them into opposition to the more moderate leaders of other states who preferred to retain the ties with the former metropole and to preserve the territorial status quo.

Ghana under the Nkrumah regime operated a wide network of subversion throughout west Africa and in other parts of the continent as well.⁹⁶ Nkrumah used his own agents, supported expatriate opposition movements, and permitted Communist powers to use Ghana as a base for subversion of African states. Nkrumah's subversive efforts were an overriding motivation which forced the French speaking states to coalesce in the Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache (OCAM). The deposition of Nkrumah removed the threat of Ghanaian subversion. Although banned anti-government elements still find a haven in Conakry and Bamako, the activities of Guinea and Mali never assumed the widespread proportions as those of Ghana.

In retrospect, the general tenor of international relations in western Africa has increasingly moved towards cooperation. Active interference in each other's internal affairs has diminished. For the time being the factors which can upset the regional stability are no longer operative. In the more distant future, the situation in Portuguese Guinea can generate disturbances. A coup d'etat in one of the moderate states, where the opposition is lodged in militant groups, can cause a new wave of inter-state subversion.

4. Implications for U.S. Security Interests

Potential conflict and crisis situations which have a direct bearing on U.S. security interests in the western region center in Liberia, Nigeria, and Portuguese Guinea. Only Nigeria is likely to present implications for the near future.

The domestic conflict potential of Nigeria remains one of the highest of the entire African continent. Whether Nigeria can survive the present

conflict among the northern Moslem tribes, the mostly Christian Ibos, and the Yorubas of the Western Region, and whether it can preserve its territorial and national integrity, is far from certain. Although U.S. military intervention appears unlikely, assistance with rescue operations of persecuted minorities or white citizens may be necessary. In any event, the United States can no longer depend on Nigeria as an exponent of democratic development and as a stabilizing force in inter-African affairs.

In Liberia, President Tubman retains his strong hold over domestic affairs. But his highly autocratic rule suggests that a transition will create disorders. Since there are no important rivals to Tubman's party, a successor regime will probably pursue a similar policy, based on cooperation with the United States. However, a potential is present for a coup by the more progressive elements of the elite and military. Tubman can invoke the 1959 agreement with the United States, claiming foreign subversion, for example. The terms of the agreement do not require any more definite action beyond consultation. United States military intervention would certainly be attacked as "colonialism" by other African states and U.S. security interests in Liberia are not so vital that compliance with such a request is necessary. On the other hand, should developments lead to a more radically inclined regime, U.S. economic interests in Liberia would be adversely affected.

In Portuguese Guinea the rebellion can eventually engender an international crisis involving a U.S. NATO ally and host to the U.S. base in the Azores. The U.S. interest in stability of west African states can also be affected should PAIGC succeed in ousting the Portuguese.

In other areas of west Africa conflict potentials have implications more for French and British interests than U.S. interests. This does not mean that upheavals there would not ultimately concern the United States. United States objectives in Africa have generally been promoted by the moderate policies of most French speaking states. But, on the whole, any sudden change in the domestic balance of power in these states will affect France and Britain more directly than the United States.

D. EQUATORIAL AFRICA⁹⁷

1. United States Security Interests

Direct U.S. Interests: Since 1960 the United States has been deeply involved in equatorial Africa. The major reason for this involvement can be found in the troubled post-independence history of Congo-L.⁹⁸

Located in the heart of Africa, the former Belgian Congo occupies a strategic position on the continent. Bordered by eight independent states and one European colony, the Congo is vulnerable to external penetration. At the same time, the Congo can threaten the security of the various

adjacent states. United States interests in equatorial Africa, although different from country to country, are directly influenced by developments within Congo-L itself. The Congo's mineral wealth further enhances the significance of the country. While direct U.S. investments in the Congo represent only 1% of the total investment there, continued western access to the vast economic resources of the Congo, and, in turn, denial of access to an anti-western power, are important to the United States.⁹⁹

The United States has, therefore, a major interest in protecting the Leopoldville Government against external subversion and in preventing an extremist regime from gaining control over the Congo. This latter eventuality would result in increased dangers for the stability of the governments in neighboring states. Hence, when the Congo's governmental structure collapsed within two weeks after independence and a United Nations peacekeeping force was called in to restore law and order, the United States fully supported the U.N. effort. In addition to U.S. political and logistical support of the U.N. operation, the United States paid more than 40% of the total U.N. costs in the Congo.¹⁰⁰ United States interests in the Congo are further reflected in the considerable aid programs there, which amounted for the period 1960-64 to \$192.1 million in economic aid and \$8.8 million in military assistance. The United States has pursued a policy of supporting the central government in Leopoldville, thereby seeking to "protect the country's unity, independence, security and territorial integrity."¹⁰¹

The Interests of the Former Metropoles: Equatorial Africa is particularly important to the former metropolitan powers. Of the more than \$2 billion private investment in Congo-L. approximately 96% represents Belgian holdings. Similarly, the British in east Africa and the French in their former colonies account for the major share of trade and investment there.

Belgium retains extensive interests in its former colonies. Despite the horrors of the Congolese rebellion and the almost incessant internal insecurity in Congo-L. since its independence, there are still some 50,000 Belgian citizens living in the Congo.¹⁰² Belgian private and governmental investments are considerable. More than 2,000 Belgian military advisers and civilian administrators are working in the Congo.¹⁰³ The Stanleyville rescue mission of November 1964, undertaken by Belgian paratroopers with American assistance, is a clear indication of Brussels' continuing interest.

France's relationship with the states of former French Equatorial Africa, Cameroon, and Malagasy is similar to that which it maintains in west Africa. The Central African Republic (CAR), Gabon, Chad, and Congo-Br. are associated with France in a regional defense agreement, as well as in individual bilateral arrangements. Malagasy also has a bilateral defense agreement with France. The Cameroon has a technical assistance agreement with France under which it receives funds and military equipment.¹⁰⁴ Paris is particularly interested in the preservation of

order and stability in Congo-Br. and Gabon. Congo-Br. is in a position to affect the trade of the two landlocked states Chad and CAR. Gabon is the site of the largest uranium deposit in the French Community.¹⁰⁵ In 1964, Paris intervened with military force to restore to power the Gabonese president, an avowed Francophile, which indicates the extent of its interest in the area.

British interests in east Africa are not quite as important, although the occurrence of army mutinies in early 1964 was sufficient to cause a temporary British military presence there.¹⁰⁶ Yet, at about the same time, a revolution in Zanzibar, despite its sanguinity and its radical ideological bent, was allowed to run its course. In the light of current plans for British disengagement from bases east of Suez and from south African protectorates, a diminution of British involvement and responsibilities in the east African area can be expected.¹⁰⁷ The British did provide troops for "training exercises" in Kenya's disputed Northern Frontier District on at least two occasions, and also agreed to provide air, logistical, and technical support for Kenyan army operations there.¹⁰⁸

Communist Incursions and Activities: The extent of Soviet and Chinese interests in equatorial Africa is partly reflected in the amounts of reported economic and military assistance to the region.¹⁰⁹ Both Communist powers have sought to establish a foothold in the center of Africa, from where they could extend their influence throughout the continent. Moscow has, however, acted with much more caution than Peking. It also has generally fewer personnel in its diplomatic missions.

Chinese efforts, overt and covert, in certain key equatorial countries -- Congo-Br. and Tanzania, for example -- have led to the speculation that Peking has turned its attention to the more vulnerable center of the continent¹¹⁰ when it failed to establish significant influence in north Africa. The volume of Chinese assistance to Tanzania may be related to the presence of liberation groups in Dar es Salaam. Chinese training facilities in Congo-Br. have had a disruptive effect on the security of Congo-L., the CAR, and the Cameroon, although the exact impact can only be conjectured. The Chinese have apparently tried to create an arc of influence in equatorial Africa extending from Dar es Salaam through Bujumbura to Brazzaville.¹¹¹ The extensive network of diplomatic posts, agents, and contacts in the region testify to this endeavor.

Conclusions: With the exception of Congo-L., the United States has a general interest in the stability of the region, rather than a particular interest in each country or group of countries, which is the case for its allies. United States policy, therefore, has left the primary responsibility for assistance and the maintenance of peace and order to its allies.

The vital role of the former Belgian Congo, by reason of its size, vast mineral wealth, and strategic location, dictates that any attempt to insure stability in the region must inevitably involve the United States. The objective of the United States is, therefore, partly preemptive in nature: to prevent control of Congo-L. by elements hostile to the West, and by a Communist-directed regime in particular.¹¹² United States military and economic assistance to the Leopoldville Government is a direct result of this concern.

2. Internal Crisis Potentials

Ethnic and Social Factors: The crisis potential of ethnic, social, and cultural factors in equatorial Africa varies considerably from country to country. Rwanda and Burundi have a history of almost continual inter-tribal violence. The former Belgian Congo, where tribal influences are all-pervasive, has experienced disruptive civil wars and rebellions which, despite a host of political considerations, were largely tribal in nature. Somewhat less violent tribal clashes have occurred in Chad, which is similar to the Sudan in its north-south racial and religious configuration, and in Uganda, where the largest tribal group, the Baganda, is virtually excluded from participation in the national government. The Cameroon, lying within the ethnic "shatter belt" between the cultures of the Niger and Congo River basins, contains over 200 tribal groupings, a few of which play a role in the continued uprisings in that country.

In Kenya and Congo-Br. tribal alignments have occasionally figured in political contests, but the relatively easy suppression of tribal challenges suggests that ethnic factors have a low crisis potential in those countries.¹¹³ The conflict potential in tribal issues is even lower in the CAR, Gabon, Tanzania, and Malagasy. In the CAR, the four major tribal groupings are relatively undifferentiated; in Gabon the Fang tribe predominates by far; Tanzania has a large number of tribes, but none is strong enough to threaten the others; and Malagasy has a high degree of ethnic homogeneity.

The most profound domestic conflict in the region in which tribalism played a role was the Congo rebellion of 1964-65. Tribal violence has plagued the republic since its independence. The secession efforts in Katanga from 1960 to 1963 and in south Kasai in 1960, and the Baluba massacre in August 1960, are some of the more familiar examples of its internal conflicts in which ethnic antagonism was a major factor.¹¹⁴

The 1964-65 rebellion was not a homogenous and coordinated movement. It consisted essentially of a number of separate dissident movements which fed largely upon ethnic and rural discontent. In the southwestern part of the Congo insurgency started to assume serious proportions in Kwilu province in January 1964. The revolt was organized by Pierre Mulele, who had spent about a year-and-a-half in Communist China. The base for the rebellion was the Bambundu, his own tribe, and the Bampende, whose leader

Antoine Gizenga was under arrest in Leopoldville. The causes of the rebellion were stated in ideological terms in which the supporters were the "exploited" and the opposing forces the "reactionaries." The latter were the national and provincial government authorities, particularly those who came from outside the area. The association of the rebellion with the Bambundu and Bampende was primarily responsible for its early successes. It was also the basic reason why the uprising failed to break out of the Bambundu-Bampende tribal area and ultimately collapsed.¹¹⁵

In the eastern part of the Congo the rebellion broke out in Kivu in May 1964 over the chieftainship of the Bafulero, a small tribe living in the Ruzizi plain on the border with Burundi. Fighting between tribal partisans and Armée Nationale Congolaise troops (ANC) resulted in the fall of Uvira, the first significant center to be lost by the Leopoldville Government. This opened the border to arms shipments for the rebels from Burundi. Gaston Soumialot, a leader of the exiled Conseil National de Libération (CNL), who had helped to foment the uprising, began to direct the Bafulero rebels. When in June the North Katangan provincial government collapsed as a result of ethnic discontent locally, Soumialot capitalized on it and moved into Albertville, the provincial capital.

In the central part of the Congo the Batetela-Bakusu tribe of Maniema and Sankuru province were the dissident elements. They believed that they had been systematically discriminated against by the Leopoldville Government, starting with the murder of their "Favorite Son," Patrice Lumumba. In early July 1964, Nicolas Olenga, a member of this ethnic grouping, organized the Armée Populaire de Libération in Maniema. With the advancement of the APL, Olenga and Soumialot managed to seize the initiative for the rebel forces. In August the rebels occupied Stanleyville and subsequently proclaimed the establishment of a Revolutionary Government in Stanleyville under the presidency of Christophe Gbenye, the head of the former CNL.

Just as the CNL was never a unified group, the Stanleyville government also lacked cohesion. Gbenye, a Mubua from the north, had the advantage of having led once before, in 1960-61, a dissident Stanleyville regime. Olenga had his power base in the APL, while Soumialot found his strength primarily in Maniema. None obtained full control of the rebel movement. Tribal interests and personal rivalries became a disruptive factor.

Moreover, the predominance of Batetela-Bakusus in the officers ranks of the APL and the gradual realization on the part of opposing as well as participating tribes that the Batetela-Bakusus were almost always spared from the increasing number of executions, alienated many supporters. This also acted as a deterrent in attempts to extend the rebellion to other tribal areas, and, in turn, proved to be a factor in discouraging external arms support. A revolutionary movement that was so loosely coordinated and essentially tribally based was likely to factionalize. When ANC troops, led by white mercenaries, managed to re-take Stanleyville in November 1964, the rebellion as such was crushed,

even though pockets of rebels could still be found as late as May 1966.¹¹⁶ Tribal factors, while undoubtedly providing the initial inspiration for the revolt, were also important elements militating against its ultimate success.¹¹⁷

Since his accession to power in November 1965, General Mobutu has greatly increased the power of the army in the provinces. The Mobutu Government, however, is by no means in control yet of the interior of the country. Press reports as late as May 1966 indicate that local fighting in the northeastern region against rebel holdouts is still continuing.¹¹⁸ Moreover, tensions between Katanga and the national government, though officially attributed to foreign pressures, remain, and have the potential to plunge the country into another serious domestic conflict.

A second country in equatorial Africa where the tribal structure has a high conflict potential is Chad. Though Chad is not of immediate importance to the United States, it does contain the site of one of the three major remaining bases for the French Intervention Force. Hence, the internal situation merits brief discussion.

The politically dominant groups in Chad are the sedentary Negro tribes in the south, who have little in common with the nomadic Arabs of the north. The southerners are Christians or animists and more prosperous, better educated, and more progressive in ideology than the northerners. Although the two ethnic groups are roughly equal in size -- each has a population of about one-and-a-half million -- the southern political faction won 67 seats in the 1960 National Assembly, while the north had only ten.¹¹⁹ Subsequent changes attenuated even this small amount of northern political influence. In January 1962, July 1964, and November 1965, riots broke out between government forces and crowds of Moslems in protest against President Francois Tombalbaye's attitude towards them.¹²⁰ A "Committee of northern Chad" was formed, which subsequently became a government-in-exile in Khartoum.

The Chad Government has taken the position that all reports of dissidence between the northern and southern factions are "fabrication." It insists that "actually, contacts between these groups are extremely enriching, and could lead to the building of one of the most original nations in modern Africa."¹²¹ The underrepresentation of the north is justified on the grounds that it only contributes 20% of the tax revenues.

The increasing frequency of clashes between government troops and Moslems, particularly near the Sudanese border and in equally remote areas, suggests that the concept of cultural "enrichment" is not a mutual one. Tribesmen of the Tibesti-Borkou-Ennedi area are known to look towards Libya for guidance and sympathy, a tendency which may increase as Libya's capability to offer such assistance grows. Nomadic Fezzani tribesmen refuse to recognize the jurisdiction of the Chad Government, and in much of northern Chad the Government is only in control in so far as elements of its tiny 900-man army are present.

The presence of some 1000 French troops in Ft. Lamy, one of the three bases in Africa of the French Intervention Force, is a factor which might prove reassuring to the Negro leaders. France, however, has shown a certain selectivity in its previous interventions,¹²² and since its only major interest in the impoverished area is the maintenance of the base itself, an armed attempt to redress the nation's political imbalance might very well go unopposed by the former metropolitan power.¹²³

Economic Factors: The states of the equatorial region all face economic problems which are potential sources of internal disorder. There are qualitative and quantitative differences in both the problems and their crisis potential in each country, but at least two patterns seem to emerge throughout most of the area. These are: urban unemployment and an under-developed agricultural infrastructure.

Partly as a result of the transition from subsistence to money economy, partly because of the growing educational opportunities, the expanding numbers of unemployed urban youth directly threaten public order in most of the key cities in the region. In Brazzaville, Pointe-Noire, and Dolisie, the three main urban centers of the former French Congo, a formidable army of unemployed has always presented a problem for the national government. In 1963, unemployed workers in both Congo-Br. and Togo were a major force behind the overthrow of Presidents Youlou and Olympio.¹²⁴ Recently, the Brazzaville Government dissolved all youth groups, such as church clubs and scouts, and ordered them to join the Mouvement National des Pionniers, partly as a means of reducing potential dissidence among the unemployed, partly in an effort to reduce the influence of the Church.¹²⁵

In Kenya, the cities of Mombasa and Nairobi house large numbers of alienated youth as the combined result of an exploding birth rate, high rates of school drop-outs, and the inaccessibility of available land in certain areas.¹²⁶ Projections through 1970 indicate that at least 400,000 persons will attempt to move from rural areas to urban centers in Kenya alone, yet plans designed to alleviate this problem are expected to provide jobs for about only 60,000.¹²⁷ In the Kenyan case an additional danger is present, due to the friction between the native Kenyan and the 170,000 Asians who control 80% of the country's wholesale and retail trade. The economic frustration of the unemployed blacks has taken the form of xenophobic riots at least twice in the past, and remains a threatening aspect of Kenya's unemployment picture.¹²⁸

In Tanzania, Uganda, the CAR, Congo-L., and Cameroon are also large numbers of youths, who have just enough education to dissipate any desire to return to rural societies, but who are usually not sufficiently qualified for the few job opportunities that do arise. In Dar es Salaam, President Julius Nyerere was forced to institute a kipande, or pass book system, similar to the one used in South Africa, primarily to clear the city of unemployed.¹²⁹ Col. Bokassa in the CAR and General Mobutu in Congo-L. have also instituted "back to the farm" movements in order to remove the unemployed from the cities and to boost agricultural output.

In Cameroon, the outlawed Union Progressiste Camerounaise (UPC) found its main support among the urban unemployed and the labor unions. Although the insurrection, led by the Bamileke tribe in the area north of Yaounde, is no longer sustained by the unemployed, it has political ties with the UPC and remains well situated to aid and stimulate urban unrest in Douala.

The bleak economic outlook for countries such as Chad, the CAR, Rwanda, Burundi, and to a lesser extent Uganda, is partly caused by the transportation problems experienced by most landlocked states in Africa. The first four states have no railroad transportation network at all, and Uganda remains dependent on Kenya for a trade outlet to the sea. Chad has virtually no economic resources, except for meagre crops of cotton and some livestock. It depends heavily on France for the revenues necessary to support government operations. The CAR has a subsistence economy based upon cotton, but which has been seriously disrupted by a diamond boom that caused a mass exodus out of the agricultural ranks. What revenues the government does manage to collect from the diamond resources -- more than \$10 million in diamonds a year are smuggled out -- are likely to be temporary¹³⁰ and will hardly compensate for the long-range dislocation of the agricultural sector. Rwanda and Burundi share the problem of a lack of natural resources, which is compounded by extremely high population densities, the highest in sub-Saharan Africa.

The only country which has a long term economic potential is Congo-L. Its resources are matched by few other states, not only in the region, but in the entire African continent. Ironically, however, Congo-L has been in a state of almost economic collapse from the time it received its independence. Sustained principally by the continued operations of Belgian mining interests in Katanga and by foreign aid, the economy has never fully recovered from the breakdown in law and order which followed the July 1960 mutinies of the ANC and the exodus of Belgian civic personnel from virtually all areas of the Congo except Katanga and Leopoldville. The transportation system in the interior has practically disintegrated. The outbreak of the 1964-65 rebellion brought economic life to a standstill in Kwilu and the northeastern provinces. More importantly, the rebels ruthlessly exterminated the native elites in the cities which they entered. Almost an entire generation of Congolese public servants has been destroyed.¹³¹ One authority estimated that it would require the use of expatriates for the next ten years to fill the vacuum in technical and other economic positions in the northeastern region of the Congo.¹³²

Internal Political Factors: The threats to the political viability of the equatorial states are usually closely related to ethnic and economic factors and foreign subversive efforts. These issues are, therefore, covered in other sections.¹³³ The situations in Cameroon and Congo-L. should be discussed here, since in both countries the position of the central government remains precarious as the result of organized armed opposition of dissident groups within the national borders.

As the scene of an active internal rebellion since 1955, Cameroon has faced a formidable task of consolidating internal power. The Federation of the Cameroons is made up of East Cameroon, which is the former French Cameroon, and West Cameroon, formerly a British-administered trust territory. These are two separate political entities with widely different colonial backgrounds, political systems, and languages. As a result the problem of political integration has been much more difficult here than elsewhere in the region. Compounding the difficulties, however, has been the existence of prolonged anti-government guerrilla activities in the eastern sector. The terrorism was organized by the Union du Peuple Camerounais (UPC), a left wing party which was outlawed in 1955 by the French administration. From abroad the party directed its campaign against the government, depending for its support on the Bamileke tribe, which accounts for almost one-fifth of the Cameroon's population. Although President Ahmadou Ahidjo has gradually been able to contain the rebellion, guerrilla groups continue to operate in the central highlands. At present rebel activity is confined to a 500 square mile area around Nkongsamba, some 100 miles northwest of Yaounde, and the self-styled "National Liberation Army" is estimated at about 1,200 men.¹³⁴ There is the possibility that the growing isolation of the more progressive political movements in the one-party state of East Cameroon will produce renewed activity among the Bamileke, just as the outlawing of the UPC in 1955 led to several years of violence. Another likely reason for a resurgence of rebel activity, however, is external assistance, a topic discussed below.

Congo-L. provides an example of how too little political activity can be as much a liability as too much. The Belgian administration, as a matter of policy, attempted to keep politics out of the Congo. Existing legislation effectively prevented the formation of political parties, a situation which prevailed until 1959, less than a year before the first parliamentary elections were to take place.¹³⁵ What did exist were cultural and social organizations. The first political parties, based on ethnic associations or on groups of intellectuals in the towns, were essentially parochial in ideology. In addition, numerous new parties sprung up, mostly along ethnic lines and without nation-wide appeal. About 40 different splinter parties stood for the 1960 election, of which only four could claim to be national in the sense that they supported candidates in all or several of the Congo's six provinces.¹³⁶ The resulting centrifugal effect was felt not only in the National Assembly, but also in the Force Publique, the instrument of the Congo's security.

When within a week after independence the soldiers of the Force Publique revolted in July 1960, the entire administrative structure of the country broke down. In the political chaos of the next few months the Congolese army disintegrated into factions, each backing a particular political movement. The opposing political groups -- the Lumumba movement in Stanleyville, the moderate Kasavubu-Mobutu wing in Leopoldville, the secessionists in Katanga and in South Kasai -- could each command the loyalty of a part of the army. The political factionalization of the Armee Nationale Congolaise (ANC)¹³⁷ has been a major obstacle to stability since independence.

The United Nations Force, which had been called in to restore law and order, succeeded in eliminating the most immediate threats to Congolese national integrity -- the secessions of South Kasai and Katanga. But the basic problem of a lack of national identity remained. Shortly after the gradual phaseout of U.N. troops had begun,¹³⁸ regional differences began to reassert themselves. By January 1964, guerrilla warfare had started in the Kwilu area, and a few months later the rebellion in the northeastern provinces broke out. Political parties had no more opportunity for development during the next two years than they had prior to independence. Factions continued to be organized on an ethnic or regional basis. Under Moise Tshombe, the Katangan secession leader who became Prime Minister in July 1964, the rebellion was put down, largely through the use of white mercenary officers.

However, the personal contest which followed between Prime Minister Tshombe and President Joseph Kasavubu made it clear that political stability involved more than the suppression of rebel movements. The commander of the ANC, General Joseph Mobutu, sensing another political impasse, similar to the one in September 1960 when President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba were firing each other, intervened again and instituted a five year period of military government.¹³⁹ The recurrent chaos in the Congo indicates that the lack of a political infrastructure and the absence of a reliable security force and responsible political parties with a sense of national awareness will continue to constitute a major threat to the stability of the Congo.

Internal Communism: There are no known Communist party organizations in the equatorial African region.¹⁴⁰ With the suppression of the Communist supported quasi-Marxist rebel movement in Congo-L., the only area where appreciable internal communist activity exists is in the east. There are Communist elements in the UPC of the Cameroon. Cuban Communist mercenaries are employed as a palace guard in Congo-Br. In both cases, however, the implications can be found in a threat to international stability, rather than to domestic security. In the Cameroon, President Ahidjo has largely succeeded in limiting the scope of the insurgency; the exiled UPC is generally pro-Communist and accepts Communist military assistance. In Congo-Br., the leftwing inclinations of the government do not have direct implications for internal stability, but they do represent serious potential problems for the neighboring states in terms of inter-state subversion.

In the Central African Republic, disclosures were made by Col. Bokassa of Chinese Communist attempts to subvert the government. The internal threat Communist elements may have posed was eliminated by Col. Bokassa's subsequent efforts to eradicate Chinese influence.

Conclusions: An overview of the domestic scene in the states of equatorial Africa indicates that ethnic and political factors have generally a high conflict potential, though their importance varies from state to state. The countries most profoundly affected are: the former Belgian Congo with its mosaic of vastly different ethnic groups and rival political factions; Cameroon with its dissident Barileke elements, even though the government is increasingly successful in containing the armed

rebels; and Chad with its cleavage between the northern Moslems and the southern Christian and animist Negroes. These countries, particularly Congo-L, will continue to experience serious internal crises which can erupt into widespread violence and which can affect international peace and order.

Prospects for economic development are remote throughout the region, with the exception of Congo-L. The urban centers with their reservoirs of frustrated unemployed younger people, contain the germs of crisis and conflict. This is especially the case in Kenya, but also in Congo-L. in spite of its rich economic potential.

3. International Conflict Potentials

Sources of Conflict: The potentials for international conflict in equatorial Africa can be found primarily in the Congo Basin. On the one hand, the domestic situation in Congo-L. is a key factor in the relations among the equatorial states. For example, the hostility directed against the Tshombe regime motivated a number of states adjacent to the Congo to assist the rebel movements in the 1964-65 rebellion. On the other hand, the leftwing inclinations of the present regime in Brazzaville provide an incipient threat to the security of the neighboring states. Brazzaville may replace Accra as a center of subversion against independent African states.

There are other sources of international conflict in the area, such as the Rwanda-Burundi disturbances and the Gabon-Cameroon differences over the final disposition of Rio Muni. But these inter-state tensions are limited in their conflict potential. Dar es Salaam is a base of operations for various nationalist movements which seek to liberate the southern African areas. Although these liberation movements present a source of unrest none of them are a serious threat to the stability of the area.¹⁴¹

Border Issues: The equatorial region is generally free from disputes over actual border delineation, but at several times the question of refugees and exiles in border areas has led to intense frictions between states. The problems between Rwanda and the neighboring states are a case in point.

Tensions have practically always characterized the relations between the Bahutu majority and the Batutsi minority in Rwanda. After the elections of 1960 and 1961 proved to be a decisive victory for the Bahutu, some 130,000 Batutsi left the country and resettled in Burundi, Congo-L., Uganda, and Tanganyika. In late 1963 and early 1964 exiled Batutsi staged a series of forays into Rwanda from Burundi. The repulsion of these attacks and the concomittant massacres of Batutsi in Rwanda reached almost genocidal proportions. The Rwanda Government blamed the neighboring states, singling out Burundi, for encouraging the activities of the Batutsi, and reported the border violations to the United Nations. A period of grave tensions between Rwanda and Burundi followed. The thousands of Batutsi who fled after the massacres to adjacent territories continue to be a cause of serious concern, not only for the host governments, but also for the Rwanda Government.¹⁴²

Similarly, the revolt of the southern provinces in the Sudan produced a flood of refugees in neighboring countries of the equatorial region, where they remain a source of friction between Khartoum and the respective states. In particular, the alleged bombing of refugee camps in Uganda by Sudanese planes¹⁴³ became an issue. In Congo-L., the Sudanese refugees complicated the problems of internal security even further. In the eastern part of the CAR, a virtually complete breakdown of law and order reportedly resulted from the rioting of refugees. In Chad, the presence of Sudanese refugees added fuel to the existing suspicion of Tombalbaye's regime that the Sudan was likely to foment dissidence among its Moslem brothers in northern Chad, if given the opportunity.

Irredentism exists in the form of the Somali claim on the Northern Frontier District of Kenya. The threat to Kenya's territorial integrity comes from a state outside of the equatorial region and is, therefore, discussed in the northeast African section of this chapter.¹⁴⁴ An incipient irredentist problem exists between Gabon and Cameroon over the territory of Spanish Guinea. Gabon's dominant ethnic group, the Fang tribe, spills over into Rio Muni; Cameroon reportedly has subsidized one of Rio Muni's nationalist groups.¹⁴⁵ Both states covet jurisdiction over the territory if Spain were to withdraw.

Inter-State Subversive Activities: Inter-state subversion in the central African region remains a source of potential conflict. The subversive efforts of the states adjacent to Congo-L., for example, threatened to turn what was essentially a domestic rebellion into an international armed conflict.¹⁴⁶ Currently, the threat of inter-state subversion comes largely from Brazzaville.

Since the 1963 coup, the regime of the former French Congo has been characterized by an increasingly radical stance. It has assumed an international posture considerably to the left of any other government in the equatorial region, a posture which is reflected in the presence of a large Chinese Communist advisory group, and a presidential guard composed of pro-Castro Cuban soldiers, and in a mounting belligerency toward most western nations and moderate African states.¹⁴⁷ In October 1963, the Massamba-Debat regime allowed the establishment of a Committee of National Liberation in Brazzaville, which had as its goal the overthrow of the central government in Leopoldville. Exiles from Congo-L. received assistance and training from the Chinese Embassy in Brazzaville.¹⁴⁸

Although the military phase of the rebellion soon shifted to the eastern part of Congo-L., Brazzaville remained a haven for exiles from Congo-L., and a source of support for their objectives. The training of forces for future rebellions by Chinese Communists continues to threaten the position of General Mobutu's government.¹⁴⁹ The Bamileke insurgents against President Ahidjo in the Cameroon have always had the benefit of leftist support, but recently observers designate Congo-Br. as a direct source of financial and material assistance.¹⁵⁰ The presence of Chinese and Cuban Communists in Brazzaville, rather than Soviet and eastern European personnel, appears to encourage Brazzaville's subversive efforts.

Other attempts at subversion have either been unsuccessful or more limited in their impact. The Sudan was at one time engaged in assisting the rebels in the Congo, and is presently suspected by the Chad Government of fomenting dissension along the Chad-Sudan frontier. The Sudan's own rebellion in the south, however, militates against such foreign adventures.

4. Implications for U.S. Security Interests

Essential to U.S. interests in equatorial Africa is the development of a stable and moderate government in the former Belgian Congo and the emergence of the ANC as a security force capable of dealing with both internal and external threats.

The problems of domestic security and development in Congo-L. remain formidable. None of the regimes so far, including the present Mobutu Government, has made significant headway towards forging a nation out of the numerous disparate and often opposing ethnic groups. Rebel groups are still active in the northeastern provinces. Apparently, however, the Mobutu Government perceives as the most immediate and important threat to its existence the exiled former Prime Minister, Moise Tshombe, and his supporters in Katanga. Since Tshombe is identified in African opinion with Belgian interests and, more generally, with "western imperialism," the Mobutu regime may well turn its current anti-Belgian campaign into an anti-western campaign. The United States must therefore be prepared for the possibility that the Mobutu Government may assume an anti-western, if not anti-American, attitude in order to strengthen its position both at home and in other African circles. On the other hand, should Tshombe attempt another comeback to the Congo, the result may well be an international conflict with some of the neighboring states, such as Congo-Br., Tanzania, and Uganda, opposing the efforts of the former Prime Minister. The center of Africa will continue, therefore, to be a source of concern for the United States.

The subversive efforts of Congo-Br. also present a problem for U.S. interests in the area in so far as they endanger the stability in the region and offer the opportunity for increased Communist influence. Material aid from Communist China to exile groups in Congo-Br., however, is bound to remain limited because of the logistical barriers. This is equally true for Chinese assistance to the liberation movements in Dar es Salaam. Nevertheless, the activities of Communist backed groups and their Communist mentors in Brazzaville and across the continent in Tanzania remain a source of unrest and a potential danger to western interests.

Other potential crisis and conflict situations in equatorial Africa do not have direct implications for U.S. interests. This is not to say that they do not exist. Internal security in Chad and Cameroon remains limited at best. But should an upheaval occur in either state, French interests would be more affected than U.S. interests. The same is true in case of disorder in other parts of western central Africa. In eastern Africa, Great Britain would experience the impact of instability to a

greater extent than the United States.

From a U.S. point of view, the Congo River Basin is by far the most sensitive area in equatorial Africa. Congo-L's strategic location and enormous economic potential as well as the presence of Chinese and Cuban Communists in Brazzaville, suggest that developments in the two Congos can directly influence U.S. interests in central Africa and affect the stability of the rest of the continent.

E. SOUTHERN AFRICA¹⁵¹

The paramount political issue in the southern Africa region, and one which causes international tensions in Africa, is the continued dominance of white minorities over black majorities in five key countries: The Republic of South Africa, South West Africa, Rhodesia, Angola, and Mozambique. In two of the countries, the Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique, armed revolution is in progress. In one other, Rhodesia, the threat of losing control led the white regime to declare its independence from British authority. In the Republic of South Africa and in its ward, South West Africa, the white minority has concentrated so many legal, political, and military powers in its hands that the manifestations of internal unrest have been effectively suppressed. This has postponed, but probably also intensified, the outbreak of violence.

The United States faces rather specific dilemmas in its relationships with these countries, and with the other five independent, or soon to be independent, black countries of the region. An intricate question at present concerns the reconciliation of the American commitment to democratic principles with the more mundane necessity of maintaining friendly diplomatic relations with members of the international community. In Africa this problem is translated into the difficulty of harmonizing the United States' repudiation of the white supremacy policies pursued in southern Africa with the need to protect its relations with countries in which the United States has important security interests.

1. United States Security Interests in Southern Africa

Direct Interests: The United States has no military commitments to the countries of the southern African area. The Republic of South Africa, due to its location athwart the convergence of the maritime routes between the Indian and Atlantic Oceans, would be important in wartime for anti-submarine warfare efforts. The Republic also possesses the only harbors in sub-Saharan Africa where major vessels can dock, fuel, and undergo repair.¹⁵² Such port facilities are not only useful logistically to the U.S. Navy's Atlantic Fleet en route to Vietnamese waters at present, but would assume even greater importance if the Suez route were interdicted. So far, however, a refusal of the South African Government to allow a U.S. vessel refueling rights,¹⁵³ has had little more than harrassment value.

United States interests further derive from U.S. space-tracking facilities at Esselen Park, Olifantsfontein, and Johannesburg which are important to U.S. lunar and deep-space programs.¹⁵⁴

The economic interests of the United States in the southern region are almost entirely limited to those in the Republic of South Africa. The Republic has traditionally been the most important trading state for the United States in Africa and provides a market for about 35% of total U.S. exports to the continent. Since imports from South Africa are relatively small, this provides a trade surplus (\$200 million in 1965) for the United States. American private and portfolio investments amount approximately to \$650 million.¹⁵⁵

Indirect Interests: The United States indirect interests in the southern region are important, inasmuch as U.S. policy towards the area affects and is influenced by U.S. relations with its allies and with the Afro-Asian states.

Portugal, which presently holds the territories of Angola and Mozambique, also controls the fate of the U.S. naval and air base in the Azores. This fact, along with the partnership implied by the NATO membership, has conditioned the positions taken by the United States on the subject of Portuguese colonialism.

Britain, a more crucial partner of the United States in the NATO alliance, does have a very direct interest in South Africa, Rhodesia, and to a lesser extent, a stake in the High Commission Territories. United States policies towards southern African states, therefore, are influenced by the need to consider British interests. Insofar as the British are able to exercise a restraining influence over developments in southern Africa, U.S. interests in stability are served.

The policies of the United States towards the region are further influenced by its objective to maintain cordial relations with the newly independent black African states and to encourage moderation on their part with respect to the question of white minority domination.

United States policies are also shaped by the activities of Communist nations which are trying to obtain access to the black majorities of the white dominated states. The Soviet Union, Communist China, and lately Cuba have supported exiled nationalist groups from the southern states with arms aid, financial assistance, and training in guerrilla warfare. Dar es Salaam is a major center of operations for Chinese Communists in this respect. However, as long as these externally supported liberation movements enjoy no more than their present level of success and are balanced by other nationalist groups of more moderate persuasion, the short term relevance for U.S. interests is limited.¹⁵⁶

Conclusions: The direct interests of the United States in the southern region are largely centered in the Republic of South Africa and are mainly economic. U.S. interests in South Africa as well as the much more vital interests of Britain, make it important for Washington to preserve normal economic and political relations with Pretoria. On the other hand, the repercussions of South Africa's racial policies on the stability of much of Africa are potentially serious. A somewhat similar problem exists with respect to Rhodesia.

The indirect interest of the United States in preventing the issue of white minority rule from developing into a grave international crisis is, therefore, more important. Particularly in the future this dilemma will demand increasing attention from U.S. policy planners for Africa. A large number of third-party states, including U.S. allies and virtually all African states, are actively concerned with the outcome of the white supremacy issue. Communist states are trying to exploit this concern. There is, moreover, a high degree of consensus on the principles involved among most states. This fact is in one sense advantageous for the United States, because it is conducive to a broader sharing of the responsibilities in a conflict situation, but it also contains an element of liability, because the positions taken by the United States will then have more widespread repercussions.

2. Internal Crisis Potentials

Social and Cultural Factors: The issue of race relations predominates in the region, almost to the exclusion of other internal issues. The minority groups which exercise governmental control may differ from one country to the next in terms of their percentage of the entire population and also with respect to the exact form in which their supremacy is exercised. The basic principle remains the same however. The most publicized of all these restrictive policies is "apartheid," a theory of separate development practiced by the Nationalist Party government in South Africa. A strictly enforced policy of segregation, both public and private, has been imposed upon almost all forms of social, political, and economic activity, although in the latter area some erosion of the barriers has taken place. The enforcement is carried out by a well-developed police organization, relying on a stringent system of "pass book" laws and ordinances.

The policy in its ultimate expression would envision geographical divisions within the country itself ("bantustans"), where blacks would live under a self-governing political system. The first of these, the Transkei, a 16,000 square mile enclave south of, and contiguous with, Basutoland, became "autonomous" in 1962 and held its first elections in 1963. An examination of the Transkeian situation indicates something less than full autonomy however. The Assembly has jurisdiction over agricultural, educational, health, and welfare matters, but the Nationalists retain exclusive control over all military operations, the manufacture of arms and explosives, foreign affairs, the police, communications, transportation, currency, immigration, and amendment of the Constitution. The election in 1963 of pro-apartheid Chief Matanzima lends weight to the impression that even internal politics in Transkei are dictated from Pretoria.

In the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique, and rebellious Rhodesia, the emphasis is not on separateness, but rather on quality. The Portuguese, claiming to be bearers of a uniquely non-racial, "Christian" civilizing mission, have held out the possibility of citizenship to those Africans who have acquired what Lisbon defines as a "civilized way of life."

Consistent with this concept, Portugal has created the "Assimilado" status, whereby the non-Portuguese who have attained a certain standard of educational or cultural excellence are permitted to enter the fully-privileged multi-racial society. Despite the theoretical existence of equal opportunity, however, the result is mostly de facto segregation.¹⁵⁷

In Rhodesia, the 1961 Constitution, which was approved by whites in a two to one ratio, provided for the progressive enfranchisement of "educated" Africans and eventual majority rule. But the all-important "time-table" of this gradualist approach is missing. Premier Ian Smith has announced that he did not expect in his lifetime to see such a nationalist government "which would mean the end of European civilization in Rhodesia."¹⁵⁸

Even in such a strong statement, however, a recognition of an eventual change is implied. Mere numbers alone predicate an inevitable adjustment of society in Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies. Europeans constitute only 6% of the Rhodesian population, and 4.2% and 1.8% of the Angolan and Mozambique populations respectively. As long as these minorities remained isolated among a politically unsophisticated and tribally-oriented indigenous people, the disproportion did not assume any significance for government stability. With the assumption of independence by most of the northern two-thirds of the continent and an increase in political consciousness among black Africans, such numerical disparity increasingly occupied the attentions of governments in the southern area.

Only in South Africa, where there is considerably larger percentage of whites (over 18% of the total) than in the other southern countries, it is considered safe to state that "the white population is of sufficient magnitude to challenge the long-cherished black African assumption that the Europeans could one day be driven out of the continent."¹⁵⁹ Even with the relatively greater security provided by this larger percentage, prospects for long-range stability in South Africa are to some extent jeopardized by the nature of the social policies followed there. In Angola and Mozambique, the multi-racial aspects of Portuguese society have created, at least on the social level, relatively favorable conditions for racial integration.¹⁶⁰ Miscegenation has created a significant mulatto population now estimated at over 60,000.¹⁶¹ Rhodesia, with long-established habits of racial moderation, respect for constitutionality, and identification with Great Britain, permits on a second roll limited African suffrage and is accustomed to having black African representatives in the Parliament. The South African system of apartheid contains few, if any, such mitigating elements.

Much has been written about the South African theory of racial separation, and the totalitarian measures required to enforce it.¹⁶² The surveillance and control of the Africans in the new "black cities" outside of the white urban areas the numbers of Africans jailed each year for pass system offences,¹⁶³ and the degree of discretionary power afforded to the Minister of Justice through such innocuously titled laws as the General Law Amendment Acts, contribute to an atmosphere of fear and frustration in the

Bantu locations. The suppression of overt opposition has thus far been successful.

However, because the opposition is forced to operate increasingly in the clandestine realm, the outbreak of violence becomes more difficult to predict. There is an object lesson in the tragic aftermath of a suburban train wreck near Durban in October 1965. Crowded coaches carrying over 1,200 blacks back to their native "locations" careened from the tracks, killing 86 passengers and injuring seriously some 200 more. A white signalman who tried to help the injured was surrounded by a mob of enraged survivors and trampled to death.¹⁶⁴ A similar incident near Johannesburg also resulted in a riot causing the police to open fire. Both cases are examples of how an unforeseeable circumstance is capable of igniting a spontaneous display of frustration and violence. The absence or weakness of nationalist organizations, internal opposition leaders, resistance groups, etc., in these southern African countries does not necessarily indicate apathy or complacency on the part of the Bantu population.

Economic Factors: Economic factors within the various countries are of secondary importance compared to the racial considerations, yet there is a growing belief that the economic forces are weakening the effect of rigid social segregation. In the Republic of South Africa especially, the apartheid policies of the government have been circumvented more by white industrialists and businessmen who try to make a profit, than by liberals and nationalists who seek to subvert the government. Three considerations have impressed business leaders.

First, there are 14 million non-whites in the country, who, despite an earning level which is only one-tenth of a white man's wage, command a buying power of over \$1 billion annually.¹⁶⁵ While at one time they were not allowed in department stores, advertising now is also aimed in their direction. Black and white shoppers crowd the same escalators and examine the same merchandise, and many stores cater especially to the African trade.¹⁶⁶

Secondly, it is increasingly difficult to recruit the skills required for the development of a country of more than 17 million from the upper crust of less than 3 1/2 million whites. As fast as the government drafts restrictions which reserve specified work for each race, certain exemptions are necessary to keep industry operating. In Pretoria, colored postmen were permitted in 1964. In the Transvaal province service, 18,000 additional non-whites were employed during the last five years, compared to 8,000 additional white workers.¹⁶⁷ The Republic remains dependent upon black labor and cannot rely upon higher-salaried whites alone.

Thirdly, it is recognized that the growing prosperity of a small group of Africans is a step in the direction of the creation of a small African middle class as a cushion for unrest.¹⁶⁸ Operating on the premise that the ordinary African would rather have a refrigerator than a vote, and well aware of the ability of material improvements to mitigate social

discontent, the partial breakdown in economic apartheid has not been too actively challenged by the Verwoerd regime. A program launched to develop industries bordering on black enclaves so that workers would not have to enter white areas to work, has been far from successful. Africans continue to flock to the cities. Industries are reluctant to relocate to less advantageous locations. A study in 1966 of the International Labor Organization found that the fast growing white economy of South Africa depends more and more upon black labor, thereby largely negating the apartheid policy goal of physical separation.¹⁶⁹

The increased awareness on the part of the Africans of the significant role which they play in the white economy will tend to heighten their demands for concurrent political rights. It seems that eventually, therefore, South Africa's economic forces will intensify, not lessen, the frictions between the races. These same factors are at work in each of the other southern countries where the disenfranchised represent a potentially powerful economic force.

Internal Political Factors: Despite the capacity of the region for future crises, internal political divisions per se are unlikely to be a source of unrest. The white governments are almost unchallenged. In South Africa, opposition Liberal Party leaders, such as novelist Alan Paton, have been banned.¹⁷⁰ The multi-racial Progressive Party has only one remaining representative in Parliament and is also in danger of proscription, while the United Party, South Africa's "official opposition"¹⁷¹ was reduced from 49 to 39 seats in the March 1966 elections.¹⁷² However, the political situation in both South Africa and Rhodesia is such that changes in the parliamentary composition do not greatly affect the policies of the government in social matters. The increasing support of Premier Smith by most segments of the white Rhodesian population, and the inroads by the Nationalist Party in South Africa, show virtually a unanimity of opinion among whites.

In the independent, or soon to be independent, black African states, however, there are political factors which have implications for the stability of the governments involved. Dr. Hastings K. Banda in Malawi has a predilection for autocratic rule which has eroded the domestic goodwill with which he started his regime. Banda's gradual Africanization policy of the civil service, his increasing powers, and his proposal for a detention law led in September 1964 to the dismissal and resignation of six key ministers from the cabinet and to widespread popular protest. Banda also jeopardized his support with the student population by closing a college which had apparently played a part in helping the dismissed ministers to escape from the country.¹⁷³ His reliance on the militant Young Pioneers and a few political favorites has further alienated much of the rest of the public minded community.

The former or soon to be independent High Commission Territories virtually depend for their political and economic existence on the neighboring white regimes. Their policies of cooperation with the white

governed states have produced internal divisions which are potentially productive of instability. In each area a leader was chosen, acceptable to the neighboring white governments since it was obvious that they would not tolerate centers of subversion near or within their borders. Such conservative leaders, however, are likely to intensify the opposition from internal progressive elements. In Swaziland, conservative tribal chiefs and white political organizations managed to elect Chief Sobhuza II, a conservative whose visions of racial interaction are acceptable to the adjacent regimes.¹⁷⁴ Britain faces a dilemma here somewhat similar to the Rhodesian case. It is under pressure from the ruling government to grant immediate independence, while the progressives are campaigning for a delay until a more representative government is in power.

In Basutoland, renamed Lesotho, Chief Leabua Jonathan also reflects the preference of the white regimes. He is the only black African Head of State who received an audience with Dr. Verwoerd and was obviously an "approved" candidate. His victory was precarious and, due to the disenfranchisement of two-thirds of the labor force which works in South Africa, hardly indicative of the indigenous political climate.

In Bechuanaland, now called Botswana, the path to independence presented less difficulty, because a relatively moderate government was able to strike a balance between conservatives and a small unorganized nationalist party. Botswana's leader, Seretse Khama, whose marriage to a white woman perhaps symbolizes his willingness to cooperate with the whites, has advocated closer relations with neighboring states, though he has condemned apartheid. In the Transkei, the nominal head of government, Chief Kaiser D. Matanzima, also apparently faces internal political dissent. The pro-apartheid leader has modified his policies somewhat and has been making racial attacks on the whites.¹⁷⁵ Transkei's internal politics, however, must always be qualified with the realization that any threatened change in the status quo would probably be counteracted by the South African Government.

The similarities in these four governmental units are striking, and have a long-range significance for stability. As one observer predicts in a reference to the Transkei:

As soon as internal political freedom is granted, the "reliable" man (in this case, Matanzima) will be outbid by the nationalist; the government will then be faced with the alternative of re-imposing control or conceding independence. After all, this has been the experience of all colonial powers in Africa so far. Why should South Africa be an exception to the rule.¹⁷⁶

This same type of internal political "bidding" is also present in the other territories and it is possible that "reliables" such as Sobhuza, Monathan, and Khama will also give way to individuals or ideas less

amenable to cooperation with neighboring governments. In this eventuality, the crisis potential becomes international in nature, since in the latter territories, South Africa, Portugal, or Rhodesia have no legal right to intervene.¹⁷⁷

Internal Communism: Due to the totalitarian nature of nearly all of the regimes in the area, Communist parties have been proscribed and internal Communist activity largely eliminated. Only South Africa has a Party organization, numbering approximately 100 members. It was outlawed in June 1950, and has been so severely circumscribed that its influence is almost indecipherable.¹⁷⁸ In the Portuguese colonies, some members of the former Communist parties have associated with nationalist organizations. In Rhodesia, certain contacts have been made with Communist countries. In none of the countries, however, does internal Communist activity constitute a factor contributing to instability.

Conclusion: While the elements for internal instability in the southern African area certainly exist -- racial confrontation, authoritarianism, tribal intransigence -- in almost all cases the de facto controls placed upon opposition elements by the governments concerned have efficiently suppressed any manifestations of this unrest. In none of the white supremacist regimes is there any likelihood that domestic movements alone could create a crisis within the immediate future. Dr. Banda in Malawi and Chief Jonathan in Lesotho are slightly less firmly in control of their opponents, but in no immediate danger from within. The southern African region evokes more the spectre of international involvement and opposition-in-exile, probably precisely because the domestic regimes seem so invincible. The following section will explore this possibility.

3. International Conflict Potentials

Sources of Conflict: A superficial appraisal or, as is common, a merely emotional conjecture as to the international conflict potentials of the southern African area has frequently resulted in one of two predictions. One involves the likelihood of African "freedom fighters," making armed incursions into, or supporting nationalist rebellions within, the white dominated countries of the south. This idea, long the pipe dream of such ideologists as Kwame Nkrumah and Ahmed Ben Bella, has been abandoned inasmuch as it is impractical from a purely military point of view.¹⁷⁹

Another possibility concerns the likelihood of an international or multilateral intervention within these areas, prompted by an uncontrollable outbreak of racial violence, or perhaps even because of non-compliance with or defiance of a resolution of a world body. This eventuality in the light of the limited capabilities of the United Nations in such matters, is also an improbable source of conflict. What represents the most immediate danger is the delicate balance of relationships between the black African states in the area and their white-run neighbors. An armed confrontation here inspired by extremist opposition groups or initiated by externally supported exiled insurgents from bordering areas runs the risk of escalation and internationalization in spite of the military imbalances in the area.

Military Relationships: A comparison of the military strengths of black and white Africa ¹⁰⁰ casts considerable doubt upon the ability of liberation movements to create instability in the south. A consideration of military relationships which was limited to the southern African region itself would of course produce an even more one-sided picture. The combined armed forces of Zambia and Malawi (3,000 and 850 men respectively) are outnumbered by Rhodesian regulars (4,300), to say nothing of the estimated 30,000 reservists many of whom are undergoing active training.¹⁸¹ The armed Portuguese troops in Angola and Mozambique outnumber the estimated insurgents there by over nine to one. The military power of South Africa and other white regimes is complete enough to defeat any incursion by a black African state. More significantly, any attempt by an international body or a non-African nation to establish a military presence in the southern region would be extremely difficult due to the logistic problems of distance and access. Military relationships are, therefore, temporarily a stabilizing factor.

Border and Territorial Issues: The question of border violations has arisen occasionally. The incidents usually involved the attempt to pursue exiled nationalists or wanted opposition members into a neighboring country. In this sense borders are potential conflict areas in the event of renewed insurgency or counter-insurgency activity.

The issue of South West Africa centered on the delicate question of national jurisdiction. Ethiopia and Liberia brought the case before the World Court. They argued that the United Nations, as the heir to the League of Nations, should be entrusted with the administration of South West Africa, since South Africa through its apartheid policy had violated the mandate. The recent decision of the International Court of Justice sidestepped the issue by a "procedural" judgment.¹⁸² African states will now bring the question before the U.N. General Assembly. But in light of the U.N. record of abortive attempts to open discussions with South Africa and in view of the series of failures by U.N. missions and committees for South West Africa, it is unlikely that the world organization will try to use force in order to impose U.N. supervision for the territory.

Subversion (Liberation Movements): The activities and prospects for liberation movements are the topic of Chapter V, and since the majority of the liberation movements have as their objective the overthrow of southern African regimes, the conclusions made in that chapter in large measure obtain.

The southern African liberation movements have been so far unsuccessful. From that sense of frustration has arisen a tendency to polarize around alternative approaches. Each of the white-run governments has two liberation groups opposing it in exile, and in each case one of the organizations can be said to have a greater degree of moderation, popularity, or contact with Communist sources, than the other.¹⁸³ These rifts have not only reduced the effectiveness of the organizations in promoting their goal of infiltration and subversion, but have in some cases almost destroyed the organizations themselves.¹⁸⁴ Furthermore, the very existence of two nationalist organizations, with two sets of leaders has had a divisive effect

upon the native populations. In effect, two nascent political parties exist, a fact which may assume even more importance in the future when and if the white minorities perceive the need for accommodation.

Economic Factors: In a very real sense, economic factors hold the key to the international stability of the region, just as economic factors seem to be a vital determinant in the internal stability picture. The inability of the neighboring black African leaders to pose a threat to the white governments, is a direct result of the "economic suasion" exerted by the white governments.

The degrees of dependence vary. Basutoland (Lesotho) is completely surrounded by South Africa and totally dependent upon the latter's communications and transportation routes for contacts with the outside world. Zambia, on the other hand, boasts two possible ground transportation alternatives, one through Rhodesia which has been placed in jeopardy, and another less practical and only slightly more secure route via the Benguela railroad.¹⁸⁵ The other black governed territories fall somewhere in between in this dependence spectrum. In every case their main transport routes are through a potentially hostile territory. In addition, sizeable proportions of their labor force are employed by industry in the white governed states; in Basutoland, two-thirds of the adult male force work in South Africa.¹⁸⁶ Twenty per cent of the Bechuanaland male population works in South Africa, while an estimated 70,000 Zambian and 200,000 Malawians work in Rhodesia subject to instant repatriation should they or their government act contrary to the "employer" governments' interests. Conversely, Rhodesian and South African highly skilled labor and expertise are sorely needed in the neighboring countries. Almost all white skilled workers in the Zambian mines and on the railroads, without whom Zambia's economy would grind to a halt, are Rhodesians or South Africans. In Swaziland, where 43% of its land is owned by the 2% white minority, South Africa provides a wide variety of banking, currency, transport, postal and telegraph services, and the vast majority of the capital investment.

In summary, there is not one of the five non-white governments which is not crucially dependent upon the neighboring white regimes. Every leader is aware of this. Their behavior, while influenced by the pull of internal political inclinations, will also be conditioned by their country's economic needs. Thus, although the territories of Swaziland, Lesotho and Botswana are natural havens for political refugees and ideally located centers for political subversion, their political leaders will probably continue to follow the British colonial policy of allowing sanctuary to exiles, but forbidding them any subversive activities. Since this type of accommodation is necessitated by economic considerations, the economic relationships can be said to be mitigating factors for the time being.

Conclusions: Although the "winds of change" have been resisted in the southern tip of the continent, the situation is not entirely rigid. Certain postulations should be made however, for their occurrence would

have definite implications for international stability.

If insurgents in Angola and Mozambique would succeed, inspired possibly by a rebel victory in Portuguese Guinea or a favorable change of government in Lisbon, this would encourage nationalists elsewhere in the region, and bring closer the day when Zambia, Malawi, and Swaziland would be no longer at the mercy of economic pressures. Rhodesia would be left with no rail route to the sea except by the leave of a black government, and South Africa for the first time would share a border with a nation over which it did not have de facto control.

The internal situation in the enclave of Lesotho is likely to change, and there is the strong probability that South Africa would establish a physical presence to prevent an unfavorable change. There are some grounds for believing that such an opportunity might be welcomed. Dr. Verwoerd has advocated in 1961 the "adoption" of all three territories as "bantustans." There are others in the government who are much less indirect or tolerant on the subject. In such an event, a South African occupation would be accomplished before British protection could be dispatched or the first protest filed at the United Nations. It would be extremely difficult for either the world organization or for Britain as the erstwhile protector of the former High Commission territories, to reverse such a fait accompli.

4. Implications for U.S. Interests

Immediate Implications: For the time being the southern African region will retain its general political and economic stability. The white governments can be expected to remain in control during the ten-year time frame of this study. Immediate domestic or international conflict potentials are low and are not likely to have serious or direct implications for U.S. interests. South African port facilities have a strategic value for the United States, but if necessary U.S. ships can be refueled at sea, as has occurred in the past.

The only important issue which currently confronts the United States in the southern region is the South West Africa problem. The decision of the World Court on South West Africa is bound to lead to mounting pressures by the Afro-Asian countries on the United States, either directly or through the United Nations, to deprive the Republic of South Africa of its mandate over the territory. But the chances for U.S. military intervention or for U.S. support of multilateral intervention are remote. The use of a multilateral military force to expel South African troops from the territory is unlikely, even if the Afro-Asian states would be able to muster sufficient votes in the General Assembly for a resolution canceling Pretoria's mandate.

United States policy toward the Portuguese colonial holdings in Africa has always been tempered by the presence of Portugal in the NATO alliance and by the U.S. military interest in the base on the Azores. While acquiescence in Portugal's policies in light of its participation in NATO appears justified, U.S. cooperation with Lisbon would be unlikely to have an appreciable

strengthening effect upon the Atlantic alliance. The Scandinavian NATO members, and the Socialist parties in Germany, France, and Britain have traditionally opposed Portuguese colonial policies. The Azores base, often cited as a major consideration in retaining good relations with Portugal, is admittedly important. But it is not generally regarded as "indispensable" in the sense that its loss would seriously affect U.S. security.¹⁸⁷

The United States would naturally be indirectly interested in any involvement of its allies in the area. Britain, with a considerable financial investment in both South Africa and Rhodesia, and a somewhat ill defined responsibility for guaranteeing the sovereignty of its former territories, has vital interests in southern Africa. In order to protect these interests, Britain is unlikely to resort to military sanctions and go beyond political and economic pressure, as is evidenced in the case of Rhodesia. Whereas Britain has the primary responsibility in settling the Rhodesian problem, U.S. actions will remain limited to facilitating the implementation of economic sanctions, imposing an embargo on military equipment from the United States to Rhodesia, and helping to alleviate the economic effects on Rhodesia's neighbors, for example, by an airlift of oil to Zambia.

Long-range Implications: A major objective of the United States in the southern region is to prevent the outbreak of disorder on a scale which invites the intervention of external powers. Yet it is to this direction that trends in the southern African region point. The present military strength of the white regimes, the disarray and impotence of the forces of black nationalism, the economic dependency of the sovereign and semi-sovereign black states, all tend to militate for a shortrun stability.

But in the long run violence may not be prevented and will then be intensified. The option to develop a liaison with the more moderate representatives of the liberation movements has not been exercised and opportunities to capitalize upon splits within the exile movements have been forfeited. If in spite of economic rationality, one of the pro-South African leaders in the black territories would be overthrown, or, if in spite of painstaking security precautions, a sudden outbreak of violence would occur, there would be no middle ground on which to base an appeal for the restoration of order. Such a situation could assume international dimensions. While it is highly improbable that a U.N. force would be created to intervene against a southern African white regime, some kind of multilateral effort may be necessary to end a racially oriented flareup. Such action would only be undertaken after all other efforts, including U.S. mediation, would have failed. Any multilateral operation would certainly require U.S. logistical support, just as surely as the chaos, which will accompany a conflict, would attract Communist interference and aid.

In contrast with the United States, the Communist nations enjoy the luxury of a completely unequivocal policy toward the southern African region. With no need to maintain relations with Portugal, Rhodesia, or

South Africa, and a theory of class revolution quite suited to internal conditions in each of the south African countries, both the Soviet Union and Communist China can pledge unconditional support to the liberation movements and express complete condemnation of the white minority regimes. In this respect the image of the United States in Africa and Asia will decline because of the understandable reluctance to take stronger action against white supremacy.

The United States can also expect a rise in Communist influence in nationalist exile movements, because liberation groups are likely to seek more and more support from Communist sources in view of their failure to obtain support from western sides. In the short run, however, the logistic problems for the Soviet Union and other Communist nations are an important consideration against increased material assistance and effectively limit the sending of military advisers.

CHAPTER IV

AFRICAN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND ALIGNMENTS

Fundamental to U.S. policy in Africa is the principle that the African states themselves should make the major effort in solving their security and development problems; the western nations are prepared to assist them. This principle reflects U.S. objectives of independence, stability, and development in harmony with the aspirations of African leaders. To promote these goals the Africans have established various regional organizations and groupings. The importance of African regional organizations to U.S. security interests lies in their potential as agencies of economic and political cooperation and as arbiters of inter-African conflict. The more these organizations succeed in ameliorating the economic and social impediments to African development, the more likely it will be that international and internal stability will be maintained or restored.

Political and economic integration on a continental or sub-continental basis has, however, met similar obstacles of diversity, local interests, uneven social and economic progress, and external pressures which can be found within the national units. The growing awareness of national interests, the disintegration of international bonds, and the breakup of federations does not inspire much hope for collective action by the African states. The Organization of African Unity (OAU), intended to be a principal instrument of international cooperation, has since its inception been at the mercy of the emergent forces of nationalism. As a result, its future effectiveness is highly doubtful.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the development of inter-African organizations and alignments -- both cooperative and competitive -- in the light of U.S. security interests and objectives. The discussion will deal first with the forces which have caused the breakdown of federations and alignments -- the early attempts to translate pan-African ideals into political reality -- and the implications this has for the current more loosely structured international associations. Subsequently, the nature, purposes and future of present international organizations will be examined. The concluding pages will explore the implications of these developments for U.S. security.

A. PAN-AFRICANISM AND THE BREAKDOWN OF FEDERALISM

The idea of pan-Africanism, the vision of African unity, has been propounded as far back as the closing years of the nineteenth century. But it did not become a political force and a basis for

action until after the Second World War. In the period between 1957 and 1960 -- from the time of Ghanaian independence to the year of independence for most of French speaking Africa -- there were genuine hopes and expectations throughout the continent that some form of pan-African union might be feasible. However, because of the highly emotional nature of pan-Africanism, the mystical sense of racial solidarity, and the unfamiliarity with the practical problems of nation-building, the leaders of the pan-African movement tended to overlook the vast regional differences in geography, culture, outlook, and political experience.

As Africa's newly independent states began to cope with the problems of nationhood, it soon became evident that pan-Africanism could not transcend the forces of nationalism and provide a workable basis for political unity. Disagreement quickly arose as to what form pan-African unity should take. States such as Guinea, Ghana, and Mali pressed for immediate political unity. Others, such as the Ivory Coast and Nigeria, favored a functional and gradual approach and loose federal arrangements. The establishment of three clusters of states during 1961,¹ each with different interpretations of pan-Africanism, destroyed any real hope for pan-African unity. Only Ghana, with the half-hearted encouragement of other militant states, persisted in its campaign for political integration with the rest of black Africa.

1. The Fragmentation of French Speaking Africa

The political fragmentation of Africa began in 1958 with the disintegration of the French Community proposed by President de Gaulle. Conceived on a grand scale as a way of preserving the French presence in Africa, the community provided for a Senate, a Secretariat, and a Council of Prime Ministers presided over by President de Gaulle. Only Guinea of the thirteen colonies invited to join the community, opted for immediate independence. This event triggered the disintegrative process and opened the way to the emergence of several competing federal conceptions within French Africa. A three-way rivalry for the leadership of French speaking Africa quickly developed between Léopold Senghor of Senegal, Sékou Touré of Guinea, and Félix Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast. Each pursued a different alternative to the community envisaged by France.²

Senghor took the lead by securing the agreement of Soudan (now Mali), Dahomey, and Upper Volta to form a federation. Economic pressures from the Ivory Coast and France, however, forced Dahomey and Upper Volta to reverse their position. Finally, in January 1959 only Senegal and Soudan joined in the new Mali Federation and asked for complete independence within the community.

Despite the ease with which the Mali Federation was established, the differing federal conceptions of the two members became quickly apparent. President Mobido Keita of Mali expected to absorb Senegal

into a unitary and highly centralized state on a Soudanese pattern. Senghor and other Senegalese leaders assumed that each state would retain its separate identity and internal autonomy. Neither regime relented on this central issue. Increasingly concerned that the Soudanese would dominate the Federation and control Senegal, Senghor withdrew his state from the short-lived federation with Mali in August 1960.

A second effort towards a larger grouping was made by Sékou Touré, who favored a more radical approach than Senghor and who spurned association with other French speaking states. Shortly after his complete break with France in 1958, Sékou Touré conferred with Kwame Nkrumah to plan a Guinea-Ghana union as the first step to a larger, militantly anti-colonial union of pan-African states. Despite the ideological fervor of both Touré and Nkrumah for this idea, the Guinea-Ghana association, formed in November 1958, never amounted to more than a paper union. No unified currency, common market, or trade organization emerged, as had been planned. Nor, after the breakup of the Mali Federation did the adhesion of Mali to the Guinea-Ghana union in December 1960 alter the essential lack of institutional bonds.³ Thus it was without serious repercussions that Touré unilaterally dissolved the union between the three states in June 1963.

The third movement towards federation was promoted by President Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast. Originally opposed to the idea of federation and an ardent supporter of the community, Houphouët-Boigny felt compelled to reconsider his position when Senghor tried to persuade Upper Volta, Dahomey, and Soudan to participate in the Mali Federation. Encouraged by France, Houphouët-Boigny sought to create a grouping with limited political objectives. In April 1959 he succeeded in enlisting Upper Volta, Dahomey, and Niger as co-members in the Conseil de l'Entente. The Entente States, as they were called, were essentially a political alignment of conservative French speaking states which retained their economic links with France and which intended to remain within the Community.

The decision of the Mali Federation to seek independence forced the Ivory Coast leader to take a more drastic step. On the eve of Mali's independence, Houphouët-Boigny declared that the four Entente States had decided to become completely independent before negotiating the terms of association with France. This move spelled the practical end of the French Community as General de Gaulle had originally conceived it. The Conseil d'Entente itself did not evolve much beyond regular meetings between government officials. It was, therefore, not subjected to the strains and conflicts between local and larger interests. As a result, it became the only major post-colonial association between French African states which remained in existence since 1959.

2. The Decline of Federalism in Former British Africa

The creation of the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland

in 1953 had been promoted by Sir Godfrey Huggins of Southern Rhodesia and Roy Welensky of Northern Rhodesia who were supported by the majority of the white population and the Conservative Government in London. By establishing the Federation, its leaders hoped to preserve white supremacy and to develop the economic potential of the three areas. Northern Rhodesia with its Copper-belt, Southern Rhodesia with its manufacturing industries, and Nyasaland with its abundance of labor, complement each other and would benefit by integration. Some white leaders, moreover, saw the formation of a Federation as a step towards independence within the Commonwealth.

None of the indigenous African leaders, however, supported the Federation. They regarded it as an instrument of white supremacy, dominated by Southern Rhodesia. The Federation became a prime target of the African independence movements. After a decade of riots, strikes, and election boycotts, the British Government, confronted with the mounting criticism of the Labor opposition at home, consented in 1963 to the dissolution of the Federation. In 1946 both Zambia, formerly Northern Rhodesia, and Malawi, formerly Nyasaland, became independent.

In east Africa, the East African Common Services Organization (EACSO) was created in 1961, based on the East Africa High Commission of the colonial era.⁴ Through this instrument Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania jointly administer their common railways, harbors, airways, post and telecommunications services, although it was initially viewed by its leaders as a basis for the eventual creation of a political federation. All the prerequisites for political integration appeared to be there: geographical proximity, prior political association, roughly similar political institutions, a common market established under the colonial regime, and joint participation in the ministerial committees -- the Secretariat and Central Legislative Assembly administering EACSO. EACSO institutions, in fact, were to be forerunners of a federation between the three countries.

Nevertheless, despite these apparent advantages, the needs and problems unique to each country have pulled Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania apart and frayed EACSO to the point of collapse. No longer does the issue revolve around the future shape of federation, but around whether what remains of the common economic services can be saved.

A large part of the difficulty stems from inequality between the three countries in their levels of economic development. Tanzania's relatively low level of development resulted in a severe trade imbalance vis à vis Kenya and Uganda, forcing Tanzania to impose restrictions on imports from the other two countries. As the most economically advanced of the three, Kenya was the chief beneficiary of the tendency for new industry to locate near existing industries. Conversely, Tanzania, and to a lesser extent, Uganda, suffered most from this trend. The trade unions in each state

feared labor competition from the other two. Consequently, there has been great reluctance on the part of Tanzania and Uganda to encourage the free movement into Kenya of labor and capital essential for economic integration.

The coordination of separate national planning of the three countries with economic planning for the east African market as a unit has been a complicated task. Desires for self-sufficiency and rapid domestic economic development have taken precedence over the needs of the region as a whole. President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania predicted in 1960 when he said that the political federation should be established before independence, or else it might never be achieved. He fulfilled his own prediction by raising tariff barriers against Uganda and Kenya, and by establishing in June 1965 Tanzania's own currency and centralized banking system.⁵ By May 1966 the three governments were still discussing possible measures to strengthen EACSO and the faltering common market.

3. Obstacles to Federation

The abandonment of federal experiments in both French speaking and former British Africa suggests that Africans have dismissed federalism as a practical alternative to the receding vision of pan-African unity. By definition, federal association implies sacrifices of national sovereignty to some degree to a larger community. No African leader, so far, has been willing to make such a sacrifice when actually confronted with this reality.

There are also practical obstacles -- closely related to the issue of national sovereignty -- which impede a federal solution. The internal problems with which each African state must cope are often so enormous and complex that they leave the leaders little inclination to seek entangling international associations. Most independent black African states comprise diverse tribes and cultures. Creating a national consciousness is a formidable task which would be rendered even more difficult by expanding the borders of the national unit and multiplying the diversities that have to be transcended. The consolidation of domestic political power and national unity has taken precedence over the creation of international associations.

Furthermore, common metropolitan ties have not been strong enough to overcome basic diversities between the states which have attempted to federate. The Mali Federation broke down partly because Mali's unitary and highly centralized political system could not be integrated with Senegal's looser, laissez-faire system. Even within a national unit, such as Nigeria, the federal system broke down because the Northern Region's autocratic, traditionalist, Moslem institutions could not be adapted to the more democratic institutions of the southern regions. The prospects for creating

federations out of states with different colonial backgrounds and equally diverse tribal cultures appear even more remote.

Finally, economic planning and coordination, which are necessary for political integration are infinitely complicated by the different economic needs and levels of development among African countries. The inevitable flow of capital and labor to the strongest economy accentuates the problems of the states with weaker economies. No country has been willing to cooperate with other states in an economic endeavor which is damaging to itself. The control of the free movement of capital and labor to prevent such damage, however, endangers the very existence of the economic association.

B. THE BRAZZAVILLE, CASABLANCA, AND MONROVIA GROUPS⁶

By the end of 1960 and in the course of 1961 the rivalry between two clusters of states became apparent in Africa. Neither group formed a unified and monolithic bloc, but the members of each shared a similar outlook on major foreign policy issues and each block had its own concept of African unity. The so-called Brazzaville group was an alignment of twelve former French colonies: Senegal, Mauritania, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, Dahomey, Chad, Gabon, the Central African Republic, Congo-Br., Malagasy, and Cameroon.⁷ The Casablanca powers were a combination of the more radical African states: Ghana, Guinea, Mali, the United Arab Republic, Morocco, and Algeria. In mid-1961 the Brazzaville twelve were joined at the Monrovia Conference by a third group of states whose main common characteristic was a leaning towards the moderate African states, rather than the radical ones.⁸

1. The Brazzaville Group

Largely at the initiative of President Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast the Brazzaville powers first met in October 1960 at Abidjan and again in December of the same year in the city from which they derived their name. They all maintained close links with France. Essentially conservative, they were extremely critical of the role played by the radical African states in international affairs. The immediate cause which prompted the alignment of the moderate French speaking states was the desire to formulate a common approach on the Congo crisis, the French-Algerian war, and Mauritania's claim to independence. Houphouet-Boigny, particularly, wanted to explore whether the independent African states could help resolve the Algerian conflict without alienating France.

The ex-French colonies tried at the same time to find ways to promote unity among themselves. After stressing each other's political independence and territorial integrity, the Brazzaville participants called for mutual cooperation on common economic problems. In line with their moderate stance, their form of pan-Africanism emphasized economic and technical coordination rather

AFRICAN ALIGNMENTS

CHART IV - I

	Brazza- ville conf. 12-1960	Casa- blanca conf. 1-1961	UAM esta- blished 3-1961	Monrovia conf. 5-1961	Lagos conf. 1-1962	UAMCE esta- blished 4-1964	Openly radical position on Congo rebellion 1964-65	OCAM states in 1965	Rhodesia issue: severed relations with Britain 12-1965
Algeria		o ¹					o		o
Ghana		o					o		o
Guinea		o					o		o
Mali		o					o		o
Morocco		o					o		
U.A.R.		o					o		o
Burundi							o		
Congo-L.					x			x	
Ethiopia				x	x				
Gambia									
Kenya							o		
Liberia				x	x				
Libya		o ²		x					
Malawi									
Nigeria				x	x				
Rwanda						x		x	
Sierra Leone				x	x				
Somali				x	x				o
Sudan							o		o
Tanzania					x ³		o		o
Togo				x	x	x		x	
Tunisia				x			o		
Uganda							o		
Zambia									
Cameroun	x		x	x	x	x		x	
C.A.R.	x		x	x	x	x		x	
Chad	x		x	x	x	x		x	
Congo-Br.	x		x	x	x	x	o	x	o
Dahomey	x		x	x	x	x		x	
Gabon	x		x	x	x	x		x	
Ivory Coast	x		x	x	x	x		x	
Malagasy	x		x	x	x	x		x ⁴	
Mauritania	x		x	x	x	x		x ⁴	o
Niger	x		x	x	x	x		x	
Senegal	x		x	x	x	x		x	
Upper Volta	x		x	x	x	x		x	

- Notes: 1. Representatives of Provisional Government of Algeria did not sign the Casablanca Charter
 2. Libya did not sign Casablanca Charter
 3. Tanganyika participated in Lagos Conference
 4. Mauritania withdrew from OCAM in 1965

o = Radical Position

x = Moderate Position

than political unification. At subsequent meetings in 1961 the Brazzaville powers founded their official organization, the Union Africaine et Malgache (UAM), and a series of specialized bodies, including a postal and telecommunications union and a common airline, Air Afrique. So long as the UAM confined its efforts to solving problems of an economic and technical nature, the loose functional approach provided a sufficient basis for joint action.

The forging of unity on political problems presented greater difficulties. The common foreign policy approach advocated by the participating states was eroded by the stresses of individual national interests. The members of the UAM were split on what form their unity should take. Houphouet-Boigny favored political coordination. Senghor was the spokesman for those who advocated broader bases for cooperation in economic, technical, and cultural development. In March 1964, at Dakar the partisans of a more limited role for the UAM carried the day. The organization was converted into a purely economic, technical, and cultural body, the Union Africaine et Malgache de Coopération Economique (UAMCE).

Like its predecessor, the less ambitious UAMCE failed to fulfill the expectations of its supporters. Disapproving of the change from the UAM to the UAMCE, the four Entente states even refused to sign the new Charter. The Entente members were also unwilling to accept the UAMCE's orientation in economic matters. International investment possibilities were tapped through bilateral arrangements or through organizations not identified with UAMCE, such as the European Economic Community or the U.N. agencies. No consensus was reached on economic matters. These developments prevented the UAMCE from exercising an important influence on the French speaking states.

The increasing subversive activities of Ghana, the continued rebellion in the former Belgian Congo, and the general dissatisfaction of the moderate states with the performance of the OAU led, however, to a renewed attempt at unity among the French speaking countries. At the Nouakchott Conference in February 1965, the UAMCE was dissolved and a new organization, the Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache (OCAM), a compromise between the defunct UAM and the looser UAMCE, was created. As a result, the aggregate of French speaking states which originally assembled at Brazzaville in 1960, continued to remain largely intact under the rubric of the OCAM.

2. The Casablanca Powers

Partly in response to the Brazzaville meeting, Guinea, Ghana, Mali, the UAR, Morocco, and the Provisional Government of Algeria adopted at the Casablanca Conference in January 1961 an African Charter which incorporated the principles of radical pan-Africanism.⁹ They affirmed their plans to create as soon as possible a Consultative African Assembly of all African states and four committees of coordination in the areas of politics, economics, and cultural and

military affairs. They condemned the establishment of foreign military forces and bases in African countries. The reference to foreign bases was particularly addressed to the remaining French bases in the Brazzaville states. Further resolutions of the Casablanca states confirmed their neutralist and more radical orientation and opposed the decisions which the Brazzaville powers had taken on the Congo, Algeria, and Mauritania.

In contrast to the Brazzaville bloc, the Casablanca powers felt that no African nation could be fully independent until its links with the colonial West were cut. Intervention in the domestic affairs of states which catered to the former metropole was therefore justified. This position inclined them to find their allies in the East.

Different national backgrounds and objectives of the Casablanca members undermined their continued collaboration as a cohesive unit. Ghana remained a member of the Commonwealth, whereas Mali continued its association with the European Economic Community. Ghana belonged to the English speaking group, while Guinea and Mali belonged to the French West African complex. The domestic policies of the Moroccan monarchy stood in sharp contrast to those of Ghanaian socialism. Ghana used the Casablanca group to further its own ideas of pan-Africanism, while Morocco had joined the radicals to enlist their backing for its claims on Mauritania, and Algeria wanted support for its struggle for independence against France. In consequence, only on specific foreign policy issues could the Casablanca powers adopt a united position.

3. The Monrovia Bloc

Concerned with the deepening split between the Brazzaville and Casablanca states, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the Prime Minister of Nigeria, attempted to reconcile the differences and invited both groups to the Monrovia Conference in May 1961. The refusal of the Casablanca powers to attend the Monrovia meeting indicated that the conference had largely failed in its purpose. Only Liberia, Togo, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somali, Ethiopia, Libya, Tunisia, and the Brazzaville states met at Monrovia. The Monrovia powers supported unity through voluntary collaboration, rather than political integration, and flatly rejected the radical pan-African vision of the Casablanca states. If anything, the Monrovia meeting marked a rapprochement between the Brazzaville bloc and the other participants, instead of a reconciliation between the former and the radicals. The follow-up conference at Lagos in January 1962¹⁰ intensified the differences between the Monrovia powers and the Casablanca group.

The Lagos meeting, however, also showed a widening gap between the Brazzaville states and the other members of the Monrovia group. The Brazzaville countries made plain that they had no intention of weakening their intimate ties with the former metropolitan power.

Contrary to the English speaking members, the Brazzaville Africans, fearful of offending France, refused to receive Algeria at the Lagos conference so long as Algeria had not yet attained full independence.

4. Conclusions

Beset by internal differences, neither the Monrovia group nor the Casablanca powers succeeded in achieving the necessary cohesion to become an effective force in African politics. On the other hand, by the end of 1962 the tensions between the radicals and the UAM relaxed. Algeria's independence and Mauritania's admission to the United Nations removed two major sources of conflict. In this more favorable climate Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Guinea made another effort towards reconciliation. Their endeavors resulted in May 1963 in the establishment of the continent-wide Organization of African Unity which absorbed the Casablanca and Monrovia groups. Nonetheless, the existence of an all African instrumentality did not eliminate the basic differences in outlook and approach between the radicals and moderates. New tensions and disagreements between the two opposing clusters of states would soon arise again.

The importance of the Brazzaville and Casablanca blocs for U.S. policies can be found in their reactions to foreign policy problems. On the whole, the position of the Brazzaville group was closer to the U.S. stand. In the Congo crisis, for example, the Brazzaville powers, like the United States, supported after the ouster of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, the Kasavubu regime, whereas the Casablanca states promoted Lumumba's cause. With the exception of Ghana, the Casablanca powers, moreover, withdrew their troops from the U.N. force in the Congo; the United States had placed its hopes on the U.N. mission for solving the Congo problem without direct U.S. intervention.

The Brazzaville powers carefully refrained as a rule from interfering in each other's internal affairs. They had a greater respect for political boundaries than the Casablanca group and were more willing to preserve the territorial status quo in Africa. More ready to compromise, the French speaking states were also more successful in solving their inter-state disputes. As a result the Brazzaville group, much more than the Casablanca bloc, contributed to African stability.

The Monrovia conference proved to the outside world that the majority in Africa was prepared to pursue a moderate course in African and other international affairs. This implied the maintenance of generally friendly relations with the western powers which could not help but further the U.S. interest in African stability and development.

C. CURRENT AFRICAN ALIGNMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

As a result of the waning strength of pan-Africanism and the failure of federalism to unify disparate political entities, African states drifted away from constricting international organizations and opted for much looser associations espousing limited political and economic objectives. They tended, since the founding of the Organization of African Unity in 1963, to preserve only those old relationships and new groupings which conformed to their recently awakened desires for international cooperation without the loss of autonomy of independence.

1. The Commonwealth

With the exception of South Africa, every African state of former British Africa belongs to the Commonwealth.¹¹ The explanation for continued membership by states with such divergent foreign policies, different internal problems, and varying views of the organization,¹² lies in the looseness of its structure, the vagueness of its aims, and its flexibility in general. These characteristics have reduced the effectiveness of the Commonwealth in settling inter-African conflicts, although it exercises a restraining influence in African affairs.

Originally, Britain envisaged the Commonwealth as a British-led community of nations drawn together by similar economic interests and common desires for mutual defense assistance. The Commonwealth was to be Britain's replacement for its former empire. But the rapid expansion of the membership of the Commonwealth and the decline of Britain's dominant economic and military role since the Second World War, have largely altered the character of the organization. The emergence of a bloc of African members, holding strongly anti-colonial views which influence their economic and military relations with the former metropole, has had a particularly profound effect on the orientation of the Commonwealth. The successful campaign in 1961 of the African members against South Africa's continued membership which was favored by Britain, indicated London's declining influence in the organization. The Commonwealth can no longer be considered a purely "British" institution. Tanzania's recent diplomatic break with Britain over the Rhodesia issue without leaving the Commonwealth, is revealing of the change which has taken place.

African Commonwealth members have relied on British troops to help solve their security problems. Uganda, Kenya, and Tanganyika asked for British assistance in suppressing the mutinies in January 1964. Kenya staged joint military exercises with Britain in September 1965 in Kenya's Northern Frontier District, reportedly as a show of force to the Somalis. On the other hand, President Julius Nyerere set a precedent by replacing British troops with a Nigerian contingent within three months after the mutiny in Tanganyika. The possibility that African Commonwealth states can call on each other

or on non-African Commonwealth members for military assistance reduces the likelihood of U.S. intervention, except perhaps in a supporting role.

2. The Arab League

Until the north African states received their independence, each of them enjoyed close relations with the League of Arab States.¹³ The League on its part was bound by its ideological view of the Arab world as an indivisible unit which was to promote the independence of non-sovereign Arab states. Morocco, Libya, Sudan, Tunisia, and Algeria were given strong support by the League in their efforts to attain independence. The League provided a haven at its Cairo headquarters for nationalist leaders expelled from their homelands; it furnished material assistance and represented the country concerned before the United Nations and other international bodies, pleading the cause of independence. When they attained national sovereignty, each of the north African states joined the League.

Once independent, however, the reliance of these states upon the League increasingly diminished and they began to regard many of its activities as irrelevant or even contrary to their interests. An extreme example was the rupture which occurred between the league and Tunisia over the latter's refusal to adopt an overtly hostile position toward Israel.

The League, as an organization, rarely involved itself with affairs south of the Sahara. The Arab states of Africa, unlike those of the Middle East, felt that they had a commitment not only to the Arab world, but also to the Maghreb as a distinct entity in itself, and to Africa as a whole. The north African Arab states, furthermore, wanted to escape Egyptian domination and to remain free to pursue their own course, particularly with respect to maintaining close economic relations with western powers. For all these reasons, the Maghreb states and the Sudan have moved increasingly away from the Arab world towards closer relations with black Africa. As an international organization, the Arab League is of little consequence to the rest of Africa.

The military arm of the Arab League, the Arab League Unified Military Command, remained largely a paper organization even after an attempt was made to revitalize it in January 1964. The collective security needs of the member states have been more effectively met by other regional security pacts. African membership in the Command includes Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, and the UAR. Because of the somnolent nature of the institution and because of the orientation of the League itself towards the Middle East rather than Africa, the existence of the Command has not had any particular relevance to over-all U.S. security interests in Africa.

3. Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache

The Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache (OCAM),¹⁴ a revival of the old Union Africaine et Malgache (UAM), was convened in February 1965. The purpose was to consolidate the efforts of the moderate French speaking states in meeting Ghana's continued subversive activities, Chinese Communist infiltration and subversion, and the resurgence of the Congolese rebellion in 1964.

Despite the initial show of unity on the objectives of the OCAM, the first year of its existence was notable for the internal disagreements which were brought to light. On only one issue -- the condemnation of Nkrumah's subversive activities in neighboring African governments -- was there unanimity. But even on this question Congo-Br., where Fulbert Youlou's regime since August 1963 had been replaced by the Government of the more radical Alphonse Massamba-Debat, later retracted its support of the resolution. No united policy toward Communist China emerged because of differences of opinion. The Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, Malagasy, Togo, and Gabon did not want any relations with Peking. Senegal, Dahomey, the Central African Republic, and Congo-Br. were in favor of diplomatic and commercial relations. A third group, composed of Cameroon, Chad, and Mauritania, proposed relations with limiting conditions.

The most serious rift within the OCAM occurred over the Congo problem only months after the opening meeting. Concerned that the protracted rebellion in the Congo might spill over to neighboring states and encourage further Communist infiltration, the OCAM cautiously agreed at its first meeting to support the regime of Moise Tshombe. Tshombe, however, was generally identified in Africa with Belgium's desire to retain economic control over Katanga. He was also widely disliked for his use of white mercenaries to crush the rebellion. When at the subsequent May 1965 meeting in Abidjan OCAM members decided to admit Congo-L. into the organization, Mauritania, Congo-Br., and Cameroon bitterly protested. Congo-Br. threatened to withdraw. President Ould Daddah of Mauritania went even further. He resigned as president of the OCAM and withdrew his state from the organization. He later confirmed his repudiation of the OCAM's conservative stance by opening diplomatic relations with Communist China.

The OCAM is faced with other problems which undermine its cohesion. Senegal has been under mounting pressures to leave the organization because of its association with Guinea, Mali, and Mauritania in developing the Senegal River. There is the possibility that Senegal may eventually withdraw its OCAM membership.

These developments have weakened the OCAM. The organization is threatened by the same problems which plagued its predecessors, the UAM and the UAMCE. The OCAM is essentially a defensive political coalition, but with Nkrumah's ouster and the repression of the Congolese rebellion, much of the original purpose behind its creation has disappeared.

It is ironic that OCAM's defense of the principles of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) -- i.e., non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, peaceful economic and political growth, and international cooperation -- has, in fact weakened the more comprehensive OAU. The majority of OCAM members lacked confidence in the capacity of the OAU to defend its own principles. The very creation of the OCAM underscored this fact. The absence of eight OCAM members from the OAU Heads of State meeting at Accra in October 1965, as a protest against Nkrumah's subversive activities, has cast doubt on the effectiveness of the OAU as an African-wide agency for international cooperation.

D. THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

1. The Establishment of the Organization

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was established, largely through the persistent efforts of Prime Minister Balewa of Nigeria, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, and President Sékou Touré of Guinea. The three African leaders feared a fragmentation of the continent as a result of the acrimonious confrontation between the radical Casablanca states and the moderate French speaking states of the UAM. They intended to create an international forum in which African states could resolve their differences on the basis of a common set of principles and execute their decisions by means of an international African instrument. It may be recalled that the Monrovia Conference of May 1961 had been convened with this in mind, but had not achieved this objective. By the end of 1962 there was a sufficient decline in tensions to permit a more successful attempt at reconciliation. The result was the creation of the OAU in May 1963 at the Addis Ababa conference.

The OAU Charter deliberately played down the kind of centralized pan-African union envisaged by Nkrumah¹⁵ and placed the emphasis on principles which, in effect, preserved the status quo:

- 1) Recognition of the sovereign equality of all member states.
- 2) Non-interference in the internal affairs of states.
- 3) Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each member state and for its inalienable right to independent existence.
- 4) Peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, or arbitration.
- 5) Unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, of political assassination as well as of subversive activities on the part of neighboring states or any other states.
- 6) Dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories which are still dependent.
- 7) Affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs.¹⁶

The Charter provided for an Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the supreme organ of the OAU, which was to meet once a year; a Council of Ministers which had to convene at least twice annually; a General Secretariat; a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration which was to deal with violations of OAU principles by voluntary consent of the disputants; and a number of specialized Commissions. In addition, a coordinating committee was established which was to channel financial and military assistance to the liberation movements.

2. Issues Before the OAU

During the first year-and-a-half of its existence the OAU had some success in meeting a number of problems. The organization faced its first test in the autumn of 1963 when the Algerian-Moroccan border dispute erupted into open fighting. After a cease-fire was effected, a committee of arbitration, appointed by the OAU Council of Ministers, assisted in reducing tensions between the two contending states.

The OAU met its second test in February 1964 when Tanganyika requested the OAU to consider the implications of the emergency use of British troops which Tanganyika had called in to quell an army mutiny. The OAU Ministers approved a Tanganyikan resolution which advocated the replacement of the British forces by units from African countries. The OAU itself did not assume any operational or other responsibilities. Tanganyika would select the countries and make the arrangements under bilateral agreements. The Tanganyikan affair, however, provided a tangible example of how African collaboration could help in making a new state less dependent on the former metropolitan power.

On the other hand, the OAU did not succeed in unifying the nationalist liberation movements in the white-dominated areas. The coordination committee was unable to compose the differences among rival factions in liberation movements of particular territories.¹⁷ Neither was the OAU able to establish a consensus on policies with respect to cold war issues. The Council of Ministers meeting in February 1964 failed to agree on a definition of non-alignment and referred the corresponding agenda item to the Assembly of Heads of State. The supreme body, however, neglected to take up the question.

The relatively effective period of the OAU came to an end when the mounting Congo rebellion began to dominate the African scene in the summer of 1964. The Congo crisis showed that the OAU was still incapable of resolving disputes between members who were not already predisposed to settle their disagreements outside the framework of the organization.

By August 1964 rebel movements had gained control of one-fifth of the territory of the former Belgian Congo. Dominated by the

radical African leaders on this issue, the OAU was unwilling to endorse Prime Minister Moise Tshombe's request for African troops to help suppress the rebels. Whereas some African states, notably Malagasy, Senegal, Liberia, and Nigeria, were prepared to provide some kind of military assistance, none dared to take this step without at least the tacit approval of the OAU. As a result, Tshombe's dependence on white mercenaries and western arms aid increased. The Ad Hoc Reconciliation Committee, which the OAU appointed in September 1964, sought, moreover, to restrain the United States from providing military support to the Congolese Government. By urging Tshombe to negotiate with the rebels and to dismiss the mercenaries, and by placing the responsibility for a cease-fire on the Congolese Government, the OAU Committee undermined the position of the Tshombe regime and strengthened the position of the rebels. In consequence, the OAU aggravated the Congo crisis and precipitated direct U.S. and Belgian intervention.

In late November the American-Belgian operation to rescue white hostages in rebel-held Stanleyville took place. The operation facilitated at the same time the reoccupation of Stanleyville by government troops. The rescue mission served to intensify the division which was already evident between African states which sympathized with the rebels and those which supported the Congolese Government. A number of radical African states declared themselves against Tshombe. Algeria, the U.A.R., Ghana, Sudan, Uganda, and Congo-Br. began openly to assist the rebels. The French speaking states remained silent for a while, although Malagasy and the Ivory Coast soon called for a condemnation of the rebels.

The OAU Council of Ministers considered the Congo crisis in February 1965. The report of the Ad Hoc Reconciliation Committee, which called for negotiations with the rebels, formed the basis of the discussions. Neither the Tshombe advocates, nor his opponents, were able to enlist the support of a majority. Unable to break the deadlock, the Council finally passed the question on to the Assembly of Heads of State. The Congo crisis had again divided Africa into the two groups which had opposed each other in 1961: the radical Casablanca states and the moderate Brazzaville powers.

While the French speaking states were not completely unified on the Congo question -- Dahomey and Congo-Br. opposed Tshombe -- the threat of interstate subversion reinforced their solidarity. Particularly the Entente states were concerned about increasing subversive efforts of Ghana and the activities of Chinese-trained guerrillas. In early 1965 fourteen French speaking states formed their new organization, the OCAM.

The radical states of the earlier Casablanca group saw the OCAM as a rebirth of the UAM. The entry of Congo-L. into the OCAM deepened the hostility of the radicals, who denounced both the OCAM and Tshombe. A special OAU Council of Ministers session in June 1965, requested by Nigeria, Liberia, and Ethiopia, failed to reconcile

the differences between the radical and moderate groups. A number of French speaking states announced their intention to boycott the next OAU summit meeting in Accra, if Ghana did not expel the political exiles it protected.

Although Nkrumah partly met the demand to ban political refugees, at the Heads of State meeting in October 1965, eight French speaking states -- Chad, Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Malagasy, Niger, Togo, and Upper Volta -- boycotted the conference in protest to the Accra venue. Nine other states sent ministerial delegations and only 19 of the 36 members were represented by their heads-of-state.

The split between the radicals and moderates was equally evident in the Rhodesian crisis. At the OAU Council of Ministers meeting in early December 1965, the radicals persuaded the conference to adopt a resolution which called for breaking off diplomatic relations with Great Britain unless the Rhodesian rebellion were crushed by December 15. In order to prevent the disintegration of the Commonwealth, Nigeria called, just before the December 15 deadline, for a Commonwealth meeting to consider the Rhodesian crisis. In all, only ten states severed relations with Great Britain: Guinea, Tanzania, Ghana, the UAR, Mali, Mauritania, Congo-Br., Sudan, Algeria, and Somali.¹⁸

By March 1966 the balance within the OAU had swung to the moderate bloc. This time at the March session a number of more radical states -- Guinea, Mali, Tanzania, Kenya, the UAR, and Congo-Br. -- walked out in protest against the seating of the delegation from Ghana's new military government. Two others -- Algeria and Somali -- did the same when a militant African draft resolution on Rhodesia was rejected. These shows of protest, which reflect the division within the organization, have seriously shaken its reliability as an agency of African cooperation.

3. The OAU as an Instrument of African Security

The OAU provides an institutional framework for the accommodation of conflicting interests and policies. So far, however, the organization has failed to be an effective instrument of African security. The existence of two camps in Africa is also found within the OAU itself and has prevented it from solving specific major conflicts. The financial difficulties of the OAU and the tendency of the Council of Ministers to abdicate responsibility for important decisions by referring them to the Assembly of Heads of State are largely a reflection of this more basic problem. In the Congo crisis, for example, the radical states showed their willingness to contravene the Charter by supporting the rebels in order to eliminate what they regarded as a neo-colonial government. The moderate countries, on the other hand, by endorsing Tshombe, indicated their determination to maintain the status quo. The same divergent views were

evident with respect to the issue of inter-state subversion when Ghana was the target.

Similar basic differences among OAU members have prevented the establishment of an OAU peacekeeping force. They disagreed on who should pay for such a force, who should command it, and when it should be used. The Commission for Conciliation, Mediation, and Arbitration has only been successful in those instances where the request for OAU mediation came from the disputants themselves, such as in the settlement of the Algerian-Moroccan border dispute. On highly volatile problems, such as the Somali-Ethiopia confrontation and the Congo rebellion, OAU conciliation has been ineffective.

The political demise of Nkrumah, one of the key leaders of the radicals, is bound to alter the balance between the radical and moderate states in favor of the latter. The moderate bloc is not much more cohesive than the OAU itself. It, too, has its divisions, but in general the influence of the moderates has been more towards African stability than the impact of the radical group. Equally important, the policies of the moderates, therefore, have generally been more in harmony with U.S. security interests than those of the radical African members. If the predominant position of the moderates can be maintained long enough to permit the growth of an effective organization, the OAU may provide an instrumentality which can help solve African conflicts in accord with African as well as U.S. interests in the continent's stability.

E. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. SECURITY

To the extent that international organizations in Africa have facilitated orderly and peaceful accommodation among the conflicting objectives and policies of their members, they have served U.S. interests in African stability. The overall trend of international organizations and alignments in Africa, however, reflects the increasing importance of divergent national interests and a steady decline in the influence of the forces of African unity.

The continent-wide OAU provides a formal means by which international problems can be tabled for oral resolution. It offers an instrument for the voluntary arbitration of African conflicts. A basis for moral suasion is established in its charter which, if a real African consensus emerges, can result in concerted political and economic measures. In the case of South Africa, for example, the African states have been capable of taking joint action when they denied the Republic commercial overflight rights in black Africa. This safety valve function of the OAU has, at times, reduced international tensions.

On the other hand, the existence of a radical and a moderate cluster of states with opposing views of African unity and security has inhibited the effectiveness of the OAU in major conflict situations. The result has even been an exacerbation of tensions, which,

in turn, was detrimental to U.S. security interests. The policy and actions of the OAU with respect to the Congo rebellion are a case in point.

As experience has shown, however, neither the moderate nor the radical camp formed an harmonious and enduring group. Hence, there is not necessarily a permanent fragmentation of the OAU. Held together by the lingering psychological force of the old pan-African vision, the OAU is likely to be a continuing feature of the African scene. In the long run, it may become an institution to which the United States can look for the solution of African problems by Africans. But at present the ability of independent Africa to solve its own security problems through the mechanism of the OAU is sharply reduced by the divisive influence of national interests. The inclination of key African states is to separate into radical and moderate blocs and a more or less neutral third group.

Inter-African cooperation is, thus, most frequently found in formal and informal sub-groupings below the level of the OAU. In the short run, the existence of smaller and less ambitious international organizations and alignments has more relevance for U.S. security interests than the OAU has.

When alliances have been made by the more moderate states, the outcome has frequently been a shift in the balance of political and military power which favored U.S. interests. For example, the Brazzaville bloc was partly formed to muster support for the moderate Congolese leaders against the ousted Lumumba regime. A key factor in the establishment of the OCAM was the determination to take concerted measures against Ghanaian and Chinese subversion. Such moves have an ameliorative effect on potential or actual instability and crises. Furthermore, the more moderate stance of the members of the OCAM and the earlier Brazzaville bloc, and their willingness to compromise have helped to reduce inter-African tensions. Although the United States has only an indirect interest in the Brazzaville and OCAM states themselves, their policies have promoted U.S. security objectives in Africa as a whole.

On the other hand, states which have militantly anti-colonial attitudes have formed alignments with the aim of eliminating regimes which continue to maintain ties with the former metropolitan powers. These developments have adversely affected African stability and, hence, U.S. security interests. The actions of the Casablanca bloc and, subsequently, the radical group in the OAU with respect to the protracted Congo crisis have been contrary to U.S. security objectives. The anti-colonial views of the radical states, moreover, predispose them to find their allies in the East. Their alignments can provide opportunities for the expansion of Soviet and Chinese influence in Africa.

CHAPTER V

INTERNATIONAL INSTABILITY FACTORS

Actual or potential international conflicts in Africa can frequently be traced to two basic conditions which, according to many African leaders, are the result of colonialism. First, one of the most pressing problems for black Africa is the continued white rule in the southern part of the continent and in the Portuguese and Spanish colonies. A major purpose of the Organization of African Unity is, as its Charter states, "to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa." Second, there can be a substantial conflict potential in the arbitrarily drawn borders established in the colonial era. Although the conflict potential in African borders is not as high as is generally supposed, dissatisfaction with the inherited political boundaries sparked territorial claims and border disputes among the newly independent states.

A third issue which has disturbed African stability is the widespread use of inter-African subversion.¹ A number of radical states, notably Ghana, have resorted to subversive activities in order to further the objectives of pan-Africanism, to overthrow a so-called neocolonial region, or to change existing frontiers.

These major issues are bound to influence inter-African relations within the time frame of this study. Their disruptive consequences for African stability can affect U.S. interests. It is important, therefore, to analyze the conflict potential in the problems of white domination, border disputes, and inter-African subversion.

In order to indicate the limitations on the use of military force to settle international issues, the military power capabilities of African states will be briefly discussed. The analysis will then deal with the conflict potentials in the existence of expatriate nationalist liberation movements whose efforts are directed against the white dominated states in southern Africa and the Portuguese colonies of Guinea, Angola, and Mozambique. Independent black Africa's support of the liberation movements will also be examined. The problems arising from irredentist claims, border disputes, and inter-African subversion will be subsequently investigated. The conclusions will analyze the implications which these international instability factors have for U.S. security interests.

A. The AFRICAN MILITARY BALANCE

1. Distribution of Military Strength

A view of the geographic distribution of military power in Africa north of the Zambesi shows the imbalance between the Mediterranean littoral and the sub-Saharan countries.² Of about 480,000 men in the armed forces of these countries, more than half are in the services of the five Mediterranean states: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and the UAR. The rest, some 184,000 troops, are distributed among the thirty-one remaining black African countries. Only two of these states, Ethiopia and Congo-L., have military establishments of more than 30,000 men. With the exception of Gambia, which does not have an army at all, the other states have armed forces which range in size from 600 men (CAR) to 18,500 men (Sudan). Ghana, Nigeria, Congo-L., the Sudan, and Ethiopia are the only black states in sub-Saharan Africa which have forces in excess of 10,000 men.

The black sub-Saharan states do not only have small military establishments, but the military effectiveness of these forces is reduced by a number of factors. First, the states south of the Sahara lack the capability to deploy their troops abroad. Only Ethiopia, Congo-L., and Ghana have some air-lift capability. Ethiopia, however, is for various reasons the least likely to deploy its troops for some foreign military venture; Congo-L. continues to be faced with serious internal security problems; and the military regime in Ghana is consolidating its power at home and needs its troops there. Second, the armies of black sub-Saharan Africa are, with a very few exceptions, primarily equipped with light and medium weapons. They also lack the administrative and logistical infrastructure for large unit (division size) operations. Third, they still suffer from a serious lack of trained and experienced officer corps. Fourth, the newly independent black states do not have defense manufacturing bases of their own, but are dependent on outside sources for equipment. Finally, the tendency in many of the one-party states to use the military command organization as an arm of the ruling party for political control of the armed forces has reduced the military effectiveness of these forces even more.

In contrast, the military strength of the white controlled regimes in the south presents an entirely different picture. Angola and Mozambique are kept under control by some 80,000 Portuguese troops. Rhodesia and South Africa have some 26,000 well equipped regulars. Rhodesia has also a para-military force of 6,400 men on active duty and 28,500 reservists, while the Republic can call on about a quarter of a million reservists in case of emergency. The military capability of South Africa is further enhanced by its possession of the most modern as well as the most experienced air force on the continent. In addition,

Chart V - I

Geographic Distribution of the Armed Forces of Africa (As of January 1966)

Region/Country	Total Armed Forces	Naval ¹ Units	Aircraft ² Cbt. Tpt.	Region/Country	Total Armed Forces	Naval ¹ Units	Aircraft ² Cbt. Tpt.
<u>North Africa</u>	315,300			<u>Central and North</u>			
Algeria	48,000	12	52 13	Central	54,535		
Libya	7,000	3	- 1	Uganda	5,960	None	- 1
Morocco	44,800	6	14 20	Rwanda	1,500	-	-
Tunisia	17,000	7	-	Burundi	950	None	-
UAR (Egypt)	180,000	108+	400 60	Kenya	4,775	3	4
Sudan	18,500	4	10 6	Tanzania	1,800	None	-
<u>Northeast Africa</u>	44,000			<u>Southern Africa</u>			
Ethiopia	35,000	6	30 12	(1) Black Africa	3,850		
Somali Republic	9,500	? PC's	18 6	Malawi	850	None	-
<u>West Africa</u>	39,000			Zambia	3,000	None	- 8'
Mauritania	1,000	None	- 1	(2) White Minority:	25,000 ⁴		
Mali	3,500	None	-	Rhodesia	4,300	None	100/120 20/25
Niger	1,200	None	- 1	Repub. of S.			
Senegal	5,500	3(PC)	- 2	Africa	21,700	28	88/118 800/(+)
Gambia	None	None	-	(3) Colonial:	81,000		
Guinea	5,000	? (PC)	-	Angola	50,000 (Port)	? ?	? ?
Upper Volta	1,500	None	-	Mozambique	30,000 (Port)	? ?	? ?
Ivory Coast	4,000	2(PC)	- 1	High Comm. Ter.	1,000 (Br)	None	? ?
Togo	1,450	4(PC)	-	<u>Other Colonial Areas</u>			
Dahomey	1,800	None	- 1	Portuguese Guinea	20,000 (Port)	? ?	? ?
Ghana	17,000	7	- 17	Spanish Sahara	6,000 (Sp)	? ?	? ?
Sierra Leone	1,360	None	-	Rio Muni and			
Liberia	3,200	3	-	Fernando Po	5,000 (Sp)	? ?	? ?
Nigeria ³	11,500	10	- 10	Ceuta	4,000 (Sp)	? ?	? ?
<u>Central and North Central</u>	54,535			Melilla	4,000 (Sp)	? ?	? ?
Chad	900	None	- 1	French Somaliland	4,000 (Fr)	2	20/25 20/25
Cameroon	3,500	3	- 3				
CAR	600	None	- 1				
Congo-Br.	1,800	6	- 1				
Gabon	750	2	-				
Congo-L.	32,000	None	5 18				

1. Includes all armed ships and small craft down to patrol craft (PC).

2. Cbt. = Combat (including armed trainers); Tpt. = Transport (including liaison).


3. Since the date of these figures, the Nigerian Army has been fragmented into regional components. Hence, its effective strength, is considerably less than this total suggests.

4. Excludes substantial reserves and civilian "commando" units who total in excess of 35,000 Rhodesians and 100,000 South Africans. Source: David Wood, op. cit. L.H. Ewing and R.C. Sellers, The Reference Handbook of the Armed Forces of the World (Washington, D.C.: 1966). The Uganda Argus, November 20, 1965 as reported by Africa Research Ltd., Special Supplement on Rhodesia, Documentation Service No. 9/65. (London: 1965).

RELATIVE STRENGTHS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE INDEPENDENT AFRICAN STATES

(Exclusive of police & gendarmerie)

Data as of January 31, 1966



South Africa is self-sufficient in the manufacture of small arms and ammunition and can build its own tanks, helicopters, and armored cars.

2. The Implications of the Military Balance

The distribution of military strength on the continent shows a vacuum between the Mediterranean littoral and the white dominated southern region. This imbalance argues against the probability of armed confrontation between the south and the rest of Africa. The independent black African states south of the Sahara do not possess the basic military power necessary to implement their frequently expressed threat to eliminate the white regimes in the south. The north African states which do have the military manpower capability and the relatively well balanced forces would still require extensive logistical support. They are too far away from the potential area of conflict to pose an immediate and credible threat.

Direct military intervention in Rhodesia seems equally unlikely as direct military action against South Africa. A recent study of the London Institute for Strategic Studies estimated that a force of 20,000 to 30,000 men would be required to subdue Rhodesia, provided South Africa would not come to Rhodesia's defense. If independent black Africa would organize such a force, however, it "would be a composite, a jigsaw of small contingents with the inherent difficulties which arise from lack of arms standardization and from the need to create an effective high command and staff organization. . . . The expense would be insupportable, even after a few weeks, because of the need to develop base installations from which to operate."³

Individual or joint military measures against Angola and Mozambique also appear unfeasible. Portugal's 50,000 troops in Angola and 30,000 men in Mozambique can meet any threat which the neighboring independent countries might pose.

Within black sub-Saharan Africa, military imbalances between individual states do not have significant implications for direct inter-African conflict. Their forces are, on the whole, so small and their logistical capabilities are so limited that any apparent military superiority of one state over the other is relatively meaningless. The possibility of conventional warfare between independent African states is, therefore, remote.

Because most newly independent African states do not have the military power capability to act against the white dominated states or to press their territorial claims against each other, they have resorted to different ways to promote their foreign policy aims. Where the southern region is concerned, independent Africa encourages and supports the liberation movements; where hostility is directed against another black African state, the recourse has frequently been to subversion.

B. WHITE-DOMINATED AFRICA AND THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS

1. Introduction

The history of Africa's effort to gain independence is notable for its moderation in comparison to the violence that accompanied the American Revolution, the post World War Two struggles in French Indochina, Indonesia, Syria, and Lebanon. The few exceptions, where violence was long or bitter, such as in Algeria and Libya, involved conditions which were unique. They do not negate the generally peaceful pattern of black Africa's search for independence. Where serious violence has occurred -- in Congo-L., in Kenya, in Rwanda and Burundi, in Nigeria, in Uganda, and elsewhere -- the causes have been associated with the transition from political independence to national integration rather than with the fight for independence.

Africa's resentment of foreign domination is now directed at the 3.8 million whites who rule nearly eight times their number of native Africans. Portugal is the last major colonial power in Africa. With a total settler population of over 300,000 and some 100,000 troops, Portugal controls Portuguese Guinea, Angola, and Mozambique, inhabited by more than 12 million black Africans. In South Africa and South West Africa 3 million whites dominate a disenfranchised non-white population of almost 13 million. In Rhodesia 225,000 Europeans rule nearly 4 million Africans on a pattern similar to that in South Africa.

The fact of South Africa's long history of independence, and Rhodesia's short and tenuous one, does not prevent black Africa from grouping them with the few remaining European possessions. Nor does the legal fiction of the political integration of Spanish and Portuguese Africa into the respective homelands change the African's view that these remaining colonial vestiges must also be eliminated. In the long run Africa's offensive against the white minorities threatens the stability of the continent,⁴ and poses a variety of potentially serious problems for the United States in its relationships with the underdeveloped world, the European allies, and the Communist states.

The determination of black Africa to emancipate these areas and the equally strong determination of the white minorities to hold on to their control appear irreconcilable. The probabilities of concerted military action by the black African states against any of the white dominated states seem, however, unlikely in the foreseeable future. Liberation efforts to date have been limited in scope and intensity, partly because the newly independent African states have been preoccupied with their own immediate internal and external problems, and partly because their military resources are extremely scarce. Economic sanctions, U.N. resolutions, denials of overflight rights, and other similar forms of pressure applied by the independent African nations on the white dominated states have

had little more than nuisance value in their impact. They are unlikely to attain such proportions that they will spark open military conflict between the south and other parts of Africa.

The same assurance does not attend the current para-military operations of dissident Africans against their white controlled homelands. Moreover, the interest of the Communist powers, particularly China, in encouraging these activities has been substantiated. Because of the danger of external Communist support, with the concomitant possibility of sudden escalation and internationalization, it is important to examine the nature and capabilities of the so-called liberation movements. So far the liberation movements have lacked the military capabilities, the central direction and concerted support required for any success. Except in Portuguese Guinea, none of these groups has made long term inroads in the target countries, and at the present time they represent only a limited internal security threat to the countries concerned.

Each of the white dominated countries of Africa is the object of liberation movements pressed by nationalist exiles. There are at least two African nationalist groups for every colonial or white dominated state in sub-Saharan Africa.⁵ Splits within the liberation movements are usually the result of traditional tribal hostilities. The groups range in character and militancy from propaganda organs and organized governments-in-exile to para-military organizations actively fighting for independence. At this time only three of the movements -- those directed against Portuguese Guinea, Angola, and Mozambique -- are armed. The rest aspire to a similar military role, but have not yet achieved it.

In every case the nationalist movements are banned in their home state and have been forced to base their activities abroad. During the early post independence days in Africa support for these dissidents was essentially a unilateral effort of certain states which had a particular interest in doing so because they were extremely radical, had experience in guerrilla operations, or had ethnic ties with the liberation movements. Since 1963, however, an attempt has been made to broaden and regularize the base of support through the OAU. The OAU has been a primary instrument in keeping these movements alive. Whether they will remain free of direct Communist control will depend in large part on the ability of the OAU to consolidate and sustain these movements.

2. The Role of the OAU

When the OAU was established in 1963 it absorbed most of the smaller regional organizations of independent black Africa. Important among these was the Pan-African Freedom Movement for Eastern, Central, and Southern Africa (PAFMECSA) which had played a significant role in the fight against colonialism in east and central Africa. With its dissolution in 1963, PAFMECSA handed over these functions to the OAU's new Liberation Committee.⁶ Like its predecessor,

Chart V - 2
Major Liberation Movements in Southern Africa

Country	Parent Organization	Date Founded	Leader(s)	Headquarters	Military Arm	Recognized by OAU	Communist Support
Angola	GRAE Government of the Republic of Angola in Exile	1962	Holden Roberto	Leopoldville	ALNA	Yes	No
	MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola) ¹	1957	Agostinho Neto	Brazzaville	Not separately identified	No	Yes
Mozambique	FRELIMO (Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique)	1962	Eduardo Mondlane	Dar es Salaam	Not separately identified	Yes	Yes
	UDENAMO (Uniao Democratica Nacional de Mocambique)	1963	Paulo Jose Gumane	Cairo	Not separately identified	No	Yes
Portuguese Guinea	PAIGC (Partido Africano da Independencia da Guine e Cabo Verde)	1956	Amilcar Cabral	Conakry	Not separately identified	No known decision	Yes, possibly indirect
	FLING (Front pour la liberation et l'Independence Nationale de la Guinee dite portugaise)	1961(?)	Francois Mendy(?)	Dakar	Not separately identified May be the MIG (Mouvement de Liberation de la Guinee dite portugaise)	No known decision	Yes, possibly indirect
Rhodesia	ZAPU (Zimbabwe African National Union)	1961	Joshua Nkomo	Lusaka	Not separately identified	No decision	Unknown
	ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union)	1963	Ndabaninge Sithole	Dar es Salaam	Not separately identified	No	Yes. Individual training only
South Africa	ANC (African National Congress)	1912	Chief Luthuli	Dar es Salaam	Not separately identified	No decision	Yes. Individual training only
	PAC (Pan-African Congress)	1959	Robert Sobukwe	Dar es Salaam	Not separately identified	No decision	Unknown
South West Africa	SWANU (Southwest African National Union)	1959	Jariretundu Kozonguizi	London	Not separately identified	No decision	Unknown
Africa	SWAPO (Southwest African People's Organization)	1960	Sam Nujoma	Dar es Salaam	Not separately identified	No decision	Unknown

1. All operations reported in 1965/6 were in Cabinda rather than in Mozambique.

Source: Africa Report, Vol. 10, No. 4, April 1965; and Vol. 9, No. 2, February 1964. Various 1965 and 1966 issues of Africa Research Bulletin, Political, Cultural and Social Series.

the OAU Liberation Committee makes its headquarters in Dar es Salaam.

Despite the professed intent of the OAU⁷ to free all dependent peoples on the continent, the Liberation Committee has not taken the initiative in forming liberation movements or directing their operations, but has limited itself primarily to a coordinating role. It has assumed three main tasks: 1) to channel military and monetary aid to liberation movements which are already in existence; 2) to act as a collection agency for financial support from OAU members to the various nationalist movements; and 3) to unify competing nationalist groups.

The most severe limitation on the Liberation Committee's activities is its lack of funds. OAU members have been reluctant to divert capital from internal development programs to external activities. The Liberation Committee's original plans called for an annual budget of \$4,200,000 for distribution to the movements, but actual contributions have reached at most half that amount. The Committee's urgent appeals in February 1966 to the members who had not fulfilled their 1965 pledges suggest that its financial capacity will remain quite modest.

Despite these serious financial setbacks, the Liberation Committee has been moderately successful in channeling and supervising the distribution of military and monetary aid to the nationalist movements. This aid has come primarily from a few countries which have taken a special interest. Algeria has been notable for providing military training to ALNA (Angolan National Liberation Army) officers and Rhodesian and South African saboteurs and freedom fighters.⁸ Tanzania, host country to the Committee, has extended both moral and financial assistance to the several nationalist groups located in Dar es Salaam and the refugee communities which have come from Mozambique. In terms of actual arms assistance, however, neither the Liberation Committee nor the specially interested OAU member countries have had the equipment or resources to supply the liberation movements on the scale which they would require for successful operations.

The Liberation Committee has been unable to accomplish its third task of uniting the rival nationalist groups of the various target countries. Faced with two or more rival nationalist groups for each white controlled state or territory, the Committee has tended to abandon reconciliation attempts, and to help chiefly the strongest party instead. This has weakened the liberation movements concerned because competition between them for this support has been intensified, rather than allayed.

For example, the OAU's decision in July 1963 to support Holden Roberto's GRAE (Government of the Republic of Angola in Exile) initially threw the rival MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertacao de

de Angola) into disarray, but as the difficulties of GRAE in Angola have increased, determination of the MPLA to wrest control of the Angolan liberation movement has hardened. Competition grew to proportions which ultimately resulted in the assassination of two GRAE leaders by agents of the MPLA. This led to a declaration on February 8, 1966, by the MPLA spokesman, Luis d'Almeida, that it was impossible to resolve the differences between the two.⁹

Similarly, the OAU's decision to channel all liberation support for Mozambique through FRELIMO (Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique) has not deterred rival groups, including the UDENAMO (Uniao Democratica Nacional de Mocambique), from independently seeking aid for their own liberation movements. This fragmentation has made the over-all effort against Portuguese colonialism less effective. The Committee's current inability to reconcile Rhodesia's ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union) and ZAPU (Zimbabwe African Peoples Union), will probably result in a decision to support ZAPU, the stronger of the two nationalist groups. But such a decision will weaken the movement as a whole.

Since armed activity in South Africa and South West Africa does not yet exist, the Liberation Committee has not felt any pressure to choose between the four rival groups who have, thus far, been recognized as representative nationalist parties.

3. Liberation Movements in Portuguese Colonies

Despite more than five years of guerrilla warfare, the GRAE's forces in Angola, the ALNA, control today less than half the territory they originally held when the rebellion broke out in March 1961. Similarly, FRELIMO's hit-and-run attacks on Portuguese forces in Mozambique have in 18 months netted them little in the way of territory or internal African support. Only in Portuguese Guinea has the liberation movement shown signs of success. PAIGC (Partido Africano da Independencia da Guine e Cabo Verde) controlled about 15% of the territory by the middle of 1963 and now claims to control between 40% and 50%.¹⁰

The success of PAIGC, however, can partly be attributed to advantages in location and terrain which both ALNA and FRELIMO lack. With sympathetic Guinea and Senegal as border states, PAIGC does not have the problems of supply and asylum which liberation operations in Angola and Mozambique encounter. The jungle of Portuguese Guinea, moreover, is ideal terrain for the type of guerrilla warfare which PAIGC is conducting.

Its president, Amilcar Cabral, has made PAIGC a highly professional group which employs all the classic techniques of clandestine operations, including the use of a cellular organizational structure and other tight security measures. PAIGC emphasizes both its operations within Portuguese Guinea, where it is identified with the largest tribe (200,000 Balantes out of a population of

565,000), and outside the country. The organization claims that most of its arms are captured Portuguese equipment. It has, however, received some Communist made weapons from the Soviet Union and through Algeria.¹¹ PAIGC has also quietly started to develop ties with similar movements in Angola and Mozambique.

PAIGC has managed to retain control over the liberation movement in Portuguese Guinea and has successfully tied down some 20,000 Portuguese troops. It has reportedly 5,000 armed rebels in the field, although some estimates run as high as 15,000 men.¹² A semi-official Portuguese journal rated PAIGC's operational effectiveness high and described its forces as "well trained in guerrilla warfare . . . well armed with Czech machine guns and machine pistols, German Mausers and Soviet rifles, mines and grenades." They were reported to be aggressive and to use "to the best advantage a difficult terrain which they know like the backs of their hands."¹³

PAIGC's prospects appear favorable in spite of Portugal's determination to remain in control. Both sides have come to regard Guinea as a test of Portugal's ability to retain its foothold in Africa. If Cabral's movement succeeds in wresting control from the Portuguese, a radical regime oriented towards the East would come into power. Such a development would have serious repercussions for U.S. security interests in Africa even though Portuguese Guinea is part of west Africa where France has more important security interests than the United States.

The outlook for the liberations movements in Angola and Mozambique is less encouraging to their followers. GRAE's military arm, ALNA (the Angolan National Liberation Army) of some 7,500 men,¹⁴ is confronted by an army of some 50,000 well-equipped Portuguese troops.¹⁵ GRAE has never expanded its military operations south of Luanda Province and apparently enjoys little support outside this area because of ethnic factors. The Portuguese, moreover, have been able to recapture rebel held territory in Luanda and driven ALNA forces into the tropical terrain bordering on the former Belgian Congo. Plagued by internal dissension and dwindling arms supplies, ALNA has been limited to small scale hit-and-run operations. Holden Roberto, the leader of GRAE, has failed to obtain external assistance from either western or Communist powers. The latter recognize GRAE's rival, the MPLA, which reduces GRAE's prospects of receiving Communist aid even further. The Liberation Committee of the OAU is in a position to extend only limited help. The possibilities that GRAE's liberation army can expand its military operations are, therefore, very slight.

Like GRAE, FRELIMO in Mozambique has not been able to obtain much external military assistance, other than from Tanzania and the Liberation Committee. At this time, an ill-equipped force of irregulars, estimated at about 2,000 men, is conducting military operations within Mozambique against an army of 30,000 Portuguese troops.¹⁶

Since most of FRELIMO's activities have been confined to the Cabo Delgado Province at the northeast frontier of Mozambique where the Portuguese have limited interests and investments, it is reasonable to conclude that the effects on the Portuguese have been minimal. FRELIMO's liberation efforts will continue to be hampered by its inability to infiltrate men and supplies other than from Tanzania. South Africa, Swaziland, Rhodesia, and Malawi, the other countries which border on Mozambique, are either sympathetic to Portugal or too cautious to offer FRELIMO a base of operations.

4. Liberation Movements in South Africa and South West Africa

The highly effective internal security system in South Africa has limited any large scale guerrilla and similar para-military activities. Expatriate members of the ANC (African National Congress) and the PAC (Pan-African Congress) have, therefore, sought individual training in subversion and sabotage from the Soviet Union, Communist China, and the OAU Liberation Committee. Once trained abroad, however, it has been extremely difficult for ANC and PAC agents to re-enter the Republic. South Africa's intelligence apparatus, which operates in Dar es Salaam and in the other liberation movement capitals, has been able to spot the departure of saboteurs from these centers and intercept them on their return. Border controls have been tightened by regulations imposed in September 1963 on flights into and out of the High Commission Territories.

Since the Republic treats South West Africa as an extension of itself, the factors which militate against black African para-military actions apply to South West Africa as well. The territory's two nationalist groups, SWAPO (South West Africa People's Organization) and SWANU (South West Africa National Union), are too small and too poor to use effectively any military assistance which the OAU might provide. Most of their activities have been confined to political and diplomatic maneuvering. They have received considerable help in this endeavor from the independent black states, notably Ethiopia and Liberia. The latter two states brought the issue of South Africa's apartheid policy in South West Africa before the World Court.

5. Liberation Movements in Rhodesia

Rhodesia's African nationalist movement, split between the rival ZANU and ZAPU factions, has failed to win solid support from OAU member states. President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia has described ZANU and ZAPU representatives in Lusaka as "stupid idiots"¹⁷ because of their inability to mobilize their followers against the Ian Smith regime. It has been almost impossible for the nationalists to organize a strike or a demonstration within Rhodesia since most of their leaders are held in detention camps scattered throughout the country. Both Joshua Nkomo and Rev. Ndabaninge Sithole, leaders of ZAPU and ZANU, are imprisoned.

Infiltration from outside Rhodesia has proved to be equally difficult. The intelligence network of the Rhodesian Government is extensive as well as effective. The only major incident of insurrection after the unilateral declaration of independence in November 1965 occurred on April 29, 1966. Rhodesian security forces surprised an armed gang of nationalist infiltrators some 80 miles north of Salisbury. Seven were killed and the rest were taken prisoners.¹⁸ No other incidents have been reported so far.

6. Conclusions

In general, the liberation movements have been markedly unsuccessful in their efforts. With the exception of PAIGC in Portuguese Guinea, none has made any significant progress toward its objective of overthrowing the white minority governments. Dissension has divided the limited amount of trained leadership among a number of groups, which have similar goals, but which have failed to reconcile their differences and unite into a strong single movement. The splits within the various liberation movements have been a major problem in enlisting OAU and other support. The white regimes in southern Africa hold an overwhelming advantage over the freedom fighters.

While for the time being the liberation forces do not seriously threaten African stability, they present a challenge to independent African leaders. No African politician can afford to appear soft on racism and colonialism. Although most African governments prefer a peaceful settlement, they will be under increasing pressures to adopt a more militant position in order to maintain their influence at home and within African organizations. This is bound to strengthen the liberation movements. At the same time, Communism has a fertile field for growth. Failing to obtain adequate political backing from the West and the necessary material support from independent African states, the freedom fighters are likely to turn to the East for help. In the long run, therefore, the activities of the liberation groups can seriously disturb the orderly development of black Africa.

C. BORDER CONFLICTS AND IRREDENTIST CLAIMS

1. Introduction

The colonial powers left Africa with a heritage of political frontiers which did not always follow physical or socio-cultural lines. Boundaries in Africa reflect the political and economic calculations of European diplomats during the period of partition in the later part of the nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth century. The demarcation lines, moreover, were often vague and ill defined. As a result, the boundaries frequently divided a single tribe or a group of closely related tribes with a political and social system of its own.¹⁹

To be sure, boundary negotiators were to some extent aware of the distribution of the indigenous populations. Several colonial territorial claims were based on prior agreements with local chiefs. Subsequent frontier accords were often drafted in accordance with these arrangements. This ensured some degree of conformance between the new political partition and the existing distribution of ethnic groups.

Nonetheless, for most regions the tribal or ethnic distribution was at best a secondary factor in border negotiations. A substantial number of ethnic groups was split by the jurisdictional limits established in the colonial period. As one study found, only surviving colonial frontiers distinguish the Tukulor of Senegal and southern Mauritania, the Tuareg of the Algerian Sahara, the Malinke of Guinea, the Songhai of Niger, the Senufo of the Ivory Coast, and the Bobo of Upper Volta from the same peoples in modern Mali.²⁰ Although border disputes have arisen since the numerous former colonies became independent the number of boundary conflicts has been surprisingly small. Border problems have generally centered on three issues:

- a. Irredentist claims by one state against another based on historic grounds.
- b. Territorial disputes over the exact demarcation of ill defined boundaries.
- c. Territorial claims based on ethnic grounds. These can be separatist claims advanced by a single tribal group within a state or claims involving a tribal group which has been divided by a border. In the latter case the desires for reunification can spark an irredentist claim by the state which includes part of the tribe.

It may be observed that the arbitrary nature of a boundary has been used as an excuse for territorial aggrandizement.

2. Irredentist Claims Based on Historic Grounds

Most international borders in Africa bear little relation to the traditional historical process. All the institutions of the colonial economy and the modern secular administrative structure, however, did develop within the colonial demarcation lines. Problems of artificially drawn borders have, therefore, no bearing on the modern or non-traditional aspects of their environment. This would suggest that if territorial claims based on historic grounds would arise in the post independence period, they are most likely to originate in the traditional sectors of African societies. The historic rationale for border changes has indeed been invoked by two African states that are monarchies with state traditions going back to the pre-colonial era: Morocco and Ethiopia.

Morocco has pursued an irredentist policy since independence. Its claims to Mauritania, the remaining Spanish enclaves in north Africa, and areas under Algerian sovereignty and in Mali are based on the argument that the Moroccan kingdom extended from the Mediterranean to the Senegal River from the time of the Almoravid dynasty in the eleventh century until Morocco became a French protectorate in 1912.²¹ Morocco's claim to Mauritania failed to lead to violence, primarily because neither side possessed the military power to engage in such a conflict and because Morocco did not succeed in enlisting the necessary support from the local population in Mauritania and from other African states.

Moroccan endeavors to regain the Spanish territories have been chiefly on the diplomatic level, although some incursions by private groups in the early 1960's produced a temporary deterioration in Spanish-Moroccan relations. Since Algerian independence, however, Spanish-Moroccan relations have improved. Apparently, Spain feared that Algeria's revolutionary fervor would spill over into Morocco. Spain was, moreover, particularly relieved when the Moroccan army defeated the Algerians during the Moroccan-Algerian border conflict in late 1963. Morocco represents for Spain stability and a buffer against Algeria. On its own initiative, Spain has quietly withdrawn most of its troops from Ifni, thus leaving the door open for a negotiated settlement of Morocco's irredentist claim. On its part, Morocco needs the Spanish market for its raw materials.²² For these reasons the Spanish-Moroccan territorial dispute is currently quiescent.

Moroccan efforts to expand its border at Algerian expense did not start in earnest until 1963. The reason for this late date was partly the result of Morocco's sympathy with Algeria's struggle for independence and its wish to avoid aggravating the problems for the Algerian National Liberation Front. Morocco also wanted to be identified with the radical anti-colonialists in order to find support for its claim to Mauritania. But Morocco's withdrawal of its claim to Mauritania which the signing of the OAU Charter implied, provided a new impetus for pushing its claim to the Algerian Sahara. Border fighting broke out in October 1963. The Algerian forces initially received a setback, but within a very short period Algeria managed to obtain pledges of Egyptian and Soviet support. Concerned lest the war would expand, Ethiopia and Mali pressured the contending states into accepting a cease-fire. Under the aegis of the OAU a temporary settlement was subsequently achieved.

The territorial issue between Morocco and Algeria is far from dead and can flare up at any time, as border incidents as recent as May 1966 have shown. The buildup of the Algerian army, moreover, is a factor which can only aggravate the tensions in this respect.

Ethiopia also pressed claims based on historical grounds to former Italian East African territories. It argued that Ethiopian sovereignty extended in the pre-colonial period from the Shoa

plateau to the coasts of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean.²³ The Eritrea issue was temporarily solved when the former Italian colony became a province of Ethiopia in November 1962. Ethiopia is unable to compromise on its claims to parts of Somali, primarily because of Somali's irredentist claims on Ethiopia and because Ethiopia fears that this will encourage separatist demands by some of the numerous Ethiopian minority groups.

In both Morocco and Ethiopia the inherited borders are seen as superimposed across traditional political communities. They are the only two states which have used historic legitimacy to back their demands for border revisions. They are the only two states which can claim a traditional political identity antedating the colonial period. Ghana and Mali have invoked the argument of pre-colonial relationships with Sudanic states of similar names. But, as one observer pointed out, "this effort has been concerned primarily with creating a national and cultural consciousness, boosting local pride and buttressing the ideology of negritude and African personality."²⁴ Most African governments have refrained from making claims to historical continuity with pre-colonial political systems. This suggests that the conflict potential of border claims based on indigenous political history will be low.

3. Disputes Over Ill-Defined Boundaries

An example of a dispute over the demarcation of ill-defined boundaries is found in the Mauritania-Mali situation. Under a French decree of July 5, 1944 Mauritania obtained the Hodh district, northwest of Niore, Soudan. The decree defined the border as the bed of the Wadou. A number of subsequent administrative decisions established a somewhat vague border line, but no exact demarcation was undertaken. No geographic, ethnic, or social boundaries were present and the particular border became subject to dispute.²⁵ Mali based its position on the July 1944 decree; Mauritania on the later decisions.

The settlement of the dispute was for a long time prevented because Mali felt that its prestige was at stake. Since it had already lost the Hodh, Mali believed that it was Mauritania's turn to compromise. The dispute was further intensified by the fact that the southern area of the north-south border contained wells and underground water supply necessary to nomadic tribes from either side of the border. The two parties finally reached a compromise in early 1963 by which both made concessions. The settlement of the dispute was noted for the absence of violence or threats of violence as a means of imposing a political solution.

4. Irredentist Claims Based on Ethnic Grounds

Since colonial borders cut across a great number of ethnic and linguistic groups, claims based on ethnic grounds would present a far more serious threat to African stability than those advanced

on other bases. With the exception of Somalian claims to Ethiopian and Kenyan areas, however, territorial disputes traceable to ethnic issues are dormant or have been settled.

The division of the Ewe tribe between Ghana and Togo has caused tensions and numerous incidents between the two states. Togo felt that British Togoland, in which large numbers of Ewe live, should have become part of independent Togo. But British Togoland was incorporated into Ghana in 1956 and Ghana absorbed thereby a major section of the Ewe. Ghana, in turn, considered not only British Togoland but the entire Togo Republic a rightful part of Ghana because of the presence there of the Ewe.²⁶ The Nkrumah regime vigorously pressed this claim, encouraging internal subversion within Togo as a means to achieve this end. With the ouster of Nkrumah the push for unification is unlikely to lead to a major conflict. Togo's irredentist claims against Dahomey, where Ewe also live, has caused only occasionally a deterioration in their relations.

The demand of Agni tribal elements in the Ivory Coast and Ghana for the reconstitution of a separate Sanwi state and the demand of northern Cameroonian tribes, principally the Fulani, for detachment from Cameroon and union with Nigeria are also based on ethnic arguments. The Sanwi claim was eliminated by suppression of the Agni leaders; the Cameroonian issue was resolved without violence when a U.N. sponsored plebiscite produced a majority vote in favor of union.

Somali's border dispute with its neighbors, on the other hand, has remained unresolved and continues to contribute to the picture of instability in north east Africa.²⁷ An estimated 1.5 million Somalis live across the borders in Ethiopia, Kenya, and French Somaliland. The major objective for every Somali government and political party before and after independence has been the unification of all Somalis in the African Horn. The Somali constitution is the only one in Africa which insists that the unification of a particular tribal group be a goal of government policy. The inflexibility and persistence of Somali's irredentist demands can largely be traced to three factors, which make the Somali case unique in Africa.

First, the social structure of the Somalis is based on segmentary lineage. This implies that each individual can identify himself, through his father and a series of increasingly larger lineage segments, with one of the six major clans, which in turn are descended from the Promphet Mohammed. On the political level this means that the individual identifies himself ultimately with the largest community to which he belongs, i.e., a greater Somalia.

Secondly, this social and political identification is intensified by the common Islamic religion and language. The present national

frontiers conflict, thus, with two major values of traditional Somali culture.

Thirdly, to the nomadic pastoral Somalis the borders represent barriers to vitally needed grazing lands and water, which makes them even less inclined to accept the present boundaries. In a traditional pattern the Somali moves from one pasture to another without regard to national boundaries. For Somalis the only frontier is the farthest limits of their pastures. In addition, since the members of the two largest and most influential clans were bisected by the borders with Ethiopia and Kenya, their plight was promptly taken up by all political groups in Somali.

There is, thus, a high degree of cultural, ethnic, linguistic, and economic homogeneity among Somalis. Within Somali this has produced a political consensus on the pan-Somali issue which finds its base in Somali's traditional culture. For this very reason Somali's leaders have to be particularly sensitive to demands generated by the traditional components of the polity. The intensity of Somali's irredentist claims mirrors this situation.

5. Conclusions

With the exception of the Moroccan-Algerian and the Somalian-Ethiopian-Kenyan territorial disputes, the conflict potential in African borders is low. In spite of the general expectations, irredentism based on historic or ethnic grounds has seldom led to serious conflict situations in the post independence era. The seventy odd interstate boundaries in Africa have been subject to a remarkably small incidence of border disputes.

Territorial claims on historic bases have been advanced only by governments, such as Morocco, with an indigenous political tradition which reaches back to the pre-colonial period. The most persistent ethnic claims have been pressed by Somali where there is a relatively homogeneous community. Both cases are the exception, rather than the rule in Africa, where the regimes are generally nontraditional and lead culturally heterogeneous communities. Most governments have been too preoccupied with welding the diverse groups into a nation. At the same time, African states have refrained from pushing border claims lest this would encourage other states to make similar demands against their own territorial integrity. The OAU Charter attests to the practical value of accepting the territorial status quo as a necessary mutual accommodation. A final factor which militates against the possibility of the eruption of a border conflict is the limited military power capabilities of the new African states.

D. INTER-AFRICAN SUBVERSION

1. Introduction

A persistent source of friction in inter-African relations has been the interference of African states in each other's domestic affairs. Inter-African rivalries have frequently been expressed in attempts by certain state leaders to subvert the governments of other states. Until Nkrumah's fall in February 1966, Ghana led the more radical African states in their campaign to promote pan-African objectives and to rectify the colonial balkanization of Africa. Subversion of African governments opposing these revolutionary ideals became an accepted technique and was justified as a fight against neo-colonialism.

Subversive activities instigated or supported from abroad have primarily been conducted for ideological reasons and generally by the radical African states against the moderate ones. Other factors, however, have also played a part. Aggressive national leaders have employed subversion for expansionist objectives or in order to force a settlement of a border dispute or other political issue. Furthermore, as a result of the highly personalized nature of African politics, subversion has been used as an instrument of an individual leader against another hostile or rival African head of state. Here again, Nkrumah was the major exponent of the use of subversion as a means to oust a foreign opponent.

The bitterness which these attempts caused was evident at the Addis Ababa Conference in May 1963 when after much debate the OAU went on record in its Charter as eschewing intervention in the internal affairs of member states. This resentment was even more pronounced at the Nouakchott Conference in February 1965 when the former UAM members established the OCAM partly to oppose collectively Ghanaian subversion.

Subversion conducted by one state against a second state has by itself never resulted in the fall of any African regime. It has under certain circumstances seriously aggravated the internal security problems for the target country. The state which uses subversive techniques needs some base of dissidence in the target country in order to influence or change the internal power balance there. The ability of a subversive effort to sustain its momentum depends partly on the extent to which it can rely on indigenous population groups. As a rule, inter-African subversion has been conducted through the protection of and assistance to an exiled opposition movement. The target country, however, has ipso facto been particularly on its guard against infiltration of banned party members and against activities of dissident groups. This fact has militated against the success of inter-African subversion.

Another element which determines the effectiveness of a subversive effort is the number of other states that are prepared to

encourage the dissident movement, and the degree of support they are willing to provide. Exiled opposition groups have generally been backed by one particular state at the time, usually by the state in which they could establish their base of operations. In several instances, the support was largely limited to the provision of sanctuary. On the other hand, since primarily the radical anti-colonial states, such as Ghana, Mali, Guinea, and later Congo-Br., provided such sanctuaries, the Soviet Union and Communist China had relatively easy access to the dissident groups. The threat of inter-African subversion to the continent's stability therefore lies also in the opportunity this presents for Communist interference.

Because subversion occurs primarily in the clandestine realm, documentary proof has been scarce. The annals of recent African history abound with charges and countercharges of subversion by foreign states, often based on not much more than inference and rumors. At one time or another a number of African states, including Mali, Guinea, Egypt, and Algeria, have resorted to subversive techniques. Evidence suggests that the Nkrumah regime conducted the most extensive and sustained subversive campaign against hostile governments. The following pages will discuss Ghana's subversive activities as the prime example of an African state engaged in this field. A consideration of foreign subversive efforts in the Congo will follow since of the various instances of inter-African subversion they created the most critical disturbance in the continent's international relations and had the most serious implications for U.S. interests.

2. Ghanaian Subversive Activities

The principal targets of Ghana's subversive activities were the former French colonies associated originally in the UAM. Rather than venture forth in the uncertain waters of pan-African unity, the leaders of the UAM states preferred for various economic and political reasons to maintain their ties with the former metropole and to strengthen the state system which they had inherited. A consonance of views between the domestic opposition in these states and the leaders of the radical countries -- principally Ghana, Guinea, and Mali -- soon prompted the latter to protect and help the dissidents.

Ghana in particular became a favorite haven for exiled opposition leaders and members of outlawed movements. Besides offering asylum to political refugees, Ghana permitted them to form organizations aimed at subverting their home governments. The Nkrumah regime also established camps where exiles received training in guerrilla warfare, sabotage, and other subversive techniques. Instructors included Ghanaian as well as Chinese and other Communist experts.²⁸ The aim of Ghana's efforts was to help undermine and if necessary overthrow African leaders unsympathetic to Nkrumah's vision of African unity. Ghanaian support to Niger's banned Sawaba

party, to the Cameroon's anti-government Union des Populations du Cameroon, and the Ivory Coast's exiled Sanwi movement are representative of Ghanaian endeavors to subvert the governments of other states.

Subversion in Niger: Shortly after Niger opted for membership in the French Community, the new Hamani Diori Government outlawed the defeated opposition Sawaba Party and its leader, the former Prime Minister Djibo Bakary. The Party first made its base in Mali, but after one of its leaders was assassinated in July 1962, the organization moved its headquarters to Accra. During the next three years Bakary and his followers used Ghana as a base for their operations against Diori's regime. With the help of Nkrumah and the Chinese Communists Bakary's group organized its subversive campaign. Exiled Nigerian nationals were trained at Nkrumah's Ideological Institute at Winneba, a training ground for subversion against neighboring countries.²⁹

Bakary himself also established in September 1962 an international group of Freedom Fighters at Accra. This organization, which Nkrumah supported, included dissident groups from Togo, Cameroon, the Ivory Coast, and other countries.³⁰

In the hope of starting a general revolt against the Diori Government, Sawaba exiles from Ghana launched in the autumn of 1964 carefully planned, but unsuccessful attacks on Niger posts along the eastern border with Chad and at the Dahomey border.³¹ At that time the relations between Niger and Dahomey were strained, partly as a result of their territorial dispute over the Island of Leyte in the Niger River. Charges and countercharges of subversion were exchanged between the two states, but since their relations subsequently improved in other respects, infiltration of Nigerian insurgents from the Dahomey border into Niger became increasingly difficult.

In consequence, actual subversive activity originating from Ghana remained limited. After Nkrumah was ousted, the new Ghanaian regime handed a group of Sawaba exiles over to the Niger Government, including several who had participated in the 1964 border raids.³²

Subversion in the Cameroon: Ghana as well as Egypt, Guinea, and Congo-Br. have all been involved at one time in aiding the insurgents in the Cameroon. Their assistance was ideologically motivated and directed against what was regarded as the neo-colonial regime of the Cameroon.

As early as 1955, the French administration banned the Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC), a nationalist party which employed terrorist tactics. After moving its base of operations from one country to another, the UPC established in 1958 its headquarters in Conakry, Guinea. With material and financial backing from Guinea and Communist China,³³ the UPC continued its terrorist activities in the Cameroon, mostly in the central highlands where it was supported by members of the Bamileke tribe.

The party split after its leader, Félix Moumié, an African Communist, was murdered in November 1960. A faction moved to Accra and in 1962 the Cameroonian dissidents joined Bakary's Freedom Fighters. Nkrumah organized guerrilla training for Bamileke "people's volunteers."³⁴ Communist China now channelled its assistance through Accra.³⁵

Ghanaian subversive activities with respect to the Cameroon were halted when the regime of General Ankrah came into power in 1966. By that time the center of external support to the Cameroonian rebels had moved to Brazzaville from where also the Chinese continued to abet Cameroonian dissidence.³⁶ As late as May 1966, Cameroonian guerrilla fighters were still waging their campaign of terrorism against the moderate Cameroonian Government.

Subversion in the Ivory Coast: Ghanaian subversive efforts against the neighboring Ivory Coast were conducted for ideological reasons as well as for expansionist purposes. The ideological aspects reflected the political rivalry between the radical states and the Entente members. The expansionist objectives centered on the Ivorien Agni tribal lands. Nkrumah supported the separatist Sanwi movement of the Agni tribe, whose peoples had been divided by the border between Ghana and the Ivory Coast. The Ivorien Agni leaders bitterly opposed President Houphouet-Boigny who tried to limit the power of the chiefs and to change Agni traditions and customs. When the Ivory Coast rejected Agni demands for independence and arrested several Agni leaders, Ghana offered in early 1960 asylum to the Sanwi government in exile.³⁷ The Sanwi liberation movement became later one of the members of Bakary's international freedom fighters association.

Recurrent attempts to infiltrate Agni agents from Ghana into the Ivory Coast met with little success, primarily because the majority of the people in the border region remained generally indifferent to the idea of secession. But these efforts continued to exacerbate the existing tensions between Houphouet-Boigny and Nkrumah.

After General Ankrah's coup d'etat a number of Ivory Coast citizens, who had been receiving training in subversive techniques in Ghana, were returned to the Ivory Coast Government. The Ghanaian regime officially apologized for the subversive activities of its predecessor against the Ivory Coast.³⁸

3. African Interference in the Congo

The most serious case of inter-African subversion occurred with respect to the former Belgian Congo during 1964-65. Interference by the more radical African states in the internal affairs of the Congo against its government had taken place once before, after its First Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, had been ousted and his followers had established their own regime in Stanleyville

at the end of 1960. The UAR had provided some financial and military assistance, but after the Sudan closed its territory to all transport to the Congo, other than transport authorized by the United Nations, it became almost impossible to continue assistance to Stanleyville.

In late 1963 and in the course of 1964 a number of dissident movements started new revolts in the Congo.³⁹ One faction led by Christophe Gbenye founded the Conseil National de Libération (CNL) in Brazzaville in October 1963. A group headed by Gaston Soumialot established its headquarters in Bujumbura in February 1964. Both factions were permitted to plot the overthrow of the Leopoldville Government and were actively supported by Chinese Communists. The rebel movement in Kwilu province, led by Pierre Mulele, also received support from Chinese sources through Brazzaville.

By August 1964 the military situation in the Congo had seriously deteriorated: one-fifth of the country was in the hands of the rebels and a rebel government was installed in Stanleyville. After the Congolese Government hired white mercenaries to command its army, however, the rebels were gradually forced back. At the end of November the Belgian-American rescue mission not only liberated white hostages held by the rebels in Stanleyville but at the same time facilitated the recapture of Stanleyville by government troops.

A number of radical African states reacted by starting to support the rebels openly. Egypt, Algeria, and Ghana ran a weapons airlift, partly financed by the Soviet Union, to the Congo via the Sudan. The Sudan permitted the flow of arms to pass through its territory and provided trucks to help transport the equipment from the border town of Juba into the Congo. Communist arms, mostly from Communist China, were routed to Congolese rebels through Tanzania, Burundi, and Uganda. Military advisers from Egypt and Algeria were reportedly instructing the insurgents. Training camps were known to exist in Algeria, Uganda, and Congo-Br.

After the fall of Stanleyville, however, the overall coordination among the rebel factions broke down, which contributed to the failure of the rebels to recapture their momentum.⁴⁰ At the end of January 1965 the Sudan closed its borders to the arms traffic to the Congo when it discovered that some of the arms destined for the Congo were falling into the hands of southern Sudanese rebels. About the same time Burundi severed relations with Communist China, which eliminated another center of transshipment for Communist weapons to the Congo. Uganda followed Sudan's example about a month later and by the end of April the UAR had also halted its arms supplies.

Partly because the rebel movement itself fell more and more into disarray, foreign support became increasingly limited to the provision of sanctuary. Some foreign assistance, primarily from

Congo-Br., Tanzania, and Algeria, continued. This help consisted mostly of political advice and training in subversive warfare of Congolese exiles. But in June 1965 a coup d'etat removed from the scene one of the most vociferous supporters of the Congolese rebels, President Ben Bella of Algeria. Once the Tshombe regime itself fell, the major incentive for the radical leaders to support the Congolese insurgents disappeared. After General Joseph Mobutu took over the government, therefore, Congolese relations with its neighbors in this respect markedly improved.

4. Inter-State Subversion on the African Continent

In the relatively short time since independence inter-state subversion has been a recurrent theme in African relations. The advantages in avoiding open armed conflict made subversion an attractive tool of foreign policy. The limited capabilities of African military establishments further encouraged recourse to subversive activities when a government decided to use force against a hostile regime. The easy access in the target country to ethnic groups split by the common border was also a factor for the instigating state.

Subversion has mostly been conducted for ideological purposes. The ideological element featured prominently in Ghana's subversive efforts. In the case of aid to the Congolese rebels, the target of the radical states was Prime Minister Tshombe because they regarded him as an instrument of European colonialism and bitterly resented him for his use of white mercenaries. Major considerations in halting the arms supplies to the Congolese insurgents were the mounting concern that the weapons would fall in the hands of Tshombe's mercenary-led troops and the increasing ineffectiveness of the rebels, who were hopelessly divided.⁴¹

Although subversion can always escalate into higher levels of conflict, so far none of the efforts in this respect have substantially affected the domestic position of the target governments. Even in the Congo, the rebels made their largest gains before they started to receive significant political and material support from foreign powers. Moreover, in spite of this support, the rebels failed to recover their losses once government forces had driven them back. The reason why, nevertheless, the subversive efforts in the Congo presented the most profound challenge to African stability, lay in the combined effect of a series of factors. External subversion fed upon an already active and widespread base of social and ethnic dissidence. Furthermore, a number of African states joined in the effort to strengthen the insurgents in the hope of overthrowing the Tshombe regime. Both the Soviet Union and Communist China also became involved and provided financial and material aid to the rebels.

A similar occurrence of serious inter-state subversion appears to be fairly remote in the near future. The political demise of

Nkrumah and Ben Bella, two of the foremost proponents of subversive warfare, has caused a general relaxation in subversive activities. Most African governments, moreover, are becoming increasingly preoccupied with the problems of internal development. It should be observed, however, that a sudden change in leadership may well spark a resurgence of this form of warfare.

E. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. SECURITY

Three general issues in African relations have the potential to spark international conflict: The existence of white minority governments in the southern region and in the remaining colonial enclaves, the artificial border delineations, and inter-state subversion. Each can present a threat to the orderly development of the newly independent states; each can offer the opportunity for Communist involvement in the affairs of the continent, and each can affect U.S. security interests in Africa.

1. Liberation Movements

One of the most difficult questions in African affairs for U.S. foreign policy is the problem of white minority domination, i.e., the problem in its broader context rather than its more specific aspect as manifested by the efforts of the liberation movements. In the ten-year time frame of this study neither a significant change in racial relations, nor an organized rebellion seems likely in South Africa because of its political, military, and economic viability. To a lesser extent this is true for the colonial territories and even for Rhodesia. But in the long run, the situation can trigger political and emotional upheavals, based on the racial issue, which will jeopardize the peace and stability in Africa and which will have serious repercussions throughout the world. Because of the psychological and symbolic elements involved, such a development will offer irresistible attractions for exploitation by the Communists. For these reasons, rather than because of a possible adverse effect on U.S. strategic, economic, or scientific interests locally,⁴² developments in southern Africa can profoundly affect U.S. national security concerns.

On the whole, the activities of the liberation movements themselves -- with the exception of PAIGC in Portuguese Guinea -- do not have immediate implications for U.S. security in Africa. PAIGC is the only organization which has achieved an increasing measure of success. It represents a two-way threat to U.S. interests in African stability. First, the rebellion in Portuguese Guinea has already assumed international dimensions. Both the northern and southern borders of the colony have been violated: by Portugal in the form of shelling and airstrikes; by Senegal and Guinea through covert support to the insurgents. Mutual reactions have so far been limited to charges and countercharges in the United Nations and to diplomatic measures, such as Senegal's severance of

diplomatic relations with Portugal. Should PAIGC forces gain more military and political grounds, tensions between the metropolitan power and the neighboring states may well increase to the point that an international conflict can erupt.

Second, should PAIGC's leadership, the Cabral group, come into power, it would mean the establishment of an extremely radical regime in west Africa, which would, moreover, carry the prestige of success. Such a regime would, on the other hand, undoubtedly encourage the liberation movements in Angola and Mozambique which already have ties with the Cabral forces. Furthermore, the presence of such a regime in west Africa would intensify the potentials for instability in the more moderate French speaking states. The continued viability of the moderate governments of west Africa is crucially important not only for France, but for the United States as well. These regimes constitute the hard core of OCAM. They provide the restraining and stabilizing forces in the OAU. They are, moreover, the major centers of resistance to Communist influence on the continent.

Other national liberation movements do not present an immediate threat to international stability and U.S. security interests in southern Africa. These movements have failed to achieve the necessary unity of effort, external support, and internal reception required for successful operations against the white dominated governments. The Soviet Union has so far been reluctant to assist substantially revolutionary groups. Communist China's assistance to the liberation movements has been confined largely to its operations in Dar es Salaam, Congo-Br., and, until Nkrumah's ouster, in Ghana. A number of factors, including particularly the highly effective counter measures by the white regimes against nationalist infiltrators and potential or active insurgents, have severely limited the capabilities of these movements to gain any real headway in the target countries.

In the long run the existence of these movements and the avowed desire of the OAU to support them augurs ill for southern Africa's stability. Serious insurgency would jeopardize political order and economic development and open the door for increased Communist subversion of the African continent. Although the initiative of the liberation efforts comes from the Africans themselves, the Soviet Union and Communist China can be expected to exploit the disruption and chaos that will accompany such endeavors.

The United States faces a particular dilemma on this point. On the one hand, the successful containment by white governments of black dissident groups and the inability of the OAU to support these movements adequately, serves international stability. On the other hand, the failure of the liberation movements to obtain sufficient assistance from OAU, western, or neutral sources, causes them to invite Communist support, which is also adverse to U.S. interests in African stability. The leaders of GRAE and FRELIMO,

for example, began by rejecting Communist support for their movements. But their repeated efforts to enlist adequate backing from non-Communist quarters failed. As a result, Holden Roberto announced in early 1964 that his group would accept Communist weapons.⁴³ About the same time he included a pro-Chinese Angolan rebel in his policy council. FRELIMO's leader, Dr. Eduardo Mondlane, showed his frustration when he declared in late 1963 that he planned to seek help from Moscow and Peking.⁴⁴

This dilemma for the United States is compounded by the fact that the liberation forces in Portuguese territories are opposing a U.S. NATO ally. United States policy on the question of the Portuguese colonies in Africa is further shaped by the U.S. interest in the military base on the Azores. The United States has followed a cautious policy of maintaining normal relations with Portugal, while at the same time, in order to meet African demands, it has urged Portugal to accept the principle of self-determination for its colonies.

As far as the effect on NATO is concerned, it should be observed that a number of NATO allies have opposed Portugal on African issues. United States support for Portugal with respect to its African policy would not necessarily strengthen the NATO alliance. As regards the Azores facility, U.S. interest there would have to be weighed against U.S. relationships in Africa. The United States has not yet been faced with the necessity of having to make a choice. But it is in the U.S. interest to advocate moderation for the liberation movements and to persuade Portugal to modify its African policies, if not to work towards a negotiated settlement.

2. Border Conflicts

Compared to the question of white minority domination, the general issue of Africa's artificial boundaries will cause the United States less concern. With the exception of two border claims, as far as predictions permit, it is unlikely that border rectifications will be made by force. The two specific exceptions, the Moroccan-Algerian and the Ethiopian-Somali-Kenyan border disputes, do have a high conflict potential. The United States will have to be prepared for either issue to flare up again. The implications for the security interests of the United States and its European allies in Africa would be serious, should armed hostilities break out. The contending parties are located in parts of Africa which are of strategic interest to the United States and its allies: the Mediterranean littoral, which borders NATO's southern flank, and the region adjacent to the Red Sea artery. Both Morocco and Ethiopia, moreover, house U.S. communications facilities.

There is some possibility of escalation into international conflict, even though this is slight. The pressures of other African states to limit and suppress an armed conflict

will be strong, as experience has demonstrated. But in the Moroccan-Algerian border hostilities in 1963, Egypt provided Algeria with military assistance against the Moroccan forces. This performance may well be repeated in another conflict.

Direct Soviet intervention on behalf of Algeria or Somali, or an immediate and substantial rise in Soviet military aid to Algeria or Somali, is, however, unlikely. The payoff for the Soviet of such a move would be extremely limited. First, the terms of logistics are against Moscow in an instant and sustained military response. Secondly, the Soviets would risk a response from the western allies which have easier access to the two areas of potential conflict. Thirdly, Moscow would lay itself open to charges of foreign intervention by the already sensitive African states, as Soviet experience with supporting the Congo's Prime Minister Lumumba showed. Fourthly, particularly where Somali and Ethiopia are concerned, a war between the two would prove embarrassing to Moscow, since Moscow is courting both with aid. Hence, the Somali clash with Ethiopia in February 1964 produced a Soviet appeal against fighting to both governments, rather than direct Soviet support for Somali. For all these reasons, the Soviet Union is much more likely to encourage a third country, especially Egypt, to come to the assistance of Algeria or Somali in the event of an armed conflict.

Soviet military assistance to Algeria and Somali, however, does play an important role in their respective border problems. The aid has enhanced their positions vis-à-vis their opponents, who have to contend with the possibility of increased Communist influence at the borders. Moscow is in a position to use the boundary issues as a means of putting pressure on other African states. Thus, the existence of these disputes increases the bargaining power of the Soviet Union in Africa as a whole. It is therefore in Moscow's interest to keep these disputes alive and occasionally exacerbate them.

3. Inter-State Subversion

Past experience has indicated that inter-state subversion can pose a threat to U.S. security interests in Africa. In addition to intensifying the unrest in the target country, subversion frequently provides the opportunity for Soviet and Chinese infiltration of exiled opposition movements and for increasing Communist influence on the continent. In the earlier and current centers of inter-state subversion, such as Accra, Algiers, Dar es Salaam, and Brazzaville, Communist embassy officials and agents have been advising or training banned opposition groups from independent African states.

Communist involvement, particularly when aggravated by Sino-Soviet rivalry, can seriously complicate the problems of U.S. security in Africa, as the Congo crisis illustrated. When the Sudan

opened its territory to arms traffic to the Congolese insurgents, the Soviet Union was able to participate directly in the aid to the rebels.⁴⁵ Moscow also agreed to replace the weapons Egypt, Ghana, and Algeria furnished to the rebels and to help finance the arms airlift. A key reason for these moves was to block the Chinese Communists from extending their support to the rebels and to show Africans Moscow's support for "wars of national liberation." The Soviet Union sought thereby to enhance its position in the ideological dispute with Communist China. As a result, the Congolese civil war threatened to become international to the extent that it would affect East-West relations in general.

The scope of aid from African states to insurgent groups is another major factor which influences the effect on U.S. interests. The intervention of a number of African states against the Tshombe Government at the end of 1964 brought a new dimension to the rebellion. The mounting aid from abroad to the dissidents raised first of all the problem of increasing U.S. assistance to the Congolese Government.

But the supply of weapons alone to the insurgents did not cause the gravest concern in U.S., Belgian, and Congolese circles. Without considerable training and guidance the rebels would not be capable of using complex arms and launching a decisive offensive against the mercenary-led government forces. However, even a few hundred foreign guerrilla fighters on the side of the rebels could have altered the military situation in their favor.⁴⁶ Hence, Ben Bella's pledge to send men as well as equipment to the rebels was viewed with intense alarm in Washington, Brussels, and Leopoldville. The United States and Belgium would then have had to contemplate taking more drastic action to help the Congolese Government and even bringing in their own troops or else permitting the Congo to fall into hostile rebel hands.

The challenge to Washington extended beyond the Congo itself and involved the presence of the West in Africa. The Congo was at the time almost completely encircled by enemy states, most of which were leaning towards the East. Had Communist-backed Algerians and Egyptians been able to subvert the Congo, the country, strategically located at the heart of Africa, could have become a center for Communist infiltration of the entire continent. The failure of the radical African states to support the rebels with troops and sufficient training militated against a resurgence of rebel strength and spared the United States from having to decide whether or not it would become deeper involved in the Congo.

The activities of radical African states with respect to the Congo provide the extreme example of the extent to which interstate subversion can affect U.S. interests. Other subversive efforts have been on a much smaller scale and have been directed at states in which the United States did not have important direct interests.

The major remaining threat of inter-state subversion comes currently from Brazzaville, where exiled dissident groups from independent African states have found a haven. Another concern to the United States is the presence of Chinese Communist agents who assist the banned opposition movements in Congo-Br. The challenge of inter-state subversion to U.S. interests in African stability remains.

CHAPTER VI

MILITARY COUPS D'ETAT

In view of the large number of nations involved, their inherited and inherent political and economic disadvantages and the rapid pace at which independence unfolded in sub-Saharan Africa, it is surprising that the governmental instability evidenced by the recent coups d'etat had not emerged earlier. Yet although black Africa contained 34 independent, if unsteady, national entities by the end of 1963, there had been only three changes of government since 1960, the year when the majority of these nations achieved independence. However, from early 1964 until the summer of 1966, a comparable time period, a total of 12 leadership changes (ten effected by the military) and six more limited examples of intervention were recorded.

This chapter will examine the underlying causes of the military coups in an attempt to identify the patterns or combinations of political, economic and social conditions that have favored the increasing frequency and changing nature of such upheavals. Instances where the military played only a supporting role, sought to achieve only a limited objective, or failed altogether, are considered when applicable.

The first section of this chapter will provide a chronological perspective, briefly discussing the significant coups and mutinies attempted since 1958, and offering general background information. Detailed accounts of the uprisings are avoided unless unusually pertinent, and the more common disruptive characteristics of developing societies, such as substandard income and educational levels, low levels of force, etc., have been assumed. Subsequently, the patterns of the military coups will be analyzed. The juntas and their initial policies will be discussed inasmuch as the presence of military regimes in Africa can be assumed to have relevance for U.S. security interests.¹ The final section of this chapter will draw conclusions about the impact of the military regimes on U.S. security interests in Africa.

A. THE MILITARY IN AFRICAN POLITICS

This section will begin with a general discussion of some earlier instances of army involvement from 1958 through 1964 and end with more detailed consideration of the seven most recent military coups.² In addition to the increased frequency noted above, there is also a qualitative difference between the armed interventions of the early 1960's and the later coups. Within the framework provided by Samuel Huntington,³ where a distinction is made between "governmental" coups, which involves no significant change in the institutional structure, and the "revolutionary" coup,


Chart VI - I

SIGNIFICANT INSTANCES OF AFRICAN MILITARY INTERVENTION SINCE 1958. A
CHRONOLOGY OF COUPS AND MAJOR COUP ATTEMPTS NOVEMBER 1958-JULY 1966

<u>Date</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Former Government</u>	<u>Activating Group</u>	<u>Result</u>
Nov. 17, 1958	Sudan	Multiparty coalition	Army	Military junta
July 5, 1960	Congo-L.	Multiparty coalition	Army mutiny	Unsuccessful
Dec. 14, 1960	Ethiopia	No-party monarchy	Imperial guard	Unsuccessful
Dec. 17, 1962	Senegal	Single-party (UPS)	Prime Minister	Unsuccessful
Jan. 13, 1963	Togo	*Major-party (CUT)	Army	New civil govt.
Aug. 15, 1963	Congo-Br.	*Major-party (UDDIA)	Labor union/Army	New civil govt.
Oct. 21, 1963	Dahomey	Multiparty	Army	New civil govt.
Jan. 12, 1964	Zanzibar	*Major-party (ZNP)	Army insurgents	New civil govt.
Jan. 20, 1964	Tanganyika	Single-party (TANU)	Army mutiny	Unsuccessful
Jan. 23, 1964	Uganda	*Major-party	Army mutiny	Unsuccessful
Jan. 24, 1964	Kenya	*Major-party (KANU)	Army mutiny	Unsuccessful
Feb. 18, 1964	Gabon	*Major-party (BDG)	Politicians/Army	Countercoup
Oct. 21, 1964	Sudan	Military	Labor/Students	New civil govt.
June 19, 1965	Algeria	Single-party (FLN)	Army	Military junta
Oct. 19, 1965	Burundi	Multiparty monarchy	Army elements	Unsuccessful
Nov. 25, 1965	Congo-L.	Multiparty coalition	Army	Military junta
Dec. 22, 1965	Dahomey	Multiparty	Army	Military junta
Jan. 1, 1966	CAR	Single-party (MESAN)	Army	Military junta
Jan. 4, 1966	Upper Volta	Single-party	Army	Military junta
Jan. 15, 1966	Nigeria	*Major-party coalition	Army	Military junta
Feb. 24, 1966	Ghana	Single-party (CPP)	Army	Military junta
Feb. 22, 1966	Uganda	*Major-party	Pres. purge	Preemptive
June 27, 1966	Congo-Br.	Single-party (MNR)	Army mutiny	Unsuccessful
July 3, 1966	Burundi	Multiparty monarchy	Palace revolt	New civil govt.
July 29, 1966	Nigeria	Military	Army	New mil. junta

* In this chart, the term "Major-Party" refers to a political system which resembles a multiparty system in the number of parties allowed, but yet does not realistically include the likelihood of an opposition party becoming the governing party through due political process. Sometimes this system is referred to as "One-party dominant."

MAP VI-I



which entails wholesale attempts at changing the political and socioeconomic systems, there is a basis for differentiation.

While the first military coup in 1958 in sub-Saharan Africa, carried out by the Sudanese army, resulted in the establishment of a military regime, there was no significant change in governmental philosophy. The abortive attempts in Ethiopia and Senegal can also be characterized as belonging to the same category. They are "palace revolutions" representing essentially a contest of individual strengths. Even the army's overthrow of President Olympio of Togo marking the first assassination of a Head-of-State in independent Africa, was apparently an unexpected development in a coup considered to be without any "religious or philosophical inspiration."⁴ Subsequent uprisings in Congo-Br., Dahomey, and Gabon, and the brushfire army mutinies in east Africa were more in the nature of a protest against a specific leader, or local condition, whether union wage level or military fringe benefit.

In almost all cases of military participation in anti-government violence from the Sudan coup of 1958 until Col. Houari Boumedienne's mid-1965 putsch in Algeria, the military role was merely a supporting one. Even on such occasions where army elements had initiated anti-governmental violence, as in Togo, Congo-L., Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika, there was little organizational planning, and no apparent desire to assume the governmental function.

Armies in sub-Saharan Africa were very slow to perceive their unique position as relatively the most cohesive and powerful organized force in the developing nations. This type of "inferiority complex" can be attributed not only to the apolitical military traditions espoused by colonial mentors, but also to the tendency of national leaders to consider the army as a defender of the party as well as the government.⁵

Another factor which probably influenced the military in the past was the concern that the former colonial powers might intervene if faced with the prospect of developments unfavorable to their interests. This occurred in Gabon and east Africa, and apparently also in several other instances.⁶ The recent reduction in French garrison strength⁷ and the rapid withdrawal of British units after the east African mutinies suggest, however, that the former metropolitan powers will be less likely to interfere in future internal political struggles in Africa.

1. Military Interventions Between 1958 - 1964

The Sudan: Lt. General Ibrahim Abboud's bloodless coup against the government of the Sudan, following a period of intense friction by political elements over ratification of a technical assistance agreement with the United States marked the first military overthrow of an elected African government. This is mainly a semantic distinction, however, for the Sudan is largely considered

a Middle Eastern area. The coup was discussed more in the context of the Egyptian military revolution of 1952, the abortive Jordanian coup of 1957, the military seizure of power in Iraq, and the instability in Lebanon in early 1958, than in connection with the sub-Saharan independent states, (which numbered only five at the time).⁸ The long military tradition of the Sudan dating back to 1882 and its more recent history of campaigns against the Italians in 1940 and southern Sudanese in an August 1955 mutiny, would further serve to distinguish the Sudanese coup from later coups in African countries with only embryonic armies.

Yet there is a surprising amount of relevancy. There is the opportunity to examine not only a coup, but also the results of six subsequent years of military role in a country with economic, social, and political difficulties similar to those in many sub-Saharan states. The Sudan shares with such states as Dahomey, Nigeria, and Chad the same problems of different religions and tribal regionalism. The Sudan has in common with most African countries the problems of internal security posed by the necessity of exercising effective control over large undeveloped areas with a minimum of security forces and limited defense spending.

Although most of modern Sudanese political difficulties center on the schism between the ruling Moslems in the north and the Christian or pagan Nilotic minority in the south, the major issues at the time of the coup were the growing apprehension of greater Egyptian control of Sudanese affairs and the question of Sudanese neutrality versus a policy of cooperation with the United States and the more conservative Arab leaders. After the February 1958 elections a coalition government was formed, led by Abdullah Khalil of the conservative Ummah Party. The new regime, a shaky alliance of conservative Arabs and southerners was beset by internal dissension over the first issue which it had to face, verification of a Technical Assistance Treaty with the United States. Vote-buying, factional maneuvers, and personal ambitions became so involved in this debate that action on other vital issues, such as Sudanese-Egyptian relations and the Constitutional draft, was deadlocked.

Disillusionment with parliamentary government rose steadily throughout the summer and fall recess, and on November 17, 1958, when Parliament was to reconvene, Generals Ibrahim Abboud and Ahmed Abd al-Wahab took command, with the apparent approval of Khalil and leading coalition members.⁹ The army junta assumed command without opposition, terminated political party activity, and appointed a Constitutional committee which was not heard from again. Despite the good intentions of the "austere, efficient, accessible and remarkably incorrupt officers,"¹⁰ the political chaos which had prompted their action soon began to make itself felt within the army.

Not only did the classic struggle between radical young officers and conservative senior staff develop, providing the nation's frenetic student groups with an opportunity for involvement, but

regional differences began to reemerge, this time without even the benefit of a parliamentary airing. In the extreme north, the Nubians, among the most articulate people in the Sudan, reacted violently to an evacuation order caused by the construction of the Aswan Dam. In the south, three provinces stepped up agitation for participation in the political process, a movement which, in the frustrating absence of success, turned quickly into a separatist one. With the rapid politization of the army (three separate countercoups originated among the officer staff during 1959), a military stalemate in the south (between 10,000 to 15,000 troops were tied down by about 1,000 to 5,000 rebels)¹¹ and a serious economic problem caused by falling world cotton prices, pressures on the military leadership mounted for a return to parliamentary government. On October 21, 1964, students, labor leaders, and civil servants began a strike which was to culminate in the overthrow of the junta. The army, which appeared to have the power to halt the disturbances offered only initial resistance, and then apparently aware of its inability to cooperate as a unified guiding force, moved aside. It had shown, in its six-year tenure, that it was just as prone to factionalism and inefficiency as the preceding coalition regime. Despite the Sudan's higher level of political and military sophistication, General Abboud's experience may prove to be of more interest to African leaders now than it was in 1964.

The Congo Mutiny (1960): The mutiny of Congolese soldiers in the first week of July, almost immediately after Congolese independence, was initially a protest against army conditions. The 25,000 man force, officered entirely by Belgians, had been completely by-passed by the advent of independence. The soldiers simply wanted better pay and the hope of promotion. In an attempt to pacify the rebellious soldiers, the Congolese Government replaced on July 8, the majority of Belgian officers with inexperienced Congolese NCO's. The abrupt Africanization of the officer corps has plagued the Congo for several years. The new Congolese officers were seldom obeyed by their troops.

With the secession of Katanga and later South Kasai, the Congolese army became increasingly internally divided. When subsequently in December 1960 a third regime was established in Stanleyville which also challenged the authority of the central government in Leopoldville, the army disintegrated into factions, each backing a particular political movement. Through the efforts of the U.N. peacekeeping mission the secession movements were halted and a rapprochement between Stanleyville and Leopoldville effected. But the unruly and factionalized army remained during the entire four years of the U.N. operation a source of disorder rather than order.

Ethiopia (1960) and Senegal (1962): The next involvements of the army in African politics could both be described as "governmental" or "palace" coups, led by disaffected members of the ruling

elite, who were supported by certain elements of the security forces. Both efforts were unsuccessful. In Ethiopia, the commander of the Imperial Guard, one of the regime's most trusted officials, took advantage of the Emperor's absence from the country and launched an unorganized "putsch." General Mangistou Neway and his brother, a provincial governor, managed to rally only a small proportion of the Guard to their cause. The army, after some initial hesitation, crushed the revolt, but not before the rebels had murdered several prominent civil servants and generally manifested their discontent with the "hieratic immobility, lack of land reform, the disparity between rich and poor, antiquated taxation, and corruption in official circles."¹²

In Senegal, almost exactly two years later, the growing differences between President Leopold Senghor and Prime Minister Mamadou Dia, men at one time considered to share the same ideological position,¹³ precipitated a crucial parliamentary debate. During the course of deliberations on a censure motion, Prime Minister Dia ordered the Chief of General Staff, General Ahamdou Fall, to surround the assembly chambers and radio station. Some deputies were arrested, while forty-eight of the remaining eighty reconvened at the home of assembly President Lamine Gueye where Senghor was voted emergency powers. As in the Ethiopian crisis, the outcome was a function of the relative strength of supporting elements in the security forces. Prime Minister Dia apparently enjoyed little more than the support of General Fall, inasmuch as the army and gendarmerie quickly lined up with the President. The paratroopers played a pivotal role, capturing Prime Minister Dia and securing the radio station and earning for their commander, Colonel Diallo, the position of new Chief of General Staff.¹⁴ The loyalty of the army was clearly a paramount consideration in these two cases, a lesson which events would show was completely lost on President Sylvanus Olympio.

Togo (1963): President Olympio was noted for his austere theories of government financing -- all unnecessary expenses were to be avoided. While other newly independent states eagerly assembled the trappings of nationhood, Olympio had decided that Togo could do without such luxuries as an airline, a news agency, and apparently also without an army.¹⁵ Although Olympio would later reverse that decision, the new army would be aware of his attitude and unhappy with the mere \$500,000 annual allotment it received.¹⁶ Therefore, although many found it ironic that the first west African military coup should occur in the nation with the smallest army (250),¹⁷ there were more cogent reasons for having expected such an occurrence. Togo, like other French speaking countries, had contributed forces to the metropolitan country. While the repatriation of these veterans created problems everywhere, in Togo, with its small native army, it proved to be critical.

On January 13, 1963, a group of veterans and labor unionists led by Bodjollé, a former adjutant in the French army, launched a

protest against Olympio's refusal to make room for them in the army. In retrospect, it appears that the rebels intended neither to overthrow the government nor to assassinate President Olympio.¹⁸ Telegrams were sent the next day to exiled political leaders in Ghana and Dahomey in an attempt to obtain a civilian leader. But the rebels did not forfeit the opportunity to advance their cause. Sgt. Bodjollé was promoted to chief of staff, and other former veterans were given positions of power in the armed forces. As a protest against what the junta called President Olympio's "profound contempt for the military," there were immediate plans to triple the army and find places for ex-servicemen.¹⁹ It was obvious, however, that apart from their bitterness over Olympio's austere military policy and their own unemployment, there were few ideological considerations which motivated the coup leaders.

Congo-Brazzaville (1963): The same could not be said concerning the overthrow seven months later of President Fulbert Youlou. There were indications that African governing circles recognized that the rebel charges against the regime (fiscal mismanagement, extravagance, neglect of unemployment, etc.) were substantially correct, and that the fall of the rather flamboyant "abbe" was of more than local significance.²⁰ While the military was reportedly the deciding factor in the outcome, the coup was provoked by the powerful labor movement, which was dissatisfied with the employment situation and which had been protesting against proposed legislation leading to the formation of a single-party. On August 15, 1963, the third anniversary of the Congo's independence and the scheduled debut of the one-party system, crowds of over 10,000 surrounded the presidential palace and forced the President's resignation.

Labor leaders and army officers cooperated in setting up an eight-man Provisional Government "composed of technicians," i.e., university educated specialists were given control of the various ministries. There were by agreement no labor or military representatives among the ministerial appointees, but months after the coup it was clear that the army had enjoyed a stronger bargaining position. The Secretary-General of the Confédération Africaine des Travailleurs Croyants (which was behind the revolt) was detained, and other labor leaders exiled.²¹ The army leaders, for which Africanization was an important issue, immediately removed French officers from command positions (on the grounds they supported Youlou), and promoted themselves to rank of commandant (major). They apparently did not object to the presence of French troops per se,²² but rather to the fact that this presence slowed the promotion process.

Dahomey: On October 21, 1963, Colonel Christophe Soglo, Chief of Staff of the 1,000 man Dahomean army, was faced with a deteriorating political squabble between three prominent Dahomean politicians representing three different regional and ethnic groupings, a pattern which has existed in Dahomey since 1946. Colonel Soglo, whom later events would prove to be a remarkably patient and

apolitical man, decided to intervene. This action was referred to at the time as the third military coup of the year. In retrospect it was little more than a warning to the political factions of the north, southwest and southeast to cease their political rivalry and concentrate on some unified approaches to Dahomey's pressing economic problems. The three regional political leaders, each of whom had served rather unsuccessfully as Dahomean President at one time or another, were allowed to remain in the new Provisional Cabinet. There the three, each given several key portfolios, showed no more inclination to cease the triangular power struggle than before. Colonel Soglo was forced somewhat reluctantly to intervene again. In January 1964, November 1965, and December 1965, Soglo -- then General Soglo -- assumed power in order "to establish a new style of politics in which people would unite around a program and not around a few personalities."²³ The 1963 intervention therefore marked merely the opening gambit in a rather unsuccessful attempt by the military to establish civilian government in Dahomey.

East Africa (1964): On January 12, 1964, only one month after independence, the island nation of Zanzibar experienced a sudden and particularly bloody revolt. The governing Arab minority, numbering only one-sixth of the island's population, had dominated the non-Arab, African elements both politically and economically for almost a century. A feudal hegemony existed which engaged in a sizeable slave trade. It was almost inevitable that with the withdrawal of British protection from the Sultan time and circumstance would dictate a redress of the considerable political inequities.

The revolt itself has been classified as a military coup,²⁴ although Zanzibar at independence had no military forces. The insurgency was carried out by a makeshift army of civilians led by a self-styled "Field Marshall" of unknown origin, and supplied by a raid upon the police arsenal. Due to the subsequent merger of Tanganyika and Zanzibar and the submersion of the island's new radical government within the larger and more moderate context of the Tanzanian bureaucracy, the coup is remembered less for its ideological significance than for the fact that it preceded by about one week the army mutinies in Tanganyika, Uganda, and Kenya on January 20, 23, and 24.

Any direct correlation between the island insurrection and the mainland mutinies has since been discounted. The arrival of "Field Marshall" Okello, a militant mystic, in Dar es Salaam several hours before the Tanganyikan mutiny occasioned most of this speculation, but in retrospect, when the actual demands of the rebels, both there and in Kenya and Uganda were analyzed, it became clear that the protests were over such local issues as higher pay, working conditions, and Africanization of the officer corps.²⁵ The Tanganyikan Government referred to the mutiny as "in industrial parlance, a strike," while Jomo Kenyatta attributed them to "emotion."

There may well have been a demonstration effect at work, but it was far from the wave of popular revolt described by columnists. In Kenya and Uganda, only small segments of the army were involved, and in Tanganyika where the unexplained disappearance of President Nyerere and most of his cabinet allowed a protest march to assume coup proportions, there was no indication that the military wished any more than a settlement of administrative grievances. British troops were invited to intervene in all four instances,²⁶ a humiliating experience for newly independent countries, and, due to the general anticolonial furor which arose in other more fortunate African states, a rather trying experience for Britain.

Gabon: The French Government was well aware of the four east African uprisings in January. When, on February 18, 1964, four young lieutenants led elements of the army and gendarmerie in a peaceful overthrow of Gabonese President and friend of General de Gaulle, Leon Mba, the French government decided to intervene. The French intervention, undertaken so that "Africans should not get the idea they can go around knocking off governments with impunity,"²⁷ was reportedly undertaken at the request of the Gabonese government, although with ex-President Mba in custody and the coup an apparent fait accompli, it was difficult to find someone to sign the request.²⁸ The violence which supposedly prompted the request for intervention did not actually materialize until after the French paratroopers began offensive maneuvers. Their landing had been unopposed by the Gabonese on the assumption that they were coming only to protect French installations and civilians as had been the case in the Brazzaville coup.

In the Gabonese case, the challenge by the military to the government was put down. Yet in another respect, the Gabonese coup may have marked the end of an era. The ill-will generated by the French action may influence any decision to intervene again. It is likely that such intervention would be resisted more forcefully, with all of the implications for French relationships with the underdeveloped world.

2. Coups in 1965-1966

Algeria: The year-and-a-half following the intervention in Gabon was free of military coups. The army regime in the Sudan stepped aside in October 1964, marking the first such overthrow of the military by a civilian group. In the summer of 1965, however, a bloodless coup against one of Africa's most charismatic and fervently nationalistic leaders, Ahmed Ben Bella in Algeria, broke the deceptive calm. Taking place only two days after the dissident Front des Forces Socialistes (FFS) had agreed to make peace with the government in the Kabylie, the overthrow of the Algerian President surprised Africans and foreigners alike. Less surprising was that the instigator of the coup was the Algerian army, 60,000 strong, commanded by Vice-President and Defense Minister Houari Boumedienne.

Since the end of the Algerian war for independence, the army has been the strongest and best organized institution in the nation. The various political factions which were struggling for power in the vacuum following the French-Algerian peace talks, sensed that Col. Boumedienne, the commander of the 20,000 man frontier army, was in a position to dictate to the new regime. Therefore, he was fired in June 1962, although Ben Khedda's provisional government had no power to enforce his dismissal. The army remained loyal to him. Boumedienne then joined forces with Ben Bella, who possessed the charisma that he lacked.

The resulting alliance of soldier and statesman lasted three years. The reasons for its failure are both political and personal. Despite a more traditional Islamic education which sometimes clashed with the "scientific socialism" of Ben Bella's Marxist advisors, Boumedienne seemed to share Ben Bella's progressive, anti-imperialist ideology, which is suggested by the fact that he now "appears anxious to prove himself just as socialist at home....as Mr. Ben Bella."²⁹ The more immediate cause for their divergence can be pinpointed as the attempt again to get rid of Boumedienne or diminish his power base. Ben Bella had almost destroyed the National Liberation Front (FLN) in an effort to build his own personal following, and although the many political leaders which he exiled or detained failed to unite against him, the weakening of his "mass" party left the army unchallenged in its supremacy.

The subsequent attempt by Ben Bella to cashier the colonel by dividing the army, a plan suggested to him by his Marxist coterie,³⁰ probably precipitated the coup as much as any ideological differences. In late 1964, the President fired a Boumedienne-supported Minister of the Interior, assuming the portfolio himself, and established the paramilitary milices populaires (peoples militia) as a counterweight to the army. He set up his own 1,500-man palace guard,³¹ and was reportedly planning to remove Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika, a Boumedienne protege, and perhaps even Defense Minister Boumedienne himself.³² Col. Boumedienne, therefore, seized control, only ten days before Ben Bella was scheduled to play host to the second "Bandung" Conference. He prevented thereby both an increase in Ben Bella's prestige, and a probable subsequent decrease in his own.

One of the first principles enunciated by the new government was a "return to collegial leadership," away from the "subjectivism," "political narcissism," and "adventurism" exhibited by Ben Bella. The milices populaires were to be dissolved, and a secretariat of the FLN established to transform the FLN from an ineffectual "mass" party into a "cadre" party. Boumedienne, by way of contrast, has refused to become head of the FLN, and remains very much in the background, even as President, while Bouteflika and the Conseil National de la Révolution (CNR) represent the government to the public.

Opposition to the Boumedienne government, which appeared in the first few weeks, is negligible, and "only a split in the army" could dislodge him.³³ The care with which Boumedienne assembled his power base makes this eventuality highly unlikely.

Congo-L.: On November 25, 1965, in a military action which was largely overshadowed by the Rhodesian rebellion two weeks earlier, Lt. Gen. Joseph D. Mobutu, Head of the Congolese army, assumed control of the government from President Joseph Kasavubu and Prime Minister Evariste Kimba. The action was not without precedent, for Mobutu had once before intervened in 1960, "neutralizing" the main contestants in a debilitating contest between President Joseph Kasavubu and Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba. Like Col. Soglo in Dahomey, however, Mobutu eventually found that "sterile political squabbles" could not be dissipated by decree. When he assumed power the second time, it was for a period estimated at five years, which he considered necessary to solve the Congo's pressing economic and tribal problems.

While after the 1960 intervention, Mobutu had invited college students back to the Congo and set up a "government of technicians,"³⁴ the 1965 takeover made fewer concessions to the democratic process and established "government by decree." A 22-man civilian government was set up, headed by General Leonard Mulamba as Prime Minister. An attack was launched on corruption. Army courts were given full powers to punish corrupt individuals, who had cost the regime about \$43,000,000 during the year, and regulations were drawn up governing the conduct of civil servants and provincial officials. Campaigns to cut salaries, and to "return to the land" were also inaugurated with General Mobutu himself setting the example.

The Armée Nationale Congolaise (ANC), which had undergone a reorganization in 1963 with the assistance from a number of western nations,³⁵ will be heavily relied upon by Mobutu. He will have to launch a drive against the remaining pockets of rebel resistance and to suppress costly smuggling practices. He will also need to restrain Congolese politicians, whom he has united against him by his arbitrary methods and his ways of disposing of his opponents.³⁶ The tasks are enormous of administering an area the size of western Europe with an army estimated at one-half of the force necessary to do this at minimal effectiveness.³⁷

The Congo at least has a chance of success. It is estimated that after an initial period of unity and austerity, the resources of the Congo could begin to provide a higher standard of living for all the citizens.³⁸ Many, if not most of the former French territories have much less cause for optimism. These countries are so poor that their leaders are committed for a long time to "politics of austerity." And, as the following three coups d'etat illustrate, military leaders protesting such subsistence economics, find themselves no better qualified to solve the problems which in some cases brought them to power in the first place.

Dahomey: The chronically unstable situation in Dahomey came to the surface again in November 1965. The political climate had apparently been sufficiently relaxed to permit in November the release of former President Maga who had been detained since 1963.³⁹ The return of the veteran politician, particularly in the atmosphere of national elections, may have been the catalyst needed to rekindle old tripartite rivalries. The Parti Démocratique Dahoméan (PDD), which had been created as a nationwide party after the 1963 coup, split.

On November 27, 1965, the PDD voted to dismiss President Sourou-Migan Apithy from office and named Vice President Justin Ahomadegbé Provisional President. When Apithy refused to resign, the army under General Soglo intervened and forced the resignations of both Apithy and Ahomadegbé. General Soglo subsequently appointed another Provisional President pending new elections.

On December 7, however, Ahomadegbé announced the formation of a new party in Cotonou, while the followers of Maga and Apithy created their new parties a few days later. In effect, the three main political parties, which had traditionally dominated Dahomean politics, had been reconstituted. The possibility that the forthcoming elections would be conducted on a basis other than the old regional and personal rivalry, seemed to be beyond hope. When union leaders took to the streets with placards calling upon the army to take over, General Soglo again heeded the call. Unlike General Mobutu of the Congo, with whom he has been compared because of his original preference to limit his role to that of an "arbitrator,"⁴⁰ Soglo did not claim a leadership role for the army. He stressed again his reluctance to assume power.⁴¹

The December 22 takeover, however, seems to have marked the end of Soglo's patience with Dahomean factionalism. It is apparent that he intends to correct the debilitating and corrupt practices of the past. The three bêtes noires of Dahomean politics, Maga, Apithy and Ahomadegbé are presently living in France. The peculiar "dual executive" through which the President shared certain powers with the Vice President-Premier was abolished.⁴² A National Renovation Committee was formed and ministers appointed who "for the first time had been chosen on the basis of their competence, to the exclusion of all other criteria."⁴³

While the problem of excessively partisan politics may be disposed of by military fiat, the larger problem of endemic poverty cannot. General Soglo's trip into the interior to promote a "take up the hoe" campaign and Foreign Minister Emile Derlin Zinsou's fund-raising trip to Paris were early indications that the regime has recognized the "catastrophic" economic situation.⁴⁴ Later demands made by labor leaders for the elimination of certain austerity measures have kept up the pressure. The frustration which General Soglo must feel over Dahomey's instability comes through in an interview on April 22, 1966 with Afrique Nouvelle in which he

said: "The current (African) instability is mainly the result of the economic situation. No matter how skillful the African leaders are, the masses remain unsatisfied..."

The Central African Republic: The political problems in Dahomey with a multi-party tradition and regional rivalry are not very similar to those in the CAR which has had a one-party heritage dating back to 1952 and a more homogeneous population. Yet, when economic difficulties are considered, the differences become less significant. Colonel Jean Bedel Bokassa overthrew his cousin David Dacko on New Year's Day 1966, basically because of the deteriorating economic situation. This was particularly acute in the CAR because of its landlocked location and as a result of the widespread corruption equalled in few other places, even in Africa. As one observer put it, it was a combination of "enrichissez-vous" and "après moi, le déluge" attitudes that led to such a corrupt climate and opened up a wide gulf between the ruling elite and the peasant class.⁴⁵ There were not only individual examples of extravagance and waste, but equally unpopular nationwide austerity programs, including a National Loan scheme that realized only one-fifth of the planned (and budgeted) revenues.

A diamond boom also contributed to long-range economic problems by attracting many individuals from farming professions. The boom is expected to be shortlived. What benefit the government now receives from the percentage of diamond export that is not smuggled out, will hardly compensate for the future unemployment and the disorientation of the former cash crop, cotton. The Bokassa regime, therefore, has imposed what amounts to a "rectification" campaign, setting up several committees to audit state accounts, and disciplining functionaries for extravagant behavior.

The prospect for success for the military regime is not encouraging. Actually, there is expected to be little change in policy. The assurances given by Col. Bokassa immediately after the coup concerning his adherence to party doctrine and his admiration for ex-President Dacko led some⁴⁶ to suggest that there had been perhaps no actual coup at all. It could have been merely an attempt by Dacko to extricate himself from a deteriorating position, and at the same time eliminate some of his more inefficient and corrupt colleagues.

Several Communist diplomats were sent home, amidst reports that the Chinese had supported the "armée populaire centrafricaine," which Bokassa considered to be subversive,⁴⁷ but this also might have been more of an attempt to exorcise the government of sources of undue influence than a radical shift in ideological allegiance.⁴⁸ The presence of a peoples militia was known to have rankled the military, as it did in the Algerian case.⁴⁹ Col. Bokassa also shared with Col. Boumedienne a premonition that his removal was under consideration.⁵⁰ He claimed to have acted on this contingency. Defense estimates totaling only 6% of the 1965 record budget were

reportedly another cause of concern. Col. Bokassa opposed, furthermore, that the gendarmerie would receive the larger share of this already low figure.⁵¹

Regardless of the charges and countercharges, basic economic difficulties predominated. The same problems of development that afflict the CAR are also acute in many other former French countries, particularly in the units carved out of the inland regions of the former French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa. Chad and Niger have had a history of instability, created partly by the absence of an economic infrastructure and the scarcity of resources. Mali's economy is an exception, but the prospects for Upper Volta's economic development are remote.

Upper Volta: The coup in Ouagadougou was a relatively uncomplicated protest against some of the austerity measures of the Yaméogo Government, measures required by Upper Volta's marginal existence level.⁵² On December 30, 1965, the National Assembly passed an austerity law which reduced civil servants' allowances and the salaries of government employees (1/3 the labor force of 30,000) by 20%. On December 31, the labor unions met under the auspices of the Confédération Africaine Des Travailleurs Croyants (CATC), beginning a strike that would result in Yaméogo's downfall three days later, when Army Chief of Staff, Col. Sangoulé Lamizana intervened to avoid "bloodshed."

A provisional government with a largely military character was set up which immediately rescinded the 20% salary cut and restored the family allowance. Only one month later, however, in a move indicative of Upper Volta's problems, Col. Lamizana found it necessary to announce "measures of austerity" including the reduction of all administrative salaries by 20 to 50%.⁵³ The national television service and several overseas posts were abolished. Hints were made that the Assembly might be reduced in size. The measures which had led to President Yaméogo's downfall had in effect been reestablished, and while there was some concern among the labor unions about continuing staff cuts, the unions continued to support the government. The state of emergency was lifted on June 1, 1966 in preparation for a return to politics envisioned by the end of the year. Without economic improvement, however, unrestrained political activities would be difficult to envision. There will probably be no opportunity to practice what Col. Lamizana wistfully refers to as "the true politics of the full stomach."⁵⁴

Nigeria: On January 15, 1966, the regionalism which had been straining the thin bonds of the Nigerian Federation since independence and had taken the form of continual fighting and violence since the October 1965 elections, culminated in the third African military coup of the new year. The regional, tribal, and religious divisions which plague Nigeria are discussed elsewhere.⁵⁵

The significant fact is that when the regional political interests, formerly isolated by geographical difference, attempted to extend their influence into the other regions, either by direct solicitation or by alliances with factional parties with like-minded interests, this brought about direct contact between political rivals, and direct contact brought conflict. The October 1965 elections in the western region, where northern conservatives have seen their greatest opportunity for inroads into the south, were more an exercise in violence than in democracy. Prime Minister Balewa made no attempt to intervene with federal troops, as he was entitled to do, and the resultant killings (an estimated 2,000 dead, 15,000 wounded) continued until the coup.⁵⁶

The army itself was perhaps the only group capable of avoiding the breakup of the Federation. The army was at one time regarded as one of the most effective unifying forces in the country. The diverse tribal origins in the army did not appear to have had a weakening effect on the force's integrity.⁵⁷ Recruitment and assignment to units was done without ethnic distinctions,⁵⁸ but because of the higher educational level of the easterners, the officer corps had a decidedly Ibo complexion. Two hundred of the total 300 officers were Ibo in 1962, as were 64 of the 80 top-ranking officers.⁵⁹ Hausa and Tiv tribes of the north supplied a majority of the lower ranks, and the latter, a pagan, extremely obstreperous group of warriors from the southern tier of the north, had never reconciled themselves to their Moslem neighbors, rebelling against Hausa domination in 1906, 1920, 1939, 1960, 1963 and 1964.⁶⁰ Yet the army was very late to exhibit the animosities felt by the civilian population.

The more educated Ibos also staffed most civil service, commercial and administrative positions in the Northern Region. In 1953 Hausa began persecuting the Ibo populations which reside in settlements outside northern walled cities. According to late reports the persecutions have not ceased.⁶¹ When the army began its internecine activity in early 1966, it had been provided with this rather unfortunate civilian example.

A group of young Ibo officers apparently started the revolt. One of the more striking features of the Nigerian coup was its violence. While Ben Bella, Kasavubu, Yaméogo, Dacko, Maga, et. al., could ponder their misfortune in relatively comfortable seclusion, federal Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, a northerner, and the powerful Premier of the Northern Region, the Sardauna of Sokoto, were assassinated. The federal Finance Minister and the Western Premier were also killed. Some reports estimate that about 50 middle grade officers, primarily Hausas and Yorubas, were killed in the first week.⁶² An assassination attempt against General Ironsi, (who emerged as leader in the general post-coup jockeying for control), was led by a Yoruba officer bent on revenge for the slaughter of several of his comrades.⁶³ Over 30 more officers remained in jail after the coup as well as some of the country's

leading political figures.⁶⁴ In June, when rioting broke out again between Hausa and the Ibo communities, the army reacted again with an upheaval of its own. Dissident Hausa officers, although their ranks had been decimated by the January coup, revolted and killed Ironsi and an unknown, but reportedly large number of Ibo officers.⁶⁵

While Nigerian news sources have released no information on the state of the army, it seems clear that it cannot be reconstituted as an integrated body within the near future, and that the Hausa are thoroughly in control of the disorganized remnant. The return of northern officers from the mid-west and eastern regions in exchange for Ibo soldiers stationed or imprisoned in the north has been completed and makes the establishment of regional armies -- and governments -- almost inevitable. The disintegration of the Federation, which in the words of one observer, was the "most effective weapon imaginable for the perpetuation of mutual hatreds,"⁶⁶ seemed almost equally inevitable. It involved the near destruction of a once-proud army and the passing of a western myth -- Nigeria as a model African nation, practicing multi-party democracy and international moderation. It was accompanied by a tribal warfare which is likely to continue unchecked in those areas where Ibo minorities remain. The process has been long and painful and the entity known as Nigeria remains in doubt as of this writing.

Ghana: The fall of Kwame Nkrumah proved to be the last in the series of military coups during the winter and by virtue of the stature of the deposed, it was one of the more startling. Ben Bella, Kasavubu, Yaméogo, Dacko, Maga, and Youlou had exercised power only a few years, three or four on the average. Except for Ben Bella none had distinguished themselves by their foreign policy, and none, including the Algerian, had found the drive or the power to assemble an apparatus of personal control over their entire government. Nkrumah had, in a very few months, become master of his party. He had in nine years of rule, a longevity in sub-Saharan Africa surpassed only by Haile Selassie and W.S. Tubman, come to possess virtually unlimited national power. The totalitarian measures employed by Nkrumah had the effect of proscribing organized opposition.

Although isolated incidents, such as the assassination attempts in 1962 and 1964, demonstrated the existence of dissidence, both its extent and location were not demonstrated until February 24, 1966. At that time, the unanimity of support given to the little known group of army officers and intellectuals who overthrew the government surprised even anti-Nkrumahists.⁶⁷ The amount of hitherto latent opposition was so substantial as to provide a buoyant atmosphere of support for the new regime during the first crucial months. It also serves as a notice to the National Liberation Committee (NLC) presently wrestling with Ghana's staggering economic problems, that there are interest groups in Ghanaian society which will undoubtedly attempt to enter the political process once again.

One of the groups to receive the most immediate attention will be the new ruling class itself, the armed forces. While the official pronouncements of Major (now Lieutenant) General J.A. Ankrah justified the seizure of power to correct the faults of the ruling Convention People's Party (CPP), such as "mal-administration, mismanagement, the loss of individual freedom, and economic chaos,"⁶⁸ there are signs that the motives may also have included professional grievances on the part of the coup planners. General Ankrah referred bitterly to "the establishment of a private army...in flagrant violation of a constitution which Nkrumah...himself had foisted upon the country, to serve as a counterpoise to the Ghana armed forces."⁶⁹

For the first five years after independence, Nkrumah appeared to have observed British military custom forbidding military or civil service involvement into realms other than their own. After an assassination attempt in 1962, which focussed attention on the question of loyalty to the government, Nkrumah increasingly came to regard the armed forces as owing loyalty to the party rather than the state. British officers, such as General H.T. Alexander, then the Chief of Ghana's Defense Staff, had argued against this idea, but with Alexander's dismissal, and the rapid Africanization of the officer corps, political pressures on the army mounted. In June 1964 Nkrumah ordered members of the armed forces to join the CPP.

Nkrumah tried to neutralize the military as a potential source of political opposition. He attempted, like many other African leaders, to encourage a certain amount of rivalry between the military and the police. Following an attempt on his life in January 1964 in which a police officer was involved, Nkrumah not only eventually disarmed the police force, emasculating them professionally, but transferred in 1965 the actual direction of both the police and defense services to the President's office. Nkrumah also created an elite "Presidential Guard," composed of men of his own tribal group, the Nzimas. The Soviets trained this guard and staffed the top positions.⁷⁰ The relatively greater prestige and better working conditions of the presidential regimen were a source of antagonism. In July 1965, it was detached from army command and made directly responsible to the President.⁷¹ Further attempts to counterbalance the army involved the strengthening of the navy and air force, and the creation of a "Workers Brigade" and a "Peoples Militia," none of which ever approached the army in actual strength but all of which must have contributed to an increasing professional resentment on the part of army officers. It is not surprising that the initiative for the overthrow came from them.

The well-trained civil service which Ghana inherited from Britain at independence had been modeled on Westminster traditions, dictating a loyal, efficient, and non-political code of conduct. However, as Nkrumah came to show his preference for relying on militants within the CPP and youth organizations, instead of the

more specialized "technocrats," the older civil servants became resentful.⁷² This resentment was especially strong in rural areas where the problems were so pressing as to require a practical approach rather than ideological solutions.

It is significant that the National Liberation Council's head, Lt. General Ankrah, who had long detested Nkrumah's interference with the professional army and civil service, announced after the coup that the day-to-day administration would be turned over to the top civil servants whose advice had been so thoroughly ignored.

This promise has been subsequently fulfilled. One of the first acts of the NLC was to reestablish the Civil Service Commission. Civil servants have been placed in charge of each of the administrative districts. They have been given specific advisory responsibilities towards the joint Armed Service/Police administrative committees at regional level. There are, therefore, several indications that the civil service will support the military leaders unless the latter would downgrade its position.

Corruption within a regime, as certainly existed in the Ghanaian nation under Nkrumah, is known to have an especially adverse effect upon the peasantry. Their lack of economic resources, organizational skills, and a guaranteed wage level makes them highly vulnerable to exploitation by functionaries and politicians who are much better organized and enjoy higher salary scales. Peasants saw spiraling food prices and taxes while Nkrumah built the huge Black Star Square for demonstration purposes and later ordered the construction of a \$20 million hotel and conference site for an OAU meeting in Accra. They became increasingly disenchanted with the Nkrumah regime.

Nkrumah's socialist philosophy envisioned a favored position for the working classes, but actual developments resulted in a different relationship between the union movement and the government. Since late 1961 when a strike among transport workers in Ghanaian coastal cities spread to other parts of the country, Nkrumah sought to restrain the labor movement. Workers became steadily disillusioned when trade union leaders began to act as tools for the CPP, under whose jurisdiction the Trade Union Congress (TUC)⁷³ was placed. Workers at the time of the coup were both unresponsive to TUC leadership and annoyed with austerity measures imposed by the CPP. Immediately after the coup expressions of support came from the Workers Brigade and the TUC,⁷⁴ although the former was disbanded soon after the coup and the latter was given a new constitution.

Although at one time tribalism was as much a problem in Ghana as elsewhere in west Africa, soon after independence Nkrumah forced a revision of existing "tribal" clauses in the constitution and promoted the development of a national awareness. Nkrumah tried in

particular to undermine the powerful position of the Ashanti tribe. He succeeded to some extent in reducing tribal cleavages. The Ashanti is still influential in Ghanaian life. But inasmuch as its power is partly derived from the fact that Ashanti tribal lands produce the rich cocoa crop and other resources, Ashanti opposition to Nkrumah was also a defense of cocoa interests and not purely ethnic hostility alone.⁷⁵

Nearly all of the economic excesses of the old regime can be traced to Nkrumah's pan-African schemes, while almost all of the political excesses can be traced to his personal messianic delusions. His attempts to carry his ideology to foreign capitals were particularly detested by his immediate neighbors. Evidence uncovered by the NLC has linked him with subversion attempts in Nigeria, Niger, Togo, Ivory Coast, Tanzania, Zambia, and other independent black African states.⁷⁶ This foreign adventurism has been generally associated with his inclination to sympathize more easily with the attitudes of the socialist countries. While his clandestine activities in other African states may not have been expressly intended to promote Communist interests, he was assisted by Russian, East German, and Chinese "technicians," and could therefore hardly have escaped serving Communist objectives to some degree.

The extent to which Nkrumah had become identified with Russian and Chinese interests had become so great that the coup leader, Col. Emmanuel Kotoka, was able to rally his paratroop company to him on the morning of the coup by charging that Nkrumah intended to send them "all to Vietnam to fight the Americans."⁷⁷ The death of several Russians in the brief fighting and the subsequent expulsion of Communist personnel are further indications of opposition to Communist influence. General Ankrah, in a radio address after the coup, deplored the "mere lip service" paid to nonalignment in the past, and pledged strict adherence to neutrality in the future.⁷⁸

Congo-Brazzaville: On June 27, 1966 a riot broke out over a government decision to transfer Captain Ngouabi, commander of the paratroops. A group of paratroopers and some civilian supporters kidnapped the Army Chief of Staff and Chief of National Security. Other high government officials were held at bay in the municipal football stadium, where they were protected by the Cuban presidential guard. The revolt broke down upon the return of President Massamba-Debat from a trip abroad. Aside from his lack of success, however, it provided some similarities with previous coups and coup attempts. Le Monde reported "as in Accra...it only required the absence of the Head of State to challenge authority,...as in Togo it was only a minor incident which sparked off the trouble,...and as in Nigeria...tribalism played a role, with the fellow-tribesmen of the dismissed officer coming to his support."⁷⁹ Le Monde might have added that as in Gabon, the situation was rapidly changed by foreign intervention, this time by Cuban "instructors," not French parachutists.

B. PATTERNS

This section deals first of all with comparable antecedent conditions, i.e., common political and socio-economic factors that obtained in certain coup situations. Some of these motivations have a universal flavor; tyranny spawns discontent, corruption breeds contempt. Still others have a more distinctly African flavor and are a product of the continent's own history. Secondly, there are some striking similarities in the junta groups themselves, commonalities of method, of personality, and of future policy. These two categories are treated separately, although there is undeniably a relationship between a precondition and the force which arises to correct it. One general warning, contained in the following quotation from a Belgian research publication, will serve as both a qualification and an introduction:

"One would be tempted to establish parallels between the different countries where the successive coups have unfolded, and draw conclusions from themwhich one would immediately be forced to qualify as "hasty." Without doubt there are similar economic and social factors in each country. It would be impossible, however, to find an identical pattern which would have led to the seizure of power in countries as diverse as Nigeria and Ghana, Congo and the CAR, Upper Volta, Dahomey or Uganda."⁸⁰

1. Precedent Conditions

Economic Factors: In addition to the problems of extreme economic underdevelopment which may cause countries never to achieve viability,⁸¹ there have been some specific economic factors directly related to coup occurrences. Four economic factors should be mentioned: labor activity, single-product economies, austerity programs, and corruption.

Several of the coups were directly preceded by a period of labor union agitation. As a result of the low level of institutionalization and the unstable authority of the early African governments, labor unions tended to emerge as one of the most powerful organized forces in their respective countries. While political parties reaped the short-lived benefits of association with nationalist causes and postindependence goodwill, the trade unions were actually more successful in winning material benefits and improvements for their constituents. Their increased influence at the bargaining table (e.g. the Nigerian strike settlement of June 1964) and locational strength in key urban areas (where unemployed Africans provide them with a veritable "army") have made labor leaders and political leaders alike aware of their potential.⁸² In several states legislation restricting the autonomy of the unions was passed. Particularly active leaders were co-opted into the political party organization.⁸³

In the Sudan after the 1958 coup, all trade union and worker association activities were banned, a committee appointed to revise labor laws, and fifteen union leaders arrested and tried,⁸⁴ indicating either labor involvement or a fear of labor. In Togo, the jobless veterans were acting in the capacity of a union themselves, and the major grievance listed by the junta government was "the government's inattention to daily increasing unemployment."⁸⁵ The Brazzaville general strike and coup of 1963 proved to be labors' finest hour, since demands of the trade unions and the arrest of their top leaders provoked the outbreak of fighting which led to Youlou's overthrow. Similarly, in Dahomey in 1963, the trade unions had a major role in precipitating the violence which led to labor-army cooperation in unseating a conservative government. When Soglo intervened for a third time in 1965, his government was considered "put in place under the pressure of labor unions,"⁸⁶ and there are indications that the regime is still somewhat responsive to their needs.⁸⁷ In Upper Volta, also, the army only stepped in after three days of labor union demonstrations led by the head of the Voltaic section of the Confédération Africaine des Travailleurs Croyants (CATC), the same group that overthrew Youlou.⁸⁸

The influence of the unions in these five takeovers was probably decisive. It has even been conjectured that without the army, labor representatives in Dahomey and Togo would have come to power themselves.⁸⁹ Cooperation between army and union could also be envisioned in other states such as Sierra Leone where a one-union structure has been imposed, or in Tanzania where the labor organization is directed essentially by the party.

The second factor, a single-product economy, poses problems for the development of a diversified economy and active market. Equally important, it adds an element of instability and uncertainty. The economy in the Sudan had become badly depressed in the month before the coup due to a sharp drop in the world price for cotton.⁹⁰ The Ethiopian economy, in which coffee accounts for more than half of the export sector, was suffering from a decline in world coffee prices at the time of the 1960 coup attempt.⁹¹ In Zanzibar, where cloves represent 80% of the country's exports, the world price for cloves had dropped from \$112 per hundred pounds to a pre-coup low of \$12.60 per hundred.⁹² Some observers have attributed Nkrumah's difficulties not so much to his radicalism or pan-Africanism, but to the disastrous drop in the world cocoa price, from \$1,540 a ton in 1954 to a 1965 level of approximately \$504 a ton.⁹³ In Dahomey where palm products account for 65% of the exports, in the CAR where a sudden exodus of individuals from the farms into diamond mining is already creating agricultural dislocation, and in Upper Volta, where 95% of the population is involved in subsistence farming, similar problems exist. Economies are so narrowly based that they are at the mercies of world prices and crop failures. The coups in those states and the overdependence of still other countries upon a major crop (e.g. Liberia, rubber; Senegambia, ground

nuts) have imparted a sense of urgency to economic diversification programs in Africa.

Yet, to complete a vicious circle, attempts to correct such unfortunate circumstances often produce as much tension as the chronic difficulties themselves. The imposition of specific economic policies which met with wide disapproval frequently preceded a coup. In Dahomey, a month before the 1965 coup, an austerity measure provided the inspiration. A 25% cut in the salaries of civil servants was imposed,⁹⁴ a drastic program in a country which was top-heavy with officialdom and where more than 60% of the treasury was used for salaries and administration.⁹⁵ The new CAR regime quickly revoked a 10% levy on state salaries which President David Dacko had imposed shortly before the coup. In Upper Volta, a projected 20% salary cut for civil servants sparked anti-austerity demonstrations which led to the military takeover three days later.⁹⁶ The presentation of the Ghanaian budget, which indicated the need for some drastic revenue producing measures, was made only two days before the coup. This led to suggestions that there was some causal relationship, although the timing of the coup would seem to be connected more with Nkrumah's absence than a budget reading.

Although nationalization of industry is not exactly an austerity measure, in at least two cases such policies are believed to have contributed to the economic problems of the regime. Col. Boumedienne in Algeria was dissatisfied with Ben Bella's extensive nationalization. While he has not abandoned the policies of socialist reforms, he has allowed the withering away of "self-management" by peasants in farming and the denationalization of small industry and business.⁹⁷ Similarly, in Ghana nationalization had reached the point where it became economically unsound. Existing industries were deprived of badly needed parts in order that new industries could be created.⁹⁸ General Ankrah quickly re-emphasized the private sector, abolished certain state enterprises and launched investigations of others.⁹⁹

Corruption as a catalyst in promoting military coups is a commonly found phenomenon. African corruption deserves to be mentioned both because of its widespread existence and the proportions it assumes relative to such limited national budgets. Only one military upheaval was not accompanied by charges of outright corruption,¹⁰⁰ but in other cases it was considered a major factor. In Nigeria, where the existence of four regional governments and one federal one afforded approximately five times the opportunity for graft, it has been estimated that over \$69 million has been squandered.¹⁰¹ Finance Minister Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh, perhaps the most notorious of all practitioners of "dash" (Nigerian vernacular for bribery), has such an odious reputation that he was put high on the death list during the January 1966 coup.¹⁰² One observer's description gets at the root of the problem:

"Most West African Ministers consider themselves to be above the law, and are treated as such by the police... Men who claim to be democrats in fact behave like emperors. Personifying the state, they dress in uniforms, build themselves palaces, bring traffic to a standstill, hold fancy parades and generally demand to be treated like Egyptian Pharaohs."103

In the CAR, a 12-man special commission for the auditing of state accounts was established to investigate the almost institutionalized corruption there. In the military tribunals of Congo-L. and the post-coup investigations in Congo-Br., Dahomey, and Ghana, a definite preoccupation with denouncing and rooting out corruption can be ascertained. The unsuccessful instigators of coup attempts in Ethiopia and Gabon also cited official misconduct as one of the motivations for their action.

Political Factors: In addition to the deteriorating economic situations, there were certain political patterns which helped dis-affect the military with civilian politicians. The authoritarian nature of the single-party system was a major irritant; the bi-cephalic system of government was particularly susceptible to interference; foreign adventurism, and attempts to counterbalance the armed forces were other policies which prompted a military response.

The majority of the military coups occurred in states which had a single-party system or a system in which a particular party was by far the dominating group. Despite the claims that the single-party system offers needed stability and provides for internal compromise, only Bourguiba's Neo-Destour and Nyerere's TANU have achieved some degree of a genuine national consensus. Most single-party systems, such as the CPP in Ghana and the FLN in Algeria, proved to be too inflexible to permit the existence of even intra-party opposition. Where external opposition is not legal, the most conceivable method of change becomes the coup d'etat. When even internal party dissent is stifled, the coup d'etat becomes even more probable. Many of the tensions and conflicts of the society come to be concentrated in the struggles within the upper hierarchy of the government. The prestige and relative freedom of the higher party functionaries and military leaders facilitates the planning and implementation of a plot against the regime.

The single-party tendency increasingly began to show that many Africans had developed a certain misconception of democracy during the long struggle for independence. Majority rule had become such an obsession that the other important precept of democracy, protection for the minority, was often neglected. An "I win, you lose" mentality developed, in which those who lost an election were penalized; their leaders were denied participation in government, the interests they represented were neglected, etc. The victorious political party in almost every African state sought to establish a paramountcy within the country. Sylvanus Olympio had secured

virtually unlimited power in Togo for his Unité Togolaise.¹⁰⁴ Youlou and Mba were making plans to impose a single-party system on Congo-Br. and Gabon when coups erupted. General Ankrah's arrest of CPP members, Lamizana's disregard for the Union Démocratique Voltaïque, and Boumedienne's determination to revamp the FLN indicate their disdain for the authoritarian party structures that preceded them. Whether the military will prove any more adept at accommodating minority opinion is yet to be seen. However, it is clear that in the above countries, the single-parties were unsuccessful.¹⁰⁵ In Guinea, Upper Volta, Malawi, and Liberia and more recently Kenya and Chad, where single-party systems or what amounts to this have been or are being imposed, there is no indication that such political monolithism will be any more successful.

Bicephalism, or the constitutional sharing of power by two political figures, is a tenuous arrangement in any country. In Africa, where regional or ethnic differences are so prevalent, it has proven particularly disastrous. In European monarchies, where royalty has served a largely ceremonial function since the World Wars, there are fewer problems, since the position of monarch and prime minister in the decision-making process are clearly defined. In a case such as Cyprus or Lebanon, however, where a division of power based on racial or religious distribution of the population is stipulated by the constitution, a potential for crisis clearly exists. The several cases of bicephalism in Africa are no less fraught with instability.

The situation in Dahomey has been discussed above. The "dual executive" placed two leaders of regionally based opposition groups in the same government and only perpetuated the political division. Both President Apithy and Prime Minister Ahomadegbé claimed leadership during the recent unrest. A similar situation existed in Congo-L. in 1960, when President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba dismissed each other; in Senegal in 1962, when Prime Minister Dia and President Senghor jockeyed for position; and in Uganda in February 1966, when Prime Minister Obote decided to remove the King of Buganda from his constitutionally guaranteed position as Chief of State. In these cases there was a conflict between two political positions or personalities with similar degrees of power. When these systems broke down, the opportunity was created for intervention by the military as supreme arbiter of power.

Even more recently in Congo-Br., an obvious power struggle within the socialist-structured Political Bureau of the National Revolutionary Movement brought to light a possible division between President Massamba-Debat and former Prime Minister Lissouba, a contest described as having illustrated the difficulties of a "bicephalous system of executive power."¹⁰⁶ In Burundi, where the Mwami until recently played an ambivalent role as political overseer, this same difficulty existed.

There is also good evidence that some recently deposed leaders had precipitated their removal by an over-indulgence in foreign adventurism. This aspect of the recent coups has been emphasized by the western press, perhaps because it was anxious to see in the coups a rejection of contacts with the Communist world and a desire to increase or resume friendly relations with the West.¹⁰⁷ Certainly the coups represented a short-range setback for Communist influence and infiltration. Ties with Communist China were severed in two instances (the CAR and Dahomey) and Communist technicians were sent home in three other instances (Algeria, Ghana, and Congo-L.). But to ascribe anti-Communist motivations to the military, as is more frequently the case in Latin America, would be entirely correct. Col. Bokassa in the CAR made perhaps the strongest remonstrations in this respect, claiming that pro-Chinese elements were plotting assassinations and building an army. Yet in this case as in others, there is little to suggest that "Communist influence" was more than a "pretext" for intervention.¹⁰⁸ The large scale expulsion of Chinese and Russians from Ghana may have been "part of the military's campaign to remove all the important props of the Nkrumah regime."¹⁰⁹ In Upper Volta, in fact, the menacing spectre of Communism was raised by President Yaméogo himself, accusing the labor leader who later helped overthrow him, of being a Communist leader.¹¹⁰ Despite allegations to the contrary by both East and West, there was no indication that the cold war was a key factor in any of the recent coups.

Foreign adventurism considered outside of the east-west context, however, was undoubtedly significant. In Algeria, Ben Bella's propensity for involvement in the "liberation" struggles elsewhere in the continent had been known and publicly applauded by many African nationalists. As his activities increased from solidarity demonstrations to such substantial assistance as shipping arms to Congo-L. in defiance of a U.N. resolution, provision of haven and training to rebels from Angola, Mozambique and South Africa, and harboring dissidents from Morocco and Tunisia,¹¹¹ they prompted less and less enthusiasm. Col. Boumedienne in particular, despite his nationalist sympathies, preferred "a foreign policy within our means,"¹¹² one more realistic with regard to the problems and abilities of Algeria. Boumedienne ousted Ben Bella only ten days before the latter was about to renew his international "revolutionary" credentials as host (at a cost of \$30 million) to a widely heralded 60-nation conference of African and Asian leaders. The new regime pledged a continued interest in aid to liberation movements, but one "less colored with propaganda, and without Algerian involvement in the internal affairs of sovereign states."¹¹³ In every respect, the fall of Ben Bella represented "a very serious blow to adventurism in Africa."¹¹⁴

Nkrumah's activities in Ghana were remarkably similar, although significantly more than half of the trainees in Ghanaian exile "camps" were from countries from already independent African states

such as Nigeria, Gabon, Upper Volta, Niger, Cameroon, Rwanda, Zambia, Malawi and Tanzania.¹¹⁵ This willingness to interfere in the internal affairs of other states contributed to a growing isolation of Ghana. Nkrumah's desire to promote himself as an international leader also led to the inevitable conference. In his case it meant playing host to the third annual OAU Heads of State meeting (at a cost of \$20 million), and spending about \$14 million a year to maintain diplomatic posts abroad.¹¹⁶ The creation of a "people's militia" in November 1965, which if necessary would be sent to Rhodesia, provided one of the final illustrations of Dr. Nkrumah's international ambitions. This particular action had implications beyond those connected with an ambitious foreign policy. It also represented an affront to the armed forces establishment, another pattern which has been suggested by recent events.

The attempts of political leaders to counterbalance their military establishments are not entirely confined to Africa. Latin America furnishes several examples of governments which unsuccessfully turned to armed militias in order to reduce the influence of the armies.¹¹⁷ In Africa, where the army often represents the best organized force in the country, these attempts have been even less subtle, and portend to enjoy little more success.

Nkrumah's efforts to offset the power of the army were perhaps the most extreme. He established a Presidential Guard which was trained and directed by Russians, a 4,000 man volunteer "People's Militia," and a "Workers' Brigade." He also attempted to promote rivalry between the army and the police (until his suspicions caused him to disarm the former), and between the army and the fledgling air force and navy. The competition for funds among the three defense branches may have residual effect even today.

Boumedienne in Algeria was particularly sensitive to encroachments upon his apparat, the Armée Nationale Populaire. The "People's Militia" which Ben Bella's Marxist advisors had suggested and the 1,500-man palace guard were as unpopular as their Ghanaian counterparts. In Algeria, however, the confrontation had the additional dimension of a bitter personal rivalry. Just as Nkrumah transferred ultimate command of the armed services from the Defense Staff to his own office, Ben Bella appointed an Army Chief of Staff without consulting Boumedienne in an attempt to produce a rivalry between his appointee and the Defense Minister.¹¹⁸

In the CAR David Dacko's precautions included promotion of a rivalry between the 500-man gendarmerie and the army. Funds for the gendarmerie were included in the defense budget. In 1965 and 1966 the allocations for the gendarmerie were higher than those for the army, a measure which Col. Bokassa had publicly opposed.¹¹⁹ Several allegations were later made as to the covert formation of

a "people's army" to be officered by Chinese or pro-Chinese elements.¹²⁰ In Congo-Br. recently, a protest by dissident elements of the army against the demotion of an officer was stopped short of a successful military coup d'etat only because an elite palace guard composed of Cuban nationals was able to rescue government officials.¹²¹ This private army had reportedly been resented by many army officers,¹²² and while it has apparently earned itself considerable equity with the present regime, there are obvious reasons and ample precedent to expect this latent resentment in the regular army to emerge sometime in the future. The Government has also established a militia within the state-controlled labor organization, and has armed the Jeunesse, a group of militants from the Party's youth wing.¹²³

Youth wings have frequently been extremely active in times of political struggle. The Jeunesse in Congo-L. was a major factor in the brutal and merciless killings during the 1964-65 rebellion. The Young Pioneers in Ghana were one of Nkrumah's major props and were completely disbanded by the Ankrah regime.¹²⁴ In Tanzania, TANU Youth Leaguers, like the Red Guards in China, "tend to exercise their 'agitprop' functions with excessive zeal, sometimes taking the law into their own hands."¹²⁵ At times, they have been appointed "special constables" to supplement the local police force. Such a security function has been carried even further in Malawi. There, Dr. Banda's Young Pioneers, responsible only to him, are immune from arrest by the police or army, and empowered to make arrests themselves.¹²⁶ The London Times (December 7, 1965) commenting on the Malawi situation predicted that the morale and effectiveness of the police force were bound to suffer from such a curtailment of its proper powers. The paper added that "the army is unlikely to be particularly happy."

That the Ghanaian army resented the Presidential Guard was obvious from the fighting between regular army units and the Russian-trained contingent. Several guardsmen and at least 11 Russians were killed in the course of the fighting.¹²⁷ As one observer put it, "the refusal of the Guard...to surrender to the regular army arose more from instincts of self-preservation than from loyalty to a man who, at that time, was visiting in the Far East."¹²⁸ The army in Congo-Br. is also jealous of the Presidential Guard, which is better lodged, better armed, and better fed.¹²⁹ In Guinea, three days after the upset in Ghana had made Sékou Touré the most radical leader in sub-Saharan Africa, Touré felt impelled to arm the youth wing of the governing party. The wisdom of this attempt to balance the Guinean army may also be somewhat doubted. What Finer defined as "the corporate self-interest of the armed forces,"¹³⁰ is establishing itself as a widespread and powerful motive for intervention throughout Africa. Blatant attempts to curb the power of the military by creating an obvious counterforce do not have an outstanding record of success.

The efficacy of more subtle restraints is also in doubt. For example, the dispatch of different elements of the same officer

corps to Communist and western countries for training is a practice calculated to provide an "ideological balance." When President Nkrumah suggested this in Ghana, alarmed senior officers tried to dissuade him and pointed out the professional disadvantages of mixed training and the dangers of political factionalization of the officer corps.¹³¹ In this particular case, although some young cadets were eventually sent to Moscow, the effect of this training cannot be determined because of their premature return. Other officer training programs in eastern and western countries are either too recent to evaluate their impact or the data is unavailable for study.

A second indirect attempt at minimizing the military's role has involved its enlistment in civic action programs in order to dilute its security function.¹³² Here again, it must be realized that civic action programs are either too young or little developed to predict their salience to army reliability. In Algeria, despite an official slogan of "Pick in one hand, rifle in the other," the army's civic action has remained largely symbolic.¹³³ The Ethiopian army, which allegedly "is not only an instrument of government, but a contributor to social progress,"¹³⁴ has accomplished little more. The Moroccan case, where the army constructed over 1000 schools in the course of one summer¹³⁵ is more significant, while the Guinean, Malian, and post-mutiny Tanzanian armies have been utilized in this fashion perhaps to an even greater extent.¹³⁶ The Guineans in particular are committed to this use of their military, even using army labor in the construction of shoe factories, a saw-mill, and a shoe repair center.¹³⁷ Ivory Coast recruits, complete with insignia symbolic of the hoe, are sent to military training schools for one year, to a civic action school for the next, and finally to a cooperative farm; the Malagasy Republic uses its army to improve communications facilities.¹³⁸

It may be significant that the above countries, among the most active in civic action programs, were untouched by the latest round of military interventions. Other factors such as a strong identification between army and party, however, may be involved, and this latest round of coups, after all, may not be the last. There are sources which consider the Guinean army, despite its spade-carrying, or perhaps because of it, to be both of doubtful loyalty and an inefficient force to serve national objectives.¹³⁹

Tribal Factors: The ethnic variety of the African continent is tremendous. The American Museum of Natural History distinguishes more than one thousand tribal groupings. National boundaries in Africa frequently enclose tribal groups which have been traditionally antagonistic towards each other. Tribal cleavages within a national state can produce a situation of dissent and serious problems of national loyalty.

When tribal splits coincide with religious, cultural, and economic differences within a state, an extremely high conflict

potential exists. This can create a domestic political stalemate which can encourage the armed forces to intervene. In the words of one observer, "tribal and regional antagonisms unquestionably helped breed the situations that brought on the army coups in the Congo, Nigeria, and Ghana."¹⁴⁰ They also featured in the military coups in Dahomey and Upper Volta, the abortive coups in Congo-Br. and Burundi, and in the non-military disturbances in Kenya and Uganda. The Nigerian coup presents the most violent illustration of a situation where traditional tribal hostilities have been reenforced by religious, cultural, educational, and economic divisions.

Nigeria is generally considered to have three major tribal regions: in the north is the so-called Northern Region; in the south along the coast are the Eastern Region and the Western Region.¹⁴¹ The largest of the three is the Northern Region which is the domain of the Hausa people, a rather fluid cluster of approximately 5½ million peoples. The Hausa are united by their language and their Moslem religion, although the presence of other tribal groupings in the Northern Region detracts from the cohesiveness of the culture. The Kanuri in the northeast constitute a sizable (1,300,000) tribal grouping, but while they speak their own language and practice subtle differences in their religion, intermarriage and cultural interchange with the Hausa is prevalent. The Fulani, originally a nomadic tribe which entered Nigeria in the fifteenth century, assimilated completely into the Hausa culture and in fact came to constitute a privileged class therein. Their members hold many of the government posts of traditional character in the north and attempt to retain their old ethnic label as a claim to class privilege. The term Hausa-Fulani is frequently used to refer to the totality of Hausa-speaking Moslems.

The majority of the Hausa peasants live in small villages surrounding the urban centers and work for Fulani and Hausa landlords in the cities. The British colonial practice of "indirect rule" did not change this feudal system. The result was that almost a century of British influence in the region preserved the positions of the traditional chiefs. Moreover, the attention of the tribal chieftains remained centered in the north and did not turn towards the coastal regions where more progressive ideas and systems developed. In contrast with the other regions, the Northern Region remained backward and conservative in social, educational, and political development.

The two other major tribal areas are found along the coast. The Ibos, located just south of the Benue River in the southeast, constitute the second largest ethnic group in Nigeria and the predominant political force in the Eastern Region of the Federation. The Ibos are competitive and individualistic, traits perhaps acquired as a result of the ruthlessness of the slave trade which centered in the areas between the sixteenth and nineteenth century. With some three generations of contact with Christian mission

education behind them, the Ibos are largely converted to Christianity and have a higher educational level than the tribes in the Northern Region where the Moslem religion does not provide for the missionary teacher. The lack of central authority caused by Ibo individualism has facilitated a widespread dispersion of Ibos into other tribal areas, where they entered the commercial and professional occupations with predictable success. Large Ibo communities grew up outside the walled cities in the Northern Region.

In the southwest of the country surrounding the federal capital city of Lagos, is the Western Region where the third largest cultural group, the Yoruba, live. In many ways, the Yoruba tribe can be considered intermediate in character between the Ibo and the Hausa. The Yorubas have a more cohesive organizational structure than the Ibos, but do not exhibit the cultural uniformity which Islam has imposed upon the Hausa-Fulani. The Yorubas share many of the Ibos' progressive tendencies, but conscious of a former tradition of empire they consider themselves more moderate and sophisticated than their aggressive neighbors. All three major tribes have in fact traditionally regarded each other with a great deal of distrust and suspicion.

The largest gulf, however, exists between the Hausas and the Ibos, partly because of the religious and ideological differences, and partly because of the presence of immigrant Ibos in the Northern Region where they staff most higher skilled and professional positions. A "shatterbelt" of smaller northern tribes, such as the Nupe, Tiv, Igala, occupy the intervening territory between the Northern and Eastern Regions which has prevented any direct opportunity for widespread tribal conflict. But periodic harrassment and persecution of Ibos in the Northern Region has occurred frequently.

With the creation of the Federation of Nigeria and the concomittant buildup of the federal bureaucracy at Lagos, it became clear that the more ambitious and more educated Ibos and Yorubas would tend to monopolize the more important positions. The Hausas also feared that the more progressive Ibos and Yorubas would eventually pose a threat to the traditional feudal system of the northern emirs. The Hausas attempted, therefore, to relegate as many federal government functions as possible to the regional level in order to insure local control. They further sought to control what Federal Government did exist.

The original leaders of the coup in January 1966 were all Ibos, and they quickly exhibited their discontent with northern practices by promoting centralization and by eliminating the most powerful Hausa politicians and several Hausa officers.

There was no immediate response to this extremely direct and sanguine attack upon northern dominance. It was not until May

that the reprisals in the Northern Region began. The Hausas had tolerated the elimination of their regional Premier in silence, but reacted vigorously to General Ironsi's suggestion in June that the civil service would be set up on a nationwide basis. The spectre of Ibo incursions into the better-paying and more prestigious government positions set off demonstrations that quickly assumed the dimensions of a genocidal conflict. When the army again intervened on July 29, 1966, "Ibo-hunting" was not halted, but extended to the military. As a result of this tribally inspired violence the army split and the almost 2 million Ibos in the Northern Region began a general exodus. With such a polarization around the positions of the Hausa and Ibo,¹⁴² the possibility of some type of compromise envisaging a retention of national unity is considerably lessened. If Nigeria, because of its internal political strife, becomes the first independent African state to undergo a territorial breakup, then blame can be largely attributed to the divisive influence of tribalism intensified by religious, social, and political factors.

In Dahomey, as in Nigeria, tribalism has thoroughly complicated the "politics of the center," although here too tribal hostilities have been reinforced by religious and cultural differences. There is, as in Nigeria, a north-south division, and also cultural affinities with tribes living on both sides of the borders. The Ewe and the Yoruba are drawn toward their kinsmen in Togo and Nigeria, while in the north the cultural attractions were toward the Djerma-Songhai and Mossi in Niger and Upper Volta respectively.¹⁴³

The more basic division, however, is between the more progressive tribesmen who inhabit the Guinea Coast "from Takoradi to Calabar,"¹⁴⁴ and the traditionalists of the hinterland. The army, though it is predominantly northern in composition, seems to look increasingly beyond purely tribal or regional conflicts for solutions. The army deposed M'aga, a northerner, in 1963 and replaced him with a southern coalition,¹⁴⁵ and in 1966 lost patience with regional groupings altogether.

In the Congo-L. General Mobutu, like Generals Ironsi and Soglo, became well aware of the detrimental effects of regionalism. Congolese independence was quickly followed by secession movements in Katanga and South Kasai. Although surface stability has been restored, the government is not powerful enough or its influence pervasive enough to transcend the thoroughly tribalized structure of Congolese society.¹⁴⁶

In Ghana, the particularism of the Ashanti in the central provinces is also derived from economic factors (the "Ashanti" problem is frequently described as a "cocoa-producers lobby"). The general support which the tribal organizations have accorded the new regime and the inter-tribal representation on the National Liberation Council are indications that tribalism will not amount to the problem there as it has in Nigeria.¹⁴⁷

On the whole, however, as is pointed out by the almost perpetual warfare between Bahutu and Watutsi in Burundi, the recent uprising of the Baganda in Uganda, the tribally-based dissension of Oginga Odinga in Kenya, and even the shortlived protest by members of the Kouyou tribe in Congo-Br. (where military demotion of a fellow-tribesman almost produced a government change), tribal differences are a basic factor in creating the instability which makes a coup possible.

2. The Military Governments

The characteristics of the military regimes are a matter of considerable interest not only because they may shed some light upon the motivations which brought their leaders to take such "unprofessional" action, but also because their objectives and policies indicate what directions such a regime might take in the future. Each junta will naturally be influenced in its behavior by the particular problems it has to face. Nevertheless, there has been a marked similarity in the initial stages with regard to the ideals and intentions of the new African "men on horseback." This similarity is accentuated by the relatively short period within which they came to power.

Accession to Power: Because of the frequency of military interventions in domestic politics, some observers have raised the question whether a "demonstration effect" might have been involved. Early in 1964, when the coup in Zanzibar was followed by the mutinies in Tanganyika, Uganda, and Kenya, it seemed that a chain reaction had taken place. In late 1965, early 1966, a series of military coups followed in rapid succession. It has been suggested that the fall of one government may have an unsettling effect upon another, particularly in unstable states.¹⁴⁸ In Africa it was clear, however, that the domestic situations had deteriorated in the coup states beforehand. Given the relatively high price that failures in such undertakings must pay, it is unlikely that there were any conscious attempts at simple emulation.

The recent coups were in fact quite well planned, especially in contrast to such earlier fiascoes as in Ethiopia, Senegal, Togo or the Congolese and east African mutinies¹⁴⁹ where a lack of leadership or organization was quite evident; the Algerian, Ghanaian, and Nigerian coups were painstakingly planned and efficiently executed. Col. Boumedienne's ALN seized control without incident. The Ghanaian coup was actually twice postponed to ensure maximum success with a minimum of bloodshed.¹⁵⁰ The Nigerian dissidents struck with precision in all parts of Nigeria, eliminated the nation's most powerful leaders, before losing control of the revolution themselves. The takeovers in Upper Volta, Dahomey, and the CAR were also effected quite speedily and efficiently.

This was possible because the army was the most powerful institution in these countries, while at the same time there appeared to

be widespread support for the army's efforts. There were enthusiastic demonstrations for the new regimes in Ghana, Upper Volta, and Dahomey. Ironsi in Nigeria was initially supported by most sections of the country. The populations and politicians in CAR and Congo-L. clearly acquiesced in the takeovers.

A high degree of clemency was also demonstrated by all but the Nigerian insurgents. In Dahomey and Ghana, the deposed heads of state became exiles, while in Algeria and Upper Volta, a "comfortable" confinement awaited former rulers. President Kasavubu in the Congo returned to his farm. Col. Bokassa in the CAR even offered his cousin, ex-President Dacko, a chance to run for re-election. This absence of retribution may be only a temporary phenomenon. General Mobutu's subsequent public hanging of four former ministers for alleged plotting, indicates that the early lack of vindictiveness may have evaporated in the face of the harsh realities of administration.¹⁵¹

Organization: Each of the coup leaders set up some type of provisional government.¹⁵² In most cases, however, there was a stated reluctance to assume power -- neither Ironsi, Soglo, Lamizana or Ankrah initiated the events which resulted in their accession to power. In most instances there was also an expressed intention to return to civilian rule again. But the initial estimates of military leaders with respect to the length of their tenure have since been markedly, if not publicly, revised. Some observers hold out hope for a voluntary military surrender of power in the not too distant future.¹⁵³ It is, however, no longer a question of an ephemeral existence, such as in the case of the Conseil Militaire Togolais which was in a hurry to withdraw after only a few days, or in the matter of the brief involvement of Soglo in Dahomey in 1963. Significantly, the "Action Group" in Nigeria admitted that Ironsi should govern at least two years, while General Mobutu has mentioned a five-year period of army rule in the Congo.¹⁵⁴

The regimes have generally exhibited a pragmatic approach. Since in many cases the deposed government had been characterized by its arbitrary authoritarian rule, there was a tendency for the juntas to stress their collegial nature. Boumedienne especially emphasized his desire to have collective leadership in the "new" FLN, as well as in the CNR.¹⁵⁵ In Dahomey, Nigeria, and Ghana, the creation of special advisory groups in addition to the regular cabinet officers, illustrates a similar preference for collective leadership. In Ghana, there is also an advisory group of economists and finance experts, reflecting the particular concern of that country with its economy.

This also illustrates the shared tendency to rely on "technicians" rather than politicians. General Mobutu resorted to this in 1960, when he intervened in Congolese politics for the first time. After his first coup he assembled a group of university students and experts to run the country.¹⁵⁶ In Congo-Br. in 1963,

Chart VI - 2

Provisional Military Governments in Africa as of June 1966

Algeria	Conseil National de la Révolution (CNR). 26-man, collegial body, guides the Council of Ministers. Assembly & FLN Politburo dissolved.	Predominantly military in composition; reflects rural interests over urban.
Congo-L.	A "government of national union." 22-man Cabinet, to advise Mobutu who will rule by "decree." Parliament eventually stripped of all effective power.	Predominantly civilian, representing all regions; <u>de facto</u> military control, however.
Dahomey	Comité de Rénovation Nationale (CNR). 25-man committee that guides 9-man govt. of technicians. Later increased to 35. Consultative role.	Includes army officers and trade unionists. Cabinet of eleven includes 2 military.
CAR	Conseil Révolutionnaire. 10-man Cabinet, to advise Bokassa who will rule by "decree." Parliament dissolved.	Includes 4 military, 3 new civilians, 3 holdovers.
Upper Volta	Provisional government. 12-man Cabinet. Lamizana to rule by decree for "interim period." National Assembly dissolved.	Predominantly military. 7 officers hold key portfolios; 5 civilians, technicians.
Nigeria	Supreme Military Council (SMC). 8-man body composed of Commanders of armed services, 4 regional military governors, and Ironsi. A Federal Executive Council of Defense and Police Heads acts in place of former Cabinet.	Entirely military. Four military governors are from regions they administer. Policy of strong centralization.
Ghana	National Liberation Council (NLC). 8-man committee to rule by decree, with advice from National Economic Council, a 7-man group of financial experts.	Entirely military. NLC has 4 army and 4 police officers. Tribal groups well represented.

the Provisional Government was composed entirely of technicians, while the current military leaders in Dahomey, Congo-L., Upper Volta, and Ghana have decided to rely on a mix of officers and technocrats. It is obvious that there is a reluctance to rely on politicians to do the job. General Soglo of Dahomey summed up the general attitude of the junta leaders:

"Myself, I do not play politics...For the first time, ministers have been chosen on the basis of their competence, to the exclusion of all other criteria: the Minister of Education is a professor, the Minister of Agriculture an agricultural engineer, the Minister of Health a doctor."¹⁵⁷

The Leaders: The new military leaders have certain similar personality traits. With the possible exception of the late General Ironsi in Nigeria, whose command of the Nigerian detachment in the Congo established him as the more colorful type of military figure, all of the new leaders are much less flamboyant than the political personalities which they replaced. From Col. Hourari Boumedienne, who lacks the charismatic appeal of his predecessor, to Upper Volta's Lamizana, a man "less at ease in the presidential palace than in a canvas field tent,"¹⁵⁸ these new personalities constitute the "new wave" of realists. They are disillusioned with the attempts of politicians to solve their country's problems. Col. Boumedienne epitomizes this attitude. He shares with many military men "a certain contempt for the political sector, and still more for the intellectual, and a scorn for doctrinaire debates."¹⁵⁹ He is of peasant origin, as is more than 90% of his army,¹⁶⁰ and identifies more with the civilian rural population than with the urban elite.

The new leaders in the French speaking states are also very similar to each other in background. General Soglo, Lt. Col. Lamizana and Col. Bokassa are all veterans of the French army, in fact were all veterans of the Indochina campaign.¹⁶¹ Ironsi and Ankrah have been described as "men cut out of the same cloth."¹⁶² They were personal friends from the early days in the "Frontier" force. Ankrah in particular seems to agree with Boumedienne's assessment of intellectuals; he is a "doer, not a thinker," quite unlike the "brooding ideologists" he overthrew.¹⁶³ General Mobutu of Congo-L., who made headline news in 1960 already, is perhaps better known than any of the new leaders. He generally fights shy of the limelight, "confining his remarks on the political scene to private conversations aimed at influencing."¹⁶⁴

Many other comparisons can be made, which is partly due to the rather similar training received from the metropole, whether at Sandhurst or St. Cyr. This is not surprising. One can expect certain similarities among the officers of armies which are roughly at the same stage of development in countries with largely similar

problems. What is more remarkable, however, is that in most instances the men involved have acted largely out of an enlightened patriotism which was deeply aroused by the political inefficiency and moral corruption in their countries. It is significant that General Ironsi, the first leader to be overthrown by counter-revolution, was eliminated not because he succumbed to the political vices and inequalities which he had earlier attempted to curb, but because he sought to impose reforms prematurely.

Policies: Since the problems which plague these governments are similar, the policies which the juntas adopt are also much alike. It is obvious that each will attempt to eliminate existing regional differences, combat economic inefficiency, purge the government of corruption, etc. Some other, less obvious patterns are emerging which have implications for the future.

In almost every case a coup or attempted coup was followed by an immediate expansion or reorganization of the army. Even in Ethiopia in 1960 and in the Ivory Coast in August 1963, where coups were unsuccessful or merely alleged, the army was strengthened: in Ethiopia to reward it for its loyalty, and in the Ivory Coast to offset certain army elements suspected of disloyalty.¹⁶⁵ In Togo, since Olympio's assassination was largely prompted by his refusal to place French army veterans in what they considered to be an undersized national army, an immediate expansion could be expected. Army reorganizations were undertaken in the east African countries after the early 1964 mutinies. In Algeria, Boumedienne began reorganization and expansion, much to the consternation of his north African neighbors. Dahomey and the CAR also announced plans for expansion shortly after the military assumed control.

Such expansions can be anticipated in the aftermath of a military coup as the fruits of victory. In African states, however, where the army is already the most powerful institution in the country, such an expansion encourages continued army involvements and control.

In addition to attempts to use the army in civic action programs,¹⁶⁶ a "back to the farm" movement has been prominent in the planning of some military regimes. Mobutu, in particular, has encouraged this program. Soglo in Dahomey has also advocated "taking up the hoe," while Bokassa in the CAR has shipped all "unproductive elements," including even the major of Bangui, to the countryside.¹⁶⁷ The return of semi-urbanized individuals to their tribal environments is likely to have a temporizing effect upon the problems of urban unemployment and development of a money crop.

The expulsion of Communist diplomatic personnel and the severance of relations in three instances, have led to the belief that the new regimes were adopting pro-western policies. Although this interpretation is open to question, more favorable relations with western nations do exist. This situation, since it has been brought

about largely by fortuitous circumstances and, in the words of one observer, "more by accident than effort,"¹⁶⁸ is therefore temporary and subject to change.

C. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. SECURITY

As long as the problems of tribal hostilities, poverty and illiteracy remain, coups will continue; generals will replace other generals. With the increase of coups d'etat a tendency has developed to regard the military regime as a logical outgrowth of the failure of the one-party system. The western world, with its traditional ideas of a civilian directed military establishment and an ingrained professionalism in the officer corps, has been reluctant to recognize the trend of increased military intervention. For Africans, however, the trend is obvious. The same General Ironsi who as Commander in Chief of the Nigerian army in 1964 remarked "the army supports the government that is,"¹⁶⁹ would later assist in overthrowing the government for reasons which he regarded more important than "professional" conduct.

The pattern of military intervention seems to be established in Africa; the success of such intervention is not. Countries such as the landlocked states of the former French territories are economically so poor, that any regime -- civilian or military -- is likely to fail in its goal. However, the very lack of resources and economic potential which contributes to the instability of these states also reduces their importance to the United States. The coups in Dahomey, Upper Volta, and the CAR, as well as the potential coup situations in Malawi, Chad, Niger, Sierra Leone, and Mauritania affect only the general U.S. interest in stability.

Whether a coup has direct implications for the United States depends on the significance of the coup state to the United States and also to some extent on the power positions and personal characteristics of the deposed head of state and the new military leader.

The United States has a direct interest in Liberia, the area of a potential coup, and in Nigeria and Congo-L., the scenes of recent military overthrows. The U.S. treaty of cooperation with Liberia raises the possibility that President Tubman, faced with a threatened coup, might request assistance in heading off "subversion," as occurred in the Gabon case. But the treaty with the United States is not sufficiently binding, nor would U.S. security interests be sufficiently affected, to make compliance with such a request likely.

In Nigeria, where a coup and countercoup precipitated such violence that the breakup into regional units is a distinct probability, a tense situation similar to the days of Katangan secession in Congo-L. exists. An internationalization of this crisis, which might conceivably occur in the event of a civil war, could also concern the United States -- much as the 1964 rebellion in the Congo involved the United States in a humanitarian rescue mission.

In Congo-L., a state of importance to the United States because of its strategic significance and its mineral resources, the 1965 coup brought initially the promise of stability in the turbulence of Congolese politics. Whether Mobutu can impose lasting law and order on the rival political groups and turn the factionalized army into a reliable security force without resorting to increasingly authoritarian measures, remains to be seen. His current anti-Belgian campaign threatens to deprive him of desperately needed help in the civil and military sectors of Congolese life.¹⁷⁰ It is unlikely that the United States will increase its aid to fill this void. There are signs, moreover, that Mobutu is turning his attacks against Belgium into a generally anti-western, if not anti-American, campaign to improve his credentials in the African world.¹⁷¹ Such a development is likely to deepen tensions in the center of Africa and will set back U.S. objectives in the Congo.

The coups both in Ghana and Algeria had direct and specific consequences for the interests of the United States and the western allies in Africa. Two of the most militantly anti-western leaders and chronic revolutionary meddlers in African affairs were removed. They were replaced by military men who sought cooperation with the West and correct, if not friendly, relations with the rest of Africa. As a result, a more receptive climate for U.S. policies evolved, which is bound to spread to other areas and to the OAU. In addition, two major centers of Communist subversive activities were closed. The coups in Ghana and Algeria have provided the United States with the unique opportunity for assisting two key states towards orderly development. If the pragmatic and more moderate governments in Ghana and Algeria can show political and economic progress, this will strengthen other moderate governments. In turn, the chances for continent-wide stability and development will be enhanced.

The military coup d'etat as a phenomenon has also a more subtle relationship to the interests of the United States and its allies. First of all, most African officers tend to be conservative in international affairs in the sense that they discourage military or political adventures against other states.¹⁷² For example, both General Ankrah and Col. Boumedienne pledged to halt foreign adventurism and interstate subversion. This is partly the result of their realization of the limitations of their armies, which they are reluctant to weaken unnecessarily. This conservatism is also a reflection of their professional training.¹⁷³ The elite of the African officers corps comes from Sandhurst or St. Cyr. This professional characteristic of the officer corps is most frequently found where European training and influence predominate. But it may decline if the army becomes politicized and political considerations determine officer selection. The germ of this situation can already be found in Mali, Guinea, and Tanzania.

Secondly, the majority of African military establishments depend on the former metropole for equipment and training. For reasons of efficiency military leaders usually oppose diversification of aid sources. This attitude tends to limit military relationships with Communist powers. In northern Africa, the more intense cold war rivalry, the tensions between France and the Maghreb states, and the larger armies which could more readily absorb mixed equipment, combined to produce more varied sources of military assistance, including Communist donors. But in sub-Saharan Africa, the military appears to be more conservative in this respect. Politicians, not military leaders, in Ghana, Kenya, and Tanzania have sent trainees to Communist countries and have sought supplies there.¹⁷⁴

This does not mean that all African military leaders will display these conservative traits in foreign affairs, nor that junior officers will continue this trend. But on the whole the United States may expect for the near future that most military regimes of sub-Saharan Africa will pursue a moderate policy in African affairs and a western oriented policy in matters of military aid.

As far as the domestic situation is concerned, military regimes can impose short term stability almost at will. However, they have a number of inherent disadvantages which can jeopardize this stability in the long run. First, the junta usually seizes power with a purely negative policy. They are against certain leaders, corruption, or a particular set of policies. But they are not likely to have a common ideology or to agree completely on the redemptive steps to be taken later. On the contrary, African officers tend to be non-ideological as a result of their professional training. The initial consensus within the officer corps may disintegrate. The factionalization of the military junta in the Sudan, for example, led to a civilian takeover.

Secondly, most military leaders lack political training and experience. They are apt to make decisions that are unwise from a purely political point of view. General Ironsi in Nigeria sorely underestimated the political atmosphere in the Northern Region when he attempted to impose unitary rule by fiat.

Thirdly, a military regime is born in secrecy and succeeds through deception; the conspiratorial mood which pervaded the planning sessions is likely to infect the provisional government councils. The rejection of unwanted governmental authority can serve as a dangerous precedent. This climate is a prelude to possible politicizing of the army.¹⁷⁵ In addition, it precipitates the isolation of the regime from the population, since stricter security measures require an increasing withdrawal from public life.¹⁷⁶ At the same time, it opens the way to authoritarianism.

In the short run, however, the military coups of 1965-66 were not harmful to U.S. security interests inasmuch as civilian governments were overthrown which did not offer the promise of social and political development. At least for the time being army rule brought domestic stability. Opportunities were opened for increased western influence in black African states, because the more pragmatic soldier-statesmen recognized the need for western military aid and technical assistance. They were less inclined than their predecessors to become involved in inter-state subversion.

It is much more difficult to appraise the long range effects of past and possible future coups on the states involved and on U.S. security concerns. In the interests of order and efficiency army rule tends to limit popular political expression and participation. If the military leaders continue to suppress political freedom the stability which they impose is liable to become arbitrary and even tyrannical, and would begin to erode as soon as army rule weakens. In this way military rule may eventually defeat the very objective of stability it hoped to achieve and U.S. policy favors.

Social and political development are the primary objectives of U.S. policies in emergent nations throughout the world. Because of the suppression of the free interplay of political, social, and frequently also economic forces, armies are not the best instruments that can maximize this development. For this reason the countries in which military governments have been installed rank high on the list of states which require continued U.S. attention.

NOTES TO CHAPTER I

1. For a discussion of the heartland concept of Sir Halford J. Mackinder, see H. W. Weigert et. al., Principles of Political Geography (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1957), Chapter 8.
2. N.J.G. Pounds The Political Patterns of the World (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), Chapter 15.
3. Africa occupies about 21% of the world's habitable land area, but contains only about 8% of the world's population. Derived from Life Pictorial Atlas (New York: Time, Inc., 1961), p. 22.
4. Weigert, op. cit., pp. 275-86.
5. Hanson W. Baldwin, "The Soviet Navy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 33, No. 4, July 1955, pp. 590-91.
6. Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara before the House Armed Services Committee on the Fiscal Year 1967-71 Defense Program and 1967 Defense Budget, March 8, 1966, p. 31.
7. General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, SACEUR, in testifying before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 31 March 1966, termed Wheelus Air Force Base "of great strategic importance...and essential to the accomplishment of the mission of the United States forces in Europe".
8. Based upon the allied experience in World War Two, it appears that use of the Suez Canal would be seriously impaired under conditions of general war. The advent of nuclear weapons and long range missiles renders this even more likely.
9. Excerpts are from the address of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev on January 6, 1961, as reported in World Marxist Review (London), January 1961.
10. See map I-1.
11. Ernest W. Lefever and Wynfred Joshua, United Nations Peacekeeping in the Congo: 1960-1964 (Washington: the Brookings Institution, 1966), p. 334.
12. Chart I-1 recapitulates the locational significance of African States in general war and under conditions short of general war.
13. New York Times, May 18, 1966.
14. Secretary of State Dean Rusk spoke in a similar vein and related U.S. national security to the welfare and stability of other nations. Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, Hearings on HR 10781, Senate Committee on Appropriations, 89th Cong., 1 Sess. (1965), p. 10.
15. U.S., Agency for International Development and Department of Defense, Proposed Mutual Defense and Assistance Programs FY 1964 (Washington: 1963), p. 61.

16. Ibid.
17. New York Times, March 24, 1966.
18. See Map I-3 for western defense agreements with African states.
19. David Wood, The Armed Forces of African States (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1966), p. 26.
20. Under bilateral agreements France will retain air base rights in the Ivory Coast (at Port Bouet), Cameroon (at Douala), the Central African Republic (at Bangui), and in Mauritania (at Atar). Small garrisons will remain in Gabon and Niger. "News in Brief," Africa Report, Vol. 11, No. 2, February 1966, p. 21. New York Times, December 24, 1965.
21. 2,000 in Dakar, Senegal, with an air detachment in Atar, Mauritania; 600 in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, with a detachment at Niamey, Niger; 1,000 at Fort Lamy, Chad, with a detachment in Bangui, CAR; and 2,000 at Diego-Suarez, Malagasy Republic. 4,000 French servicemen are at Mers-el-Kebir and about 2,000 at the Saharan test sites.
22. Michael Howard, "Britain's Strategic Problem East of Suez," International Affairs, Vol. 42, No. 2, April 1966, p. 182.
23. Attributed to the British Minister of Defense, Dennis Healey, in Hugh Hanning, "Britain East of Suez--Facts and Figures," International Affairs, Vol. 42, No. 2, April 1966, p. 260.
24. M.J.V. Bell, Army and Nation in Sub-Saharan Africa (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1965), pp. 9-10.
25. Wm. Gutteridge, Military Institutions and Power in the New States (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 118, 120-21. Nigeria provided a battalion to Tanganyika in April 1964, to assist in maintaining internal law and order.
26. Wood, op. cit., p. 27.
27. Ibid.
28. New York Times, March 27, 1965.
29. Speech by G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Department of State Press Release, No. 48), March 18, 1965.
30. See Rene Pelissier, "Spain's African Sandboxes," Africa Report, Vol. 11, No. 2, February 1966, p. 17, and "Spain's Discreet Decolonizations," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 43, No. 3, April 1965, pp. 521-524.
31. Waldemar A. Nielsen, African Battleline (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), pp. 28-31.

32. For a detailed discussion of Soviet objectives in Africa, see Alexander Dallin, "The Soviet Union" in Zbigniew Brzezinski (ed.), Africa and the Communist World (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963), pp. 7 ff.
33. Richard Lowenthal, "China" in ibid., p. 152.
34. See table I-4 and map 1-4.
35. Georgetown Research Project, The Soviet Military Aid Program as a Reflection of Soviet Objectives (Washington: 1965), p. 6.
36. Ibid., pp. 57-58.
37. See Colin Legum, "Peking's Strategic Priorities," Africa Report, Vol. 10, No. 1, January 1965, pp. 19-21.
38. The discussion of the U.N. Congo operation and factual data are based on Lefever and Joshua, op. cit.
39. The Korean operation, nominally under the U.N. command, was initiated, planned, managed, and largely financed by the United States. In legal terms, the United States could be called the executive agent of the United Nations in Korea. See Ruth B. Russell, United Nations Experience with Military Forces: Political and Legal Aspects (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1964), pp. 24-43.
40. Speech by Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (U.S. Department of State Press Release, No. 34), January 17, 1963.
41. Speech by Assistant Secretary of State G. Mennen Williams (U.S. Department of State Press Release, No. 291), December 16, 1965.

NOTES TO CHAPTER II

1. The discussion of the influence of Islam is based on Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, "The Islamic Factor in African Politics," Orbis, Vol. 8, No. 2, Summer 1964, pp. 425-44. W. Montgomery Watt, "The Political Relevance of Islam in East Africa," International Affairs, Vol. 42, No. 1, January 1966, pp. 35-44. For a more detailed analysis, see Jacques Baulin, The Arab Role in Africa (London: Pengiun, 1962). Thomas Hodgkin, "Islam, History, and Politics," a series of articles in West Africa, September-November 1956. Thomas Hodgkin, "Islam, History, and Politics," Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1963, pp. 91-97. Benjamin Rivlin, "Arab Africa in the Emerging African Community," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1961, pp. 42-51.
2. In ancient usage the term Arab was confined to the bedouin tribes who lived in the north of the Arabian peninsula. In modern times the term is applied not only to the Semites of Arabia, but also to their descendants, including those in northern and eastern Africa. Arabs are Semites, while Berbers are Hamites of northern Africa west of Tripoli. It may be recalled that Islam is the religion, while Moslems are its adherents.
3. For example, when Congolese Prime Minister Moise Tshombe tried to attend the conference of nonaligned nations in Cairo in October 1964, President Gamal AbdelNasser of Egypt put him under house arrest and prevented him from attending the meeting. After his release when Tshombe returned to the Congo, he was able to enlist mass support at home by denouncing the UAR and recalling that Arabs had long been involved in the congolese slave trade. New York Times, October 20, 1964.
4. The conflict potential in African borders is not as high as is often assumed. The specific circumstances under which border disputes can assume serious proportions are discussed in Chapter V, section C.
5. The example of Algeria is often cited. French settlers concentrated on vineyard cultivation, leaving the independent Algerians with a wine industry which their Moslem religion actually proscribes.
6. Stewart C. Easton, The Twilight of European Colonialism (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), p. 316.
7. Dorothy M. Pickles, France, the Fourth Republic (New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1958), p. 147.
8. Easton, op. cit., p. 29.
9. For an analysis of this often found situation, see Anthony J. Hughes, East Africa: The Search for Unity (Baltimore: Penguin, 1963), pp. 150 ff.

NOTES TO CHAPTER III

1. Northeast Africa as used in this discussion includes Ethiopia, the Somali Republic, French Somaliland, and, to the extent that it is affected by the pan-Somali issue, Kenya.
2. U.S., Agency for International Development and Department of Defense, Proposed Mutual Defense and Development Programs FY 1966 (Washington: 1965), p. 227.
3. Georgetown Research Project, The Soviet Military Aid Program as a Reflection of Soviet Objectives (Washington: 1965), p. 55.
4. Colin Legum, "Peking's Strategic Priorities," Africa Report, Vol. 10, No. 1, January 1965, p. 19.
5. Jeanne Contini, "Politics with a Difference," Africa Report, Vol. 9, No. 10, November 1964, pp. 6-7.
6. For a detailed discussion of the development of Somali's political party system and the all-pervasive influence of the tribal factors, see A.A. Castagno, Jr., "Somali Republic" in James S. Coleman and Carl Rosberg, Jr., Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), pp. 512-559.
7. Only Mali with 21.2%, Cameroon with 19.5%, and South Africa with 19.9% outrank Somali. David Wood, The Armed Forces of African States (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1966), p. 29.
8. For example, the Eritrean Liberation Front claimed that some 360 Ethiopian troops were killed in September 1965 by Eritrean nationalist guerrillas. "News in Brief," Africa Report, Vol. 10, No. 11, December 1965, p. 22.
9. Alphonse A. Castagno, "Ethiopia: Reshaping an Autocracy," Africa Report, Vol. 8, No. 9, October 1963, p. 6.
10. "News in Brief," Africa Report, Vol. 10, No. 4, April 1965, p. 27. Ibid., Vol. 10, No. 7, July 1965, p. 24.
11. Ibid., Vol. 11, No. 1, January 1966, p. 28. Ibid., Vol. 11, No. 5, May 1966, p. 32.
12. An analysis of the various factors involved in the border dispute is presented in Chapter V, section C.
13. The British decided in 1962 to send a fact-finding commission to the area to determine popular sentiment. In March 1963 the British Government announced, however, that the NFD would be part of Kenya, which would become independent at the end of 1963. "New Crisis in the Horn," Africa Report, Vol. 8, No. 4, April 1963, p. 6.

14. A historical background of the Ethiopian-Somali border dispute is presented in "Somali-Ethiopia Border Dispute," Africa Research Bulletin, Political, Social and Cultural Series, Vol. 3, No. 5, May 1-31, 1966, pp. 530-32.
15. Africa Research Bulletin, Political, Social and Cultural Series, Vol. 3, No. 6, June 1-30, p. 558C.
16. New York Times, August 28, 1966.
17. Somali has an army of 8,000 men and a fledgling air force of some 1,250 men. Ethiopia has a military establishment of a total of 35,000 men. Its army, air force, and navy are largely equipped with modern American equipment. Kenya's forces are the smallest of the three with less than 5,000 men. See Wood, op. cit., pp. 15-23 passim.
18. African Research Bulletin, Political, Social and Cultural Series, Vol. 2, No. 7, August 1-31, 1965, p. 331B. Ibid., Vol. 3, No. 3, March 1-31, 1966, pp. 494C-495A.
19. Ibid., Vol. 3, No. 6, June 1-30, 1966, p. 549B.
20. Ethiopian-Sudanese talks in June 1966 led to the agreement to establish a joint border committee, which would define the frontier, and a joint administrative committee, which would deal with any "local dispute on the border." Ibid.
21. For purposes of this study, the northern African region comprises the five nations bordering on the Mediterranean, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and the UAR, the remaining Spanish territories, Spanish Sahara, Ifni, and the smaller Mediterranean "enclaves," and the Sudan, which because of its historical development and political posture, is more closely associated with the preceding countries than with sub-Saharan Africa.
22. Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara before the House Armed Services Committee on the FY 1967-68 Defense Program, March 8, 1966.
23. The Sudan, for example, has received relatively large amounts of special supporting assistance in return for granting overflight rights and landing privileges. Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Regional Arms Control Arrangements for Developing Areas (Cambridge: 1964), p. V-11.
24. It is already probable that the Soviet Union would be given access to the Canal comparable to that accorded the United States in such a situation. This would be either unrestricted usage prejudicial to neither side, or a general interdiction of the Canal thoroughfare to all warships regardless of origin. This is not true of the Dardanelles or the Strait of Gibraltar.

25. During the Congo-L. rebellion of 1964-65, the Soviets felt constrained to simply "sponsor" such support, giving planes, arms and money to the UAR, Algerian and Ghanaian governments. These governments then obtained landing rights into Khartoum and Juba in the Sudan. In at least one instance, however, a direct flight was made to the Sudan from a Soviet base near the Black Sea. New York Times, December 7, 1964.

26. M.I.T., op. cit., p. IV-24.

27. See below section 4.

28. Le Monde, July 21 and 22, 1966.

29. Africa Report, Vol. 10, No. 11, December 1965, p. 30. It was claimed that the entire population of Equatoria Province had been turned into refugees.

30. New York Times, July 21, 1965.

31. New York Times, August 19, 1965.

32. New York Times, November 22, 1965.

33. In a number of respects, the Libyan situation is similar to that prevailing in Iraq prior to 1958, in which a conservative monarchy with considerable revenues suddenly at hand failed to respond to the challenge of an increasingly powerful and articulate opposition with genuine grievances against the existing social and economic order.

34. The French promulgated the Berber Decree of 1930, making the Berber subject to French rather than Moslem personal law. They apparently underestimated the extent of the Berber's Islamification.

35. William H. Lewis, "Algeria Changes Course," Africa Report, Vol. 10, No. 10, November 1965, p. 12.

36. On June 17, 1965, Ben Bella announced that the dissident FFS had finally agreed to peace in the Kabylie area. Two days later, he was overthrown by Boumedienne, who is much more unpopular in the mountain areas. Africa Report, Vol. 10, No. 8, August 1965, p. 21.

37. N. Manfred Shaffer, "The Sudan: Arab-African Confrontation," Current History, Vol. 50, No. 295, March 1966, p. 143.

38. U.S., Agency for International Development, Selected Economic Data for the Less Developed Countries (Washington: 1966), p. 5.

39. While the total area of Egypt is approximately 386,000 sq. mi., the population is almost entirely settled within the Nile valley, delta and oases, which cover about 13,680 sq. mi.

40. Halford L. Hoskins, "Africa's Arab Fringe," Current History, Vol. 50, No. 295, March 1966, p. 141.

41. M.I.T., op. cit., p. IV-11.

42. This relationship to the continent, particularly France, has been criticized by the IMF, among others, as tending to discourage the development of industry intended for local consumption. One of the largest revenue crops in Algeria is wine, which is proscribed by Moslem law. It must therefore export the entire crop. When French farmers pressured the French government into cutting back on Algerian wine imports, Algerian authorities found themselves burdened with a residue of over 568 million gallons, and a depressed price for wine.

43. Le Monde, May 11, 12, and 13, 1966.

44. Stuart Schaar, "King Hassan's Alternatives," Africa Report, Vol. 8, No. 8, August 1963, p. 7.

45. Lorna Hahn, "Politics and Leadership in North Africa," Orbis, Vol. 9, No. 3, Fall 1965, p. 738.

46. Ibid.

47. New York Times, June 9, 1966; September 6, 1966; September 24, 1966; September 27, 1966.

48. See Chapter VI.

49. The last drive against the Communists took place in the summer of 1965, and there are recent signs of its resumption (New York Times, October 12, 1966), while the Moslem Brotherhood is even more frequently purged (New York Times, August 22, 1966).

50. While no reliable figures are available, a figure generally cited is 8,000, and estimates range as high as 11,000. U.S., Department of State, World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations (Washington: 1966), p. 133.

51. They emerged as the single most powerful force in the Sudanese civilian government which took office following the coup. New York Times, November 1, 1964.

52. Washington Post, November 22, 1965.

53. The Mahgreb states of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia could be considered as 1) the western extremity of the Arab world, 2) part of the southern tier of the Mediterranean basin, or 3) the northernmost countries of the African continent. The United Arab Republic is most frequently included in the Middle Eastern, rather than African, category of a regional analysis. The U.S. Departments of State and Defense adhere to this practice.

54. The following military data are based on Wood, op. cit.
55. Peter Braestrup, "Algeria Building a Stronger Army," New York Times, August 2, 1964.
56. "Algerians Build Military Power," New York Times, May 29, 1966. A shipment of 11 jet fighters and several dozen tanks and armored personnel carriers from the Soviet Union occasioned the speculation.
57. Ibid.
58. New York Times Magazine, February 13, 1966, p. 59.
59. Le Monde, May 11, 12, 13, 1966.
60. Africa Research Bulletin, Economic Financial and Technical Series, Vol. 3, No. 4, April 15-May 14, 1966, p. 500B.
61. Africa Research Bulletin, Political, Social and Cultural Series, Vol. 3, No. 5, May 1-31, 1966, p. 529A.
62. M.I.T., op. cit., p. IV-3.
63. The name is from a former marker, which the French removed. Bourguiba has described the area as "a narrow, arid strip of territory without petroleum, water or any life or habitation." L'Action (Tunis) March 26, 1966. The possibility of petroleum, however, is a matter of opinion.
64. Africa Research Bulletin, Political, Social and Cultural Series, Vol. 3, No. 6, June 1-30, 1966, p. 548B.
65. The Moroccan-Algerian border dispute is further discussed in Chapter V, section C.
66. For example, Abd el-Krim leader of Moroccan Rif tribes; Allal al Fassi, leader of Moroccan Istiglal Party; Ferhat Abbas of the Algerian F.L.N.; Tunisia's Salah Ben Youssef; Somalia's Mahmoud Harbi; and Niger's Djibo Bakary have all resided in Cairo.
67. See Jacques Baulin, The Arab Role in Africa (London: Penguin, 1962), Chapter 3, for a more detailed account of Egypt's sub-Saharan involvement.
68. See Chapter V, Section D.
69. Africa Research Bulletin, Political, Social and Cultural Series, Vol. 2, No. 5, May 1-31, 1965, p. 298B and Vol. 2, No. 7, July 1-31, 1965, p. 335B.
70. New York Times, January 20, 1966.
71. Africa Report, Vol. 9, No. 5, May 1964, p. 17.

72. King Idris has long been supported by the British. During the second world war the British encouraged the Sanusis, the leading Moslem movement in Libya which is headed by King Idris, against the Germans and Italians.

73. Wood, op. cit., p. 27. A small British force in Benghazi and in Tobruk remained. The British also continue to operate the air staging post at Benina and El Adem. The British agreement expires in 1973. The U.S. treaty runs through 1970.

74. New York Times, July 26, 1966

75. This was the evaluation of observers at that time. See New York Times, December 20, 1964.

76. West Africa as referred to in this discussion includes: Togo and the countries of former French West Africa (Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, Upper Volta, Guinea, Niger, Ivory Coast, and Dahomey); the ex-British territories of Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Gambia; Portuguese Guinea; and Liberia.

77. M.J.V. Bell, Military Assistance to Independent African States (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1964), p. 11.

78. U.S. economic aid to Nigeria amounted from the beginning of the program through fiscal 1964 to \$111.1 million.

79. For French military commitments in Africa, including the western region, see Chapter I, chart I-3.

80. Also in comparison with other African countries, Soviet aid to Ghana, Guinea, and Mali has been significant. For a comparison of Soviet aid to African countries, see Chapter I, table I-4.

81. J.H.A. Watson, "Mauritania Problems and Prospects, "Africa Report, Vol. 8, No. 2. February 1963, pp. 3-6.

82. See for example, W. Arthur Lewis, Politics in West Africa (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 24-25.

83. Washington Post, March 7, 1966. Conversely, the new military regime, consisting mostly of members of the Ewe, has been criticized for tribal discrimination against the Fantis, who were favored by its predecessor. Washington Post, October 9, 1966.

84. The divisions among the three tribes which led to the coup and counter-coup of 1966 are more fully analyzed in Chapter VI, sections A and B.

85. For a discussion of the single-party system and its liabilities, see Lewis, op. cit., pp. 28-38 and 55-63.

86. Ibid., p. 56.
87. Watson, op. cit., p. 4.
88. Helen Kitchen (ed.), A Handbook of African Affairs (New York: Praeger, 1964), pp. 124-25.
89. Africa Report, Vol. 8, No. 10, November 1963, p. 32.
90. Ibid., Vol. 11, No. 6, June 1966, p. 42.
91. Frank G. Snyder, One-Party Government in Mali: Transition Toward Control (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 114-16.
92. Kitchen, op. cit., p. 80.
93. Lewis, op. cit., p. 25.
94. The issue of Portuguese colonies and the liberation movements is discussed more in detail in Chapter V, section B.
95. The reasons for the relatively low conflict potential in border problems and the issue of irredentism are discussed in Chapter V, section C.
96. See Chapter V, section D for a detailed discussion of Ghanaian subversive activities.
97. Equatorial Africa in the discussion includes the following groups of states: former French equatorial Africa: Gabon, the Central African Republic, Chad, and Congo-Brazzaville; the Federal Republic of the Cameroon; Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Congo-L.); former British Africa: Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda; the remaining colonial enclaves: Cabinda, Rio Muni, and Fernando Po; and Malagasy.
98. If cognizance of the new name of the capital is taken, Congo-Kinshasa. The abbreviated form of the old reference, Congo-Leopoldville, is used in this report.
99. G. Mennen Williams, "U.S. Objectives in the Congo, 1960-65," Africa Report, Vol. 10, No. 8, p. 13.
100. Ernest W. Lefever and Wynfred Joshua, United Nations Peacekeeping in the Congo: 1960-1964 (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1966), p. 378
101. G. Mennen Williams, op. cit., p. 20.
102. New York Times, May 27, 1966.

103. Ibid., November 26, 1965.

104. Wood, op. cit., p. 7.

105. Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, The Emerging States of French Equatorial Africa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960), p. 252.

106. London, however, intervened only after east African authorities made specific requests that Britain honor its treaty commitments. There is evidence that Paris was less circumspect. See Chapter VI of this report.

107. Hanson W. Baldwin, "Region East of Suez Presents Problem in Allied Defense," New York Times, July 5, 1966.

108. M.J.V. Bell, Military Assistance to Independent African States (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1964), p. 15.

109. See chart I-4 in chapter I of this report.

110. Colin Legum, "Peking's Strategic Priorities," Africa Report, Vol. 10, No. 1, January 1965, pp. 19-20.

111. Ibid.

112. G. Mennen Williams, op. cit., p. 13, stated specifically that the United States was quite concerned "that the Congolese and not Communists control the Congo."

113. For example, Kenya's Vice President Oginga Odinga, whose political base of support is the Luo tribe in the Lake Victoria area, tried in the spring of 1966 to challenge the authority of President Jomo Kenyatta, a Kikuyu. Odinga's hastily formed opposition party, however, was defeated in special elections a few months later. In Congo-Br. the transfer of an army officer in June 1966 resulted in a demonstration on his behalf by members of his tribal group, the Kouyou. The gendarmerie and the Cuban guard quickly put down the disturbance.

114. For a discussion of the role of tribalism in the Katangan secession, see Daniel J. Crowley, "Politics and Tribalism in the Katanga," Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 1, March 1963, pp. 68-78. The ethnic base of support of the secessionist Mining State of South Kasai, created on August 9, 1960, were the Kasai Baluba. Tribal disorders between the Kasai Baluba and the local Bene-Lulua resulted in the imprisonment of Bene-Lulua. On August 27, Congolese army troops loyal to Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba occupied Bakwanga, the capital of the secessionist state, and released Lulua tribesmen from prison. In the ensuing fighting between Balubas, Lulus, and army troops, thousands of civilians were killed before order was restored. See Lefever and Joshua, op. cit., Vol. 3, Appendix P-5.

115. For a detailed discussion of the Mulelist rebellion, see Renee C. Fox, Willy de Craemer, and J.M. Ribeaucourt, "La deuxième indépendance: Etude d'un cas, la rébellion au Kwilu," Etudes Congolaises, Vol. 8, No. 1, Jan.-Feb. 1965, pp. 1-35.

116. London Times, May 9, 1966.

117. The above discussion of the Congolese rebellion has been limited to the influence of tribal factors only. For a fuller discussion, see M. Crawford Young, "The Congo Rebellion," Africa Report, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 6-11, and Benoit Verhaegen, Rébellions au Congo (Brussels: Centre de Recherche et d'Information Socio-Politiques, 1966).

118. London Times, May 9, 1966.

119. The independents won 6 seats. The elections actually took place in 1959, but Chad gained independence in 1960, which is the reason why the 1960 date is used above.

120. One observer would agree that Tombalbaye's willingness to compromise with opposition elements is quite limited. Philippe Decraene suggests that "Tombalbaye's attitude toward Islam is to blame -- he sees only black and white." Le Monde, December 1, 1965.

121. Ibid.

122. Gabon versus Congo-Br. and Togo, for example.

123. The French apparently consider Moslem influence as an element which in "this part of Africa has always constituted a stabilizing factor." Le Monde, November 20, 1965.

12.. See Chapter VI.

125. Africa Research Bulletin, Political, Social and Cultural Series, Vol. 2, No. 10, October 1-31, 1965, p. 390B.

126. Although the problem of white-owned highland farms appears to have been solved through government purchases, even larger areas that have been set aside for the Masai tribe for grazing are now contested by other tribal cultivators.

127. Aaron Segal, "The Problem of Urban Unemployment," Africa Report, Vol. 10, No. 4, April 1965, p. 14. John Spencer, "Kenyatta's Kenya," Africa Report, Vol. 11, No. 5, May 1966, p. 12.

128. Lawrence Fellows, "Kenya Warns Foreign Businesses to Africanize," New York Times, May 6, 1966.

129. After warnings that action would be taken against "jobless loiterers," some 650 persons were arrested in October 1965 and removed from Dar es Salaam to rural areas.

130. Experts do not expect the diamond boom to last more than a few years. Victor T. LeVine, "Insular Problems of an Inland State," Africa Report, Vol. 10, No. 10, November 1965, p. 20.

131. No accurate account of the executions has been made, or is even possible. Responsible estimates range between 20,000 and 100,000. See M. Crawford Young, Africa Report, April 1965, p. 11, and New York Times, November 26, 1965. Leaders of the revolt had declared that "counter-revolutionaries" would be destroyed without pity, and lacking any definition of "counter-revolutionary," an extremely broad interpretation of the term was employed. Gradually, the category of "intellectual" became tainted as a reactionary group with the result that most teachers and low-level functionaries were killed.

132. M. Crawford Young, Politics in the Congo (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 589-90.

133. The domestic problems in Rwanda, Burundi, Chad, and Uganda are basically related to ethnic factors, which have political ramifications, of course. The situations in Congo-Br., Tanzania, and Kenya have more relevance to international relationships than internal stability.

134. Washington Post, May 12, 1966.

135. Catherine Hoskyns, The Congo Since Independence (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 21-22.

136. "Political Parties in the New Congo," Africa Report, Vol. 5, No. 6, June 1960, pp. 2-5.

137. The Congolese army was renamed from Force Publique to Armée Nationale Congolaise in July 1960. It should be noted that the Katangan secession movement was supported largely by the local gendarmerie and white mercenaries. After the secession was ended in January 1963, the gendarmerie was integrated into the ANC, an effort which was never completely successful. The Katangans remained an "army" within the ANC.

138. The U.N. Force, which had numbered about 20,000 men at one time, was phased out after the ending of Katangan secession in 1963. By August 1963, total U.N. strength had dropped to 7,700 men and their task was limited to rescue missions and surveillance. See Lefever and Joshua, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 367-68.

139. In September 1960, the then Colonel Mobutu also intervened and "neutralized" all political factions and installed a College of Commissioners to run the country till the end of the year.

140. U.S., Department of State, World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations (Washington: 1966), pp. 113-17.

141. The effect of the liberation movements in Dar es Salaam is discussed in Chapter V, section B.

142. "The United Nations' Findings on Rwanda and Burundi," Africa Report, Vol. 9, No. 4, April 1964, pp. 7-8. Elsbeth Huxley, "The Rise and Fall of the Watutsi," New York Times Magazine, February 23, 1964, pp. 10 ff.
143. Africa Research Bulletin, Political, Social and Cultural Series, Vol. 2, No. 9, September 1965, p. 362B.
144. Kenya's border dispute with Somali is further discussed in Chapter V, section C.
145. Rene Pelissier, "Political Movements in Spanish Guinea," Africa Report, Vol. 9, No. 5, May 1964, p. 5.
146. For a discussion of subversive efforts in the Congo during the 1964-65 rebellion, see Chapter V, section D.
147. See for example Philippe Decraene in Le Monde, August 15, 1965, and Africa Report, Vol. 10, No. 9, October 1965 p. 42.
148. New York Times, August 14, 1964. Washington Post, March 7, 1965.
149. East African Standard, February 19, 1966.
150. Washington Post, May 12, 1966.
151. For the purposes of this study, southern Africa comprises the three members of the former Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, (now Malawi, Zambia, and Rhodesia); The Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique and all territories to the south; The Republic of South Africa, South West Africa, and the High Commission Territories (Bechuanaland, Swaziland, and Basutoland).
152. Testimony of William E. Lang, Dep. Ass. Secretary of Defense for the African Region, United States-South African Relations, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 89th Cong., 2 Sess. (1966), p. 106.
153. In May 1965 the American aircraft carrier, the Independence, on its way to Vietnam was denied refueling rights in Capetown. The South African Government took the position that only white crews could land at the port, whereupon the carrier cancelled its visit to Capetown. The vessel was refueled off the coast of South Africa by a navy oiler dispatched from the east coast.
154. Testimony of Earl D. Hilburn, Dep. Associate Administrator of NASA, United States-South African Relations, Hearings, p. 117.
155. New York Times, March 2, 1966.
156. External assistance to the nationalist liberation movements is discussed in Chapter V, section B.

157. By 1961, for example, less than $\frac{1}{2}$ of 1% of all the Africans in Angola and Mozambique were considered "assimilados." James Duffy, Portugal in Africa (London: Penguin, 1963), p. 10.
158. Rhodesian Herald, April 17, 1964.
159. F.M.G. Wilson, "Prospects for Southern Africa," Current History, March 1966, p. 167.
160. Waldemar A. Nielsen, African Battleline (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 18.
161. Ibid. In fact, Portuguese policy toward her colonies actually promotes inter-racial marriage as a means of achieving a truly non-racial society. William A. Hance, The Geography of Modern Africa (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), p. 303.
162. See, e.g., Pierre L. Van Den Berghe, South Africa: A Study in Conflict (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1965) and Leo Kuper, An African Bourgeoisie: Race, Class and Politics in South Africa (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965).
163. According to the New York Times, January 23, 1966, some 800,000 Africans are jailed each year for pass offenses. The number of prisoners per 100,000 of population is over six times as large as in England and France.
164. "The Wreck of the 5:28," Time, October 15, 1965.
165. Roy Perrott, "South Africa's Verwoerd," Washington Post, May 15, 1966.
166. Joseph Lelyveld, "Apartheid Stops at Cash Register," New York Times, August 8, 1965.
167. Washington Post, November 4, 1965.
168. Perrott, Washington Post, May 15, 1966.
169. "Prosperity Blurs Apartheid's Goal," New York Times, April 14, 1966.
170. This tactic leaves members free, but bars them from engaging in political activity. Washington Post, August 8, 1965.
171. The United Party has forsaken its once-liberal tradition to become a reasonable facsimile of the Nationalist Party. Composed of persons of English descent, it had initially acted as a counterweight to the Afrikaner influence, then moved closer to the Nationalist position under the pressures of racialistic politics. The recent action of the white Rhodesians brought the two even closer; the United Party was more vociferous than Verwoerd in support of the rebellion. Margery Perham, "The Rhodesian Crisis: The Background," International Affairs, Vol. 42, No. 1, January 1966, p. 12.

172. New York Times, April 1, 1966.
173. Africa Report, Vol. 3, No. 10, November 1964, P. 23.
174. Jack Halpern, South Africa's Hostages (Baltimore: Penguin, 1965), p. 366.
175. New York Times, July 30, 1965. Washington Post, August 19, 1965.
176. John Mander, "South Africa: Revolution? Partition?", Encounter, October 1963, p. 18.
177. See below section 3, "International Conflict Potentials."
178. U.S., Department of State, World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations (Washington: 1966), p. 131.
179. See below.
180. A discussion of the distribution of military power in Africa is presented in Chapter V, section A.
181. Wood, op. cit., pp. 16-17.
182. The judgment read that Ethiopia and Liberia did not have "a legal right or interest regarding the subject matter of their claims," and the case was hereby dismissed. Africa Report, Vol. 11, No. 7, October 1966, p. 47.
183. See Chapter V, Chart V-2.
184. Particularly bitter is the feuding between Angolan exiles and the rival factions from Rhodesia; a fight between over 300 ZANU and ZAPU supporters in Zambia had to be suppressed by police. E.g., see Africa Research Bulletin, Political, Social and Cultural Series, Vol. 3, 1966, pp. 497B, 598C, 557C, 578C.
185. The Benguela route, which had to be improved for use, now is the major outlet for Zambia's vital copper industry. It also passes through a white dominated region and might be interdicted in any general confrontation. Geoffrey Taylor, "Zambia Looks For Other Roads to Sea," The Guardian, June 18, 1966.
186. This and the following statistics on employment are from Richard P. Stevens, and Leslie Rubin, "The High Commission Territories: What now?" Africa Report, Vol. 9, No. 4, April 1964, pp. 9-17.
187. Nielsen, op. cit., p. 31.

NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

1. The so-called Brazzaville group; the Casablanca powers; and the Monrovia group consisting of the Brazzaville states and certain moderate African states. The significance of these three groups is discussed in section B of this chapter.
2. The following discussion is based on Michael Crowder, "Independence as a Goal in French West African Politics: 1944-60" in William H. Lewis (ed.), French-Speaking Africa: The Search for Identity (New York: Walker and Co., 1965), pp. 15-41.
3. After Mali joined, the enlarged Guinea-Ghana union was renamed the Union of African States in April 1961.
4. The following discussion draws upon Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Patterns and Catalysts in Regional Integration," International Organization, Vol. 19, Autumn 1965. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "From Common Market to Federation," Africa Report, Vol. 8, No. 8, August 1963. "Strains in East Africa," New York Times, August 29, 1965.
5. Aaron Segal, "Where is Tanzania Heading?" Africa Report, Vol. 10, No. 9, October 1965, p. 16.
6. For a more detailed discussion, see John Marcum, "How Wide is the Gap Between Casablanca and Monrovia" Africa Report, Vol. 7, No. 1, January 1962, pp. 3 ff. Victor T. LeVine, "New Directions for French-Speaking Africa?" Africa Report, Vol. 10, No. 3, March 1965, pp. 7 ff. Frederick H. Gareau, "Bloc Politics in West Africa," ORBIS, Vol. 5, No. 4, Winter 1962, pp. 470-488. Thomas Hovet, Jr., Africa in the United Nations (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1963).
7. Rwanda and Togo joined the Brazzaville twelve in 1963 as members of the Union Africaine et Malgache.
8. See Chart VI-1. The term "radical" is used here to indicate a strongly anti-colonialist and pro-pan-African position. The radical states are not necessarily pro-Communist in the cold war, but more anti-West in so far as they identify western nations with colonialism. The "moderate" African states, on the other hand, are generally prepared to cooperate with western nations. They do not regard economic ties with the West as a threat of neo-colonialism as the radical states tend to do.
9. Libya and Ceylon also attended the Casablanca Conference, but were not invited to become signatories of the Charter. Although the Provisional Government of Algeria did not sign the Charter either, Algeria became identified with the radical Casablanca powers.

10. Libya and Tunisia did not attend the Lagos Conference. This loss was partly offset by the participation of Congo-L. and Tanganyika.

11. Rhodesia, as an independent state, is not recognized by the Commonwealth.

12. For a discussion of the attitudes of members toward the Commonwealth, see Maurice Zinkin, "The Commonwealth East of Suez," International Affairs, Vol. 42, No. 2, April 1966, pp. 207-218.

13. The Arab League is discussed here only with respect to its relations to Africa as a whole and as an international organization.

14. Victor D. Du Bois, "The Search for Unity in French-Speaking Black Africa," Parts I-IV, American University Field Staff West African Series, Vol. VIII, Nos. 3-6, 1965. OCAM members are: Ivory Coast, Senegal, Upper Volta, Niger, Malagasy, Togo, Gabon, Chad, Dahomey, Mauritania, Rwanda, Central African Republic, Cameroon, and Congo-Br. When Congo-L. joined OCAM in May 1965, Mauritania withdrew.

15. Before the founding meeting of the OAU, Nkrumah proposed the creation of a "Central Political Organization." His plan for African unity provided for the establishment of an Upper House and a Lower House, the formulation of a common foreign policy, common economic development planning, a common currency, and a central bank, and the creation of a common defense system.

16. Helen Kitchen (ed.), A Handbook of African Affairs (New York: Praeger, 1964), pp. 263-264.

17. The role of the OAU in assisting the liberation movements is discussed in Chapter V, Section B.

18. Mauritania had withdrawn from the OCAM in June 1965 and was moving closer to the radical group. Congo-Br. was controlled by the more radical Massamba-Debat regime. Although still a member of the OCAM, Congo-Br. took a militantly anti-colonial position in foreign policy. Somali had, in fact, already broken relations with Great Britain in March 1963. It now stated that in view of the Rhodesia issue, the Somali Government could not be expected to restore diplomatic ties with Britain.

NOTES TO CHAPTER V

1. The term "inter-African subversion" in this chapter refers to subversion conducted by African states north of the Zambesi against another independent African state. It does not include the subversive activities directed against the white dominated states, nor subversion which is predominantly Communist in character. The former is discussed in section B of this chapter and the latter in Chapter III.
2. See Map V-1 and Chart V-I. Statistics mentioned in this section are based on David Wood, The Armed Forces of African States (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1966).
3. Wood, op. cit., p. 4.
4. The internal stability problems which emanate from the social, economic, and political domination of the native majorities in the Republic of South Africa, Rhodesia, Angola, and Mozambique are treated in detail in Chapter III, Section E. This section deals only with the over-all relationship of these states with the rest of Africa.
5. Chart V-2 lists the major liberation movements, their founding date, origin, and other details.
6. Its 1966 membership: Ethiopia, Guinea, Algeria, Congo-L., Nigeria, Senegal, UAR, Tanzania, Zambia, Uganda, and Somali.
7. Expressed in the Preamble and Articles II and III of the OAU Charter.
8. The UAR and Cuba have also trained freedom fighters. See, for example, Col. Donald H. Humphries, The East African Liberation Movement (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1965), p. 5.
9. "News in Brief, January 11-February 10," Africa Report, Vol. 11, No. 3, March 1966, p. 29.
10. "News in Brief, November 11-December 10," Africa Report, Vol. 11, No. 1, January 1966, p. 29.
11. I. William Zartman, "Africa's Quiet War: Portuguese Guinea," Africa Report, Vol. 9, No. 2, February 1964, p. 12.
12. Africa Report, Vol. 11, No. 1, January 1966, p. 29.
13. Diario de Noticias (Lisbon), February 5, 1966, cited in Africa Report, Vol. 11, No. 3, March 1966, p. 30.
14. John Marcum, "The Angolan Rebellion: Status Report," Africa Report, Vol. 9, No. 2, February, 1964, p. 3.

15. South African Financial Gazette, February 11, 1966.
16. Wood, op. cit., p. 27.
17. Africa Research Bulletin, Political, Social and Cultural Series, Vol. 2, No. 11, November 1-30, 1965, p. 412 A.
18. Washington Post, April 30, 1966.
19. R. J. Harrison Church, "African Boundaries" in W. Gordon East and A. E. Moodie (eds.), The Changing World: Studies in Political Geography (New York: World Book Co., 1956), pp. 744-45.
20. James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg (eds.), Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), p. 219.
21. Anthony M. Reyner, "Morocco's International Boundaries," Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 1, September 1963, pp. 313-26. I. William Zartman, "The Politics of Boundaries," Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 2, August 1965, pp. 155-73.
22. For a discussion of Spanish-Moroccan relations, see Stuart Schaar, "Hassan's Morocco," Africa Report, Vol. 10, No. 7, July 1965, p. 12.
23. Mesfim Wolde Marian, "The Background of the Ethiopian-Somalian Boundary Dispute," Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 2, July 1964, pp. 189-219.
24. Ravi L. Kapil, "On the Conflict Potential of Inherited Boundaries in Africa," World Politics, Vol. 18, No. 4, July 1966, p. 665.
25. "Wadou" simply means river bed, which caused a dispute over which "wadou" was meant. Negotiations became more complicated when experts could not find a "wadou" at all. Details of the Mali-Mauritania dispute are discussed in I. William Zartman, "A Disputed Frontier is Settled," Africa Report, Vol. 8, No. 8, August 1963, pp. 13-14.
26. A detailed consideration of the Ewe unification problem is presented by James S. Coleman, "Togoland," International Conciliation, No. 509, September 1956.
27. For a discussion of the Somali border problem, see Kapil, op. cit., pp. 656-673. John Drysdale, The Somali Dispute (New York: Praeger, 1964). Alphonse A. Castagno, "The Somali Republic in Transition," Africa Report, Vol. 7, No. 11, December 1962, pp. 7-10. Jeanne Contini, "Politics with a Difference," Africa Report, Vol. 9, No. 10, November 1964, pp. 3-8.

28. New York Times, March 1 and June 10, 1966. Washington Post, May 12, 1966. When Nkrumah was ousted, the new military government in Accra officially announced that it would stop all subversive activities against independent African states. Political refugees engaged in subversive activities were ordered to leave Ghana. New York Times, March 1, 1966.

29. Africa Report, Vol. 10, No. 6, June 1965, p. 26.

30. Ibid., Vol. 7, No. 9, October 1962, p. 30.

31. Ibid., Vol. 9, No. 11, December 1964, p. 24.

32. Africa Research Bulletin, Political, Social, and Cultural Series, Vol. 3, No. 3, March 1-31, 1966, p. 485C.

33. UPC leader Félix Moumié was even given an office right in the National Assembly building in Conakry. The Chinese Communist Embassy in Conakry had a special liaison office with the UPC. For a discussion of Communist Chinese support of the UPC through Guinea, see Richard Lowenthal, "China," in Zbigniew Brzezinski (ed.), Africa and the Communist World (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963), pp. 165-75.

34. Washington Post, May 12, 1966. Africa Report, Vol. 10, No. 6, June 1965, p. 26.

35. Washington Post, May 12, 1966.

36. Ibid. Africa Report, Vol. 10, No. 6, June 1965, p. 26.

37. Victor D. Du Bois, "The Search for Unity in French-Speaking Black Africa: Part I: The Founding of the Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache," American Universities Field Staff, West Africa Series, Vol. VIII, No. 3, June 1965, p. 20.

38. Africa Research Bulletin, Political, Social, and Cultural Series, Vol. 3, No. 3, March 1-31, 1966, p. 485b.

39. All data presented in the discussion are based on reports in the New York Times, Le Monde, and the Washington Post during 1964 and 1965. La rébellion au Congo, the white book published by the Congolese Government in December 1964 presents documentary evidence of African and Communist support to the rebels.

40. The rebellion failed for a variety of reasons. Among others: 1) there was a lack of effective leadership and there was no cohesion in the rebel movement as a whole; 2) the counter-offensive of the mercenary-led government troops became more and more effective; 3) the rebel groups fell increasingly into discredit among the local population because of their atrocities and arbitrary killings of Congolese who might oppose them or might present a potential threat

to them; 4) a number of ethnic groups participated in the rebellion, but this in itself created a counter reaction among other ethnic groups and prevented the rebellion from spreading further.

41. New York Times, April 24, 1965. London Times, April 26, 1965. It may be recalled, however, that the Sudan stopped its assistance when some of the weapons for the Congolese found their way into the hands of southern Sudanese insurgents.

42. The United States has space tracking facilities in South Africa which are important, particularly for lunar and other deep-space programs. Sudden removal of these facilities would adversely affect the progress of U.S. space programs.

43. New York Times, January 4, 1964.

44. Waldemar A. Nielsen, African Battleline (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 23.

45. Some Soviet planes carrying military equipment for the Congolese rebels flew directly to the Sudan from the Black Sea area. New York Times, December 7, 1964.

46. New York Times, December 13 and 19, 1964.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VI

1. In this connection, it is interesting to note that the U.S. Senate, while passing the Military Aid Authorization Bill for FY 1967, added a voice-vote amendment banning all military aid to Latin American military regimes that came to power by overthrowing a constitutionally elected government. New York Times, July 28, 1966. There is nothing to indicate whether the Legislative branch's criticism is applicable to African military regimes; nor is there any evidence that the Executive branch shares this opinion. A tendency to stigmatize the military regime, however, does exist in various sectors of U.S. political life.
2. See Chart VI - 1 and Map VI - 1.
3. Samuel F. Huntington (ed.), Changing Patterns of Military Politics (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 22-23.
4. Christian Science Monitor, January 16, 1963.
5. Fred Greene, "Toward Understanding Military Coups," Africa Report, Vol. 2, No. 2, February 1966, p. 11.
6. Despite the general condemnation the French government received for its Gabonese intervention, Information Minister Pierre Peyrefitte in a defense of France's action admitted that French forces had intervened at least 10 times since 1960 in six African countries. Africa Report, Vol. 9, No. 3, March 1964, p. 15.
7. On September 29, 1964, the French announced a planned reduction of their troops in Africa from 27,800 to 6,600, and alluded to a more restrictive interpretation of the defense agreements. Africa Report, Vol. 9, No. 10, November 1964, p. 21. The British, except for training troops and a small detachment in Zambia, have essentially disengaged themselves militarily from the continent. David Wood, The Armed Forces of African States (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1966), p. 27.
8. Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 240.
9. Special Operations Research Office, Area Handbook for the Republic of the Sudan (Washington: 1966), p. 314.
10. Africa Report, Vol. 8, No. 10, November 1963, p. 46.
11. New York Times, August 14, 1965.
12. Africa Report, Vol. 8, No. 9, October 1963, p. 5.
13. William H. Friedland and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr. (Eds.), African

Socialism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), pp. 160 ff.

14. Africa Report, Vol. 8, No. 1, January 1963, p. 30.

15. M. J. V. Bell, Army and Nation in Sub-Saharan Africa (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1965), p. 3.

16. The Togolese army even in 1964 numbered only 300, the smallest in Africa. Gabon, with only 1/3 the population had an army twice this size (and a defense budget allocation over six times as generous). Neville Brown and W. F. Gutteridge, The African Military Balance (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1964).

17. E.g., Helen Kitchen, "Filling the Togo Vacuum," Africa Report, Vol. 8, No. 2, February 1963, p. 9.

18. Ibid. The President reportedly was killed only because he himself had fired upon his would-be arrestors.

19. The French assisted materially in the initial expansion from 250 to 750. Washington Post, March 8, 1963.

20. Africa Report, Vol. 8, No. 9, October 1963, p. 22.

21. Bahri, Mohammed, "One View of Congo Brazzaville," Jeune Afrique (Tunis), August 8, 1965, as translated in Africa Report, Vol. 10, No. 9, October, 1965.

22. Actually the actions of French troops stationed there (they were deployed to protect government offices and vital installations) won cautious approval, even from the Ghanaian government. Africa Report, Vol. 8, No. 9, October 1963, p. 22.

23. Le Monde, December 28, 1965.

24. Wood, op. cit., p. 31.

25. On January 7, five days before the Zanzibar coup, President Nyerere had issued a strongly-worded memo revoking the 1962 Africanization law and calling for an end to discrimination in favor of Africans in the civil service. On the same day President Obote of Uganda had made a policy address alluding to a single-party system. There were probably undercurrents of dissatisfaction antedating the mutinies by several weeks.

26. The British Government refused to enter the Zanzibar situation although it did assist in evacuations, etc. The Sultan's government had earlier declined to sign a mutual defense treaty with Britain, a decision it no doubt regretted.

27. New York Herald Tribune, February 20, 1964.

28. The French finally dispatched a special mission to the Eastern Region where Vice-President Yembit was campaigning. However, Ronald Matthews, in an account of the interventions, points out that in view of the time and distance factors involved, such a request could not have been signed before the French counter coup was launched. African Powder Keg (London: Chattus and Windus, 1965), pp. 125 ff.

29. David Ottaway, "Ben Bellaism Without Ben Bella," New York Times, January 16, 1966.

30. Lorna Hahn, "Politics and Leadership in North Africa," Orbis, Vol. 9, No. 3, Fall 1965, p. 731.

31. Peter Braestrup and David Ottaway, "In Algeria It's Not 'Yah, Yah, Boumedienne!' But 'Wait and See.'" New York Times Magazine, February 13, 1966, p. 59.

32. William H. Lewis, "Algeria Changes Course," Africa Report, Vol. 10, No. 10, November 1965, p. 9.

33. Patrick Seale in Washington Post, July 10, 1966.

34. Catherine Hoskyns, The Congo Since Independence (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 236.

35. Mohammed Bahri, "Cinq pays forgent l'Armée de l'unité," Jeune Afrique, (Tunis), January 16, 1966. Italy is training aviators; Israel, paratroopers; Canada, communications technicians; Belgium is responsible for training at the service schools and for the organization of the headquarters. The U.S. gave material support.

36. Four former ministers were hanged before the public on June 2, 1966 on charges of plotting against the Mobutu Government.

37. Gen. S. L. A. Marshall, "Black Soldiers' Burden," Army, August 1961, p. 27. Mohammed Bahri, "Mobutu et la rébellion," Jeune Afrique, December 26, 1965.

38. Jeune Afrique, January 16, 1966.

39. L'Aube Nouvelle, November 21, 1965.

40. Justin Vieyra, "L'Afrique des coups d'état," Jeune Afrique (Tunis), December 12, 1965.

41. "We are neither a provisional government nor a transitional government." Le Monde, June 30, 1966.

42. West Africa, January 1, 1966, p. 20. This arrangement, worked out as a compromise between the two southern factions, had actually exacerbated tensions, and led to disagreements over recognition of

Red China, government appointments, etc. A dispute over a court appointment, in fact, led to the PDD's split in November.

43. Philippe Decraene, "Dahomey: prétoriens et intellectuels de gauche," Le Monde, June 30, 1966.

44. A report by the Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs made the rare admission that the economic situation was "dramatic and catastrophic," and that Dahomey was the only African country where the economy had not progressed since independence. Le Moniteur Africain du Commerce et de l'Industrie, March 16, 1966.

45. Victor LeVine, "Insular Problems of an Inland State," Africa Report, Vol. 10, No. 10, November 1965, p. 18.

46. Philippe Decraene in Le Monde, January 22, 1966.

47. La Libre Belgique, January 6, 1966.

48. See section B. of this chapter.

49. Donald Loucheim in Washington Post, January 9, 1966.

50. West Africa, February 12, 1966.

51. Jeune Afrique, January 30, 1966.

52. Upper Volta has virtually no industry; 95% of its people eke out an existence on the 7% of the land that is cultivated.

53. Le Monde, February 12, 1966.

54. Agence Tchadienne de Presse (Ft. Lamy), July 27, 1966, as reported in Africa Research Bulletin, Political, Social and Cultural Series, Vol. 3, No. 7, July 1-31, 1966, p. 574B.

55. The north-south divisions between traditional Moslem tribes and a progressive Christian minority is discussed in Chapter II; the tribal differences, between the Northern Hausa, the Eastern Ibo, and the Western Yoruba, are coincident with regional and religious divisions. They are discussed in Chapter III, Section C, and at greater length in this Chapter, Section B.

56. Claire Sterling, "Can Nigeria Catch up With her Reputation?" Reporter, May 19, 1966, p. 41.

57. Special Operations Research Office, Area Handbook for Nigeria (Washington: 1961), p. 554.

58. Ibid., p. 562.

59. Martin Kilson, "Behind the Nigerian Revolt," The New Leader, January 31, 1966, p. 9.

60. Ibid., p. 12.
61. The New York Times, June 6, 1966, reports over 115 Ibos slain and over 500 injured in one week.
62. Washington Post, January 19, 1966.
63. New York Times, January 19, 1966.
64. New York Times, April 3, 1966. Washington Post, March 8, 1966.
65. A painstaking attempt to determine the extent of the attrition among Hausa and Ibo officers was hopelessly inconclusive. Both western and European news sources reported divergent and contradictory figures, -- all from "usually reliable sources" -- making all accounts suspect. It would seem generally true, however, that of the approximately 80-90 field-grade officers, which had included about a dozen Hausas and around 30 Ibos, at least half are either dead or missing, and of the 150-200 Ibos in the entire officer contingent between 30 (confirmed) and 124 (estimated) have been killed.
66. Sterling, op. cit., p. 40.
67. Irving Markovitz, "The Winter of Discontent," Africa Report, Vol. 11, No. 4, April 1966, p. 10.
68. General Ankrah's broadcast to the nation, Radio Accra, February 28, 1966, as reported in Africa Research Bulletin, Political, Social and Cultural Series, Vol. 3, No. 2, February 1-28, 1966, p. 467B.
69. Jon Kraus, "The Men in Charge," Africa Report, Vol. 11, No. 4, April 1966, p. 17.
70. Lloyd Garrison, "Exit Nkrumah," New York Times Magazine, April 3, 1966, p. 118.
71. Kraus, op. cit., p. 20. This event precipitated General Ankrah's forced "retirement" from the army.
72. Dr. Conor Cruise O'Brien, quoted in New York Times, February 25, 1966.
73. Colin Legum, "Socialism in Ghana: A Political Interpretation," African Socialism, op. cit., p. 133.
74. African Research Bulletin, Political, Social and Cultural Series, Vol. 3, No. 2, February 1-28, 1966, p. 468B.
75. See below section B.
76. See Lloyd Garrison, "Ghana Uncovers Nkrumah's African Spy Network," New York Times, June 10, 1966. See also New York Times, March 14 and 18, 1966.

77. Garrison, New York Times Magazine, April 3, 1966, p. 118.
78. Africa Research Bulletin, Political, Social and Cultural Series, Vol. 3, No. 2, February 1-28, 1966, p. 467C.
79. Le Monde, June 30, 1966.
80. Problèmes Africaines, (Brussels), No. 327, March 3, 1966, p. 3.
81. Graham Hovey, New York Times, March 3, 1966.
82. William H. Friedland, "Organizational Chaos and Political Potential," Africa Report, Vol. 10, No. 6, June 1965, p. 12.
83. Many labor leaders came to rival even the Communists in their proselytizing zeal, causing a remarkable "warning" from a leading Communist theoretical journal, the World Marxist Review, against regarding themselves as the sole vanguard force in the African national liberation revolution. Ibrahim Zakharia and Cuthbert Magigwana, "Trade Unions and the Political Scene in Africa," December 1964.
84. Africa Report, Vol. 4, No. 2, February 1959, p. 13.
85. Kitchen, Africa Report, February 1963, op. cit., p. 8.
86. Decraue, op. cit., p. 1.
87. On May 9, 1966, a list of demands submitted by union leaders, received Soglo's assurance that they would be considered, although a month previously he had gone on record as opposing such measures. Africa Report, Vol. 11, No. 6, June 1966, p. 40.
88. Washington Post, January 3, 1966.
89. West Africa, July 16, 1966, p. 796.
90. Area Handbook for the Republic of the Sudan, op. cit., p. 313.
91. Africa Report, Vol. 8, No. 10, November 1963, p. 18.
92. Ibid., p. 17.
93. While it is natural for Communist sources to explain Nkrumah's misfortune in terms of a capitalist conspiracy against cocoa prices (see V. Sidenko, "Ghana: the coup and the Imperialists," New Times (Moscow), March 9, 1966, p. 15), western sources also have stressed the importance of the loss of this market. E.g. Alan Rake, "Ghana's Economic Crisis," Africa Report, Vol. 10, No. 3, March 1965, p. 48. New York Times, March 1, 1966.
94. Africa Report, Vol. 10, November 1965, p. 37.

95. New York Times, January 2, 1966.
96. Togo Presse, January 3-5, 1966 and Afrique Nouvelle, January 6-13, 1966, as reported in Africa Research Bulletin, Political, Social and Cultural Series, Vol. 3, No. 1, January 1-31, 1966.
97. Washington Post, July 10, 1966; Braestrup and Ottaway, op.cit., p. 54.
98. In 1963-4 (latest figures available) existing state enterprises operated at only 29% of their productive capacity. Yet plans were made to go ahead with 25 or more projected new industries. New Statesman, March 11, 1966, p. 336.
99. Ghanaian Times, March 3, 1966.
100. The Ben Bella regime, although charged with "deviation," "fumbling," "narcissism" and "an incoherent ensemble of improvised measures," escaped the charge of corruption.
101. Lloyd Garrison, "Corruption the Main Enemy," New York Times, February 4, 1965.
102. Ibid.
103. W. Arthur Lewis, "Beyond African Dictatorship; the Crisis of the One-Party State," Encounter, August 1965, p. 3.
104. Dieter Lindenlaub, "Putsch ohne sozialen Umbruch," Neues Afrika, No. 3, March 1964, p. 87.
105. Joseph Kraft, "African Dominoes," Washington Post, January 19, 1966.
106. Le Monde, May 9, 1966.
107. See e.g., Le Monde, January 5, 1966. Wall Street Journal, February 25, 1966. Guardian, February 26, 1966.
108. Although Le Monde (January 4, 1966) felt the coup was designed primarily "to modify the course of a foreign policy judged too adventurous by some," the same article went on to show that the "cooperation" between CPR Ambassador Yung Meng and MESAN officials was not so much the result of ideology as it was opposition to Dacko.
109. Victor LeVine in a letter to Africa Report, Vol. 11, No. 4, April 1966, p. 8.
110. Washington Post, January 3, 1966. New York Times, January 3, 1966.
111. W. H. Lewis, "Algeria Changes Course," Africa Report, Vol. 10 No. 10, November 1965, p. 14.

112. Braestrup and Ottaway, op. cit., p. 54.
113. Information Minister Bachir Boumaza on July 30, 1965, Africa Report, Vol. 10, No. 7, October 1965, p. 38.
114. Philippe Ben, Le Soir, June 22, 1965.
115. Lloyd Garrison, "Nkrumah's African Spy Network," New York Times, June 10, 1966.
116. J. Russell Boner, "Turbulent Africa," Wall Street Journal, February 25, 1966.
117. Finer, op. cit., pp. 55 ff.
118. Braestrup and Ottaway, op. cit., p. 58.
119. Africa Report, Vol. 11, No. 3, March 1966, p. 23.
120. Le Monde, January 11, 1966.
121. New York Times, June 30, 1966.
122. New York Times, June 29, 1966.
123. Ibid.
124. Ghanaian Times, March 18, 1966.
125. Rene Lemarchand, "Nation-building in Tanzania," Africa Report, Vol. 10, No. 2, February 1965, p. 13.
126. "Dr. Banda's Private Army," The Yorkshire Post, January 6, 1966.
127. Washington Post, March 1, 1966.
128. Philippe Decraene, "Ghana: des officiers qui ont la faveur du peuple," Le Monde, July 2, 1966.
129. Ibid.
130. Finer, op. cit., p. 47.
131. Kraus, op. cit., p. 18.
132. Fred Greene, Africa Report, February 1966, p. 11, warns that civic action programs can lead to military corruption and inefficiency. He also cautions that "foreign advisers who stress the importance of the military's role in nation-building may inadvertently be encouraging the army to judge its record -- and its hopes -- against that of a lackluster regime." These programs can further detract from the country's security capabilities in the face of possible threats

and thereby encourage the military to take matters into its own hands. Hugh Hanning, "The Peaceful Uses of Military Forces," Survival, January 1966, pp. 28 ff., sets forth a more positive view. He maintains that civic action programs are beneficial because of the material gains achieved (roads, schools, etc.) and the closer contacts which soldiers have with the people.

133. Braestrup and Ottaway, op. cit., p. 59.

134. William Gutteridge, "The Year of the Generals," Guardian, February 9, 1966, p. 5.

135. Hanning, op. cit., p. 30.

136. Pierre Van den Berghe, "The Role of the Army in Contemporary Africa," Africa Report, Vol. 10, No. 3, March 1965, p. 16.

137. Bell, op. cit., p. 5.

138. Ibid.

139. "Phoney War," West Africa, March 26, 1966, p. 343.

140. New York Times, March 1, 1966.

141. In 1964 the Mid-Western Region was carved out of the Western Region. A mixture of tribes led by the Bini, Itsekiri, and Urhobo live in the Mid-Western Region.

142. The Yorubu are at the moment not a party to the confrontation, although it was in the Western Region that seeds of the conflict were sown. The split between progressive and conservative Yoruba, which also follows a North-South configuration, made it more difficult for the tribe to align with either the Hausa or Ibo.

143. Ruth Morgenthau, Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa, (Clarendon: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 316.

144. Ibid.

145. Bell, op. cit., p. 7.

146. See Chapter III, Section D.

147. Louchheim, Washington Post, March 7, 1966.

148. Finer, op. cit., p. 240. Latin America in 1947-8 and the Middle East in 1957-8, provide additional examples.

149. The Togolese rebels were both surprised and confused by their unexpected success. Kitchen, Africa Report, February 1963, p. 7.

150. Garrison, New York Times Magazine, April 3, 1966, p. 118.
151. Time, June 10, 1966, p. 42.
152. See Chart VI - 2.
153. See Colin Legum, "Can the Military Do It in Africa?" Current, April 1966, pp. 33 ff.
154. Africa Research Bulletin, Political, Social and Cultural Series, Vol. 2, No. 11, November 1-30, 1965, p. 397C.
155. Africa Report, Vol. 10, No. 9, October 1965, p. 38.
156. Francis Monheim, Mobutu; l'homme seul (Brussels: Editions Actuelles, 1962), pp. 151-67.
157. Philippe Decraene, "Dahomey; prétoriens et intellectuels de gauche," Le Monde, June 30, 1966.
158. Le Monde, June 30, 1966.
159. Philippe Herreman, Le Monde, June 22, 1965.
160. Lewis, op. cit., p. 10.
161. Le Monde, July 1, 1966.
162. Garrison, New York Times Magazine, April 3, 1966, p. 119.
163. Ibid., p. 33.
164. New York Times, November 27, 1965.
165. Africa Report, Vol. 8, No. 9, October 1963, p. 21.
166. See discussion above in this section.
167. West Africa, July 9, 1966.
168. Graham Hovey, "Washington's Opportunity in Today's Africa," New York Times, May 9, 1966.
169. Bell, op. cit., p. 6.
170. New York Times, September 2, 1966.
171. Le Monde, September 4, 1966. Ibid., October 8, 1966.
Washington Post, October 16, 1966.
172. Col. Nasser is an obvious exception, but Nasser is more identified with the Middle East than with Africa.

173. For a discussion of military professionalism, see Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 7-18, 59-79.

174. Bell, op. cit., p. 10.

175. In the Sudan, for example, small "factions" made four armed attempts to replace the incumbent military regime.

176. General Ironsi was able to make fewer public appearances as time went on, and was rumored to have spent the evenings on a naval vessel as a precaution against coup attempts. Le Monde, July 5, 1966.

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